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The World Wide Web gradually becomes an essential part of our daily life
in the digital age. The web architecture used to be a client-server model, in
which clients (or browsers) request and fetch web contents, such as HTML,
JavaScript and CSS, from web servers. Recently peer-to-peer (P2P) techniques
have been introduced into the web infrastructure, which empower browsers to
directly communicate with each other and form a P2P web overlay. On one
hand, this web overlay decentralizes the web to provide better availability of
web resources and efficiency of transferring these resources. On the other hand,
this also brings the open and unsolved problems like privacy issues to the new
web architecture. In this thesis, we analyze privacy and robustness issues in web
overlays, and propose solutions to address these issues using cryptographic and
hardware primitives.
First, we present inference attacks in peer-assisted content delivery networks
(CDNs) on top of web overlays, which can infer user’s online activities such
as browsing history. To thwart such attacks, we propose an anonymous peer-
assisted CDN (APAC), which employs onion-routing techniques to conceal
users’ identities and uses region-based circuit selection algorithm to reduce per-
formance overhead. Second, previous studies have shown that a global adver-
sary is realistic, and it can reveal users’ online activities (or access patterns) us-
ing long-term traffic analysis. Against such adversaries, we design an oblivious
peer-to-peer content sharing system (OBLIVP2P), which uses new primitives
such as distributed oblivious RAM (ORAM) in the P2P setting.
Lastly, we propose solutions to ensure the robustness of P2P primitives, as
all the utilities and security / privacy properties provided by P2P protocols (in-
cluding the aforementioned two protocols) are relied on the robustness of the
correct execution of these protocols. Recent evidence suggests that malicious
(or byzantine) nodes can easily join the open P2P systems and perniciously dis-
ix
rupt the execution of the given protocol to weaken the core utility (e.g., Bitcoin)
or the anonymity guarantee (e.g., Tor). To ensure the robustness of protocols
against such byzantine adversaries in contrast to the honest-but-curious ones
in the prior two works, we leverage a new hardware primitive, Intel software
guard extensions (SGX). By enforcing our properties, we reduce the byzantine
model to the general-omission model, where byzantine nodes have no extra ad-
vantage than omitting messages. We further propose new algorithms realizing
two fundamental primitives and improve the efficiency of P2P protocols in the
synchronous setting. For future work, we are planning to leverage SGX fea-
tures to re-design OBLIVP2P to achieve decentralization and better throughput
with low latency against byzantine adversaries. Furthermore, we can integrate
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The World Wide Web (or the web) provides assorted web resources and services
for users to conduct essential activities online, such as reading news, paying
bills and accessing medical records. In our digital era, the web has become an
integral part of everyone’s daily life. The traditional web architecture adopts
the client-server model, where a web browser sends requests and retrieves web
contents from a web server. The server is responsible for hosting all the web
resources and delivering relevant resources to clients for every request.
This way, the server becomes the centralized bottleneck, which is a ma-
jor factor influencing the efficiency of fetching resources for clients. To ad-
dress such challenge, conventional CDN operators, e.g., Akamai [1] and Cloud-
Flare [11], distribute web contents around the world-wide servers (dubbed edge
servers) for faster loading of content resources. CDN operators can increase the
geo-density of edge servers up to an extent (e.g., placing edge servers in ma-
jor cities of various countries), but fetching resources for users far away from an
edge server has major latency. In the meantime, owing to the tremendous cost of
renting CDN servers, small companies cannot afford a large-scale deployment
(say worldwide) of servers. To resolve these issues, various approaches have
been proposed utilizing proxies or client-side software as CDN servers to deliver
resources to clients [2, 33, 37, 45, 57, 62, 130, 134, 135, 149, 218, 222, 228, 231].
1
Previous studies have shown advantages of such peer-assisted CDNs systems:
they can significantly reduce the cost of all parties including Internet Service
Providers (ISPs) [147, 156]. For example, NetSession has over 25 million users
in 239 countries and territories, and offloads 70−80% of the traffic to peers
without the trade-off of reliability [232].
With the recent advances of peer-to-peer (P2P) techniques (supported by
real-time communications [59]) in web browsers, browsers can also serve as
CDN servers to deliver the fetched contents to other browsers, which helps to
offload the burden of servers and improve the efficiency of data transfer. These
P2P techniques empower browsers to directly communicate with each other for
data transmission, such as voice / video streaming. As a result, browsers act both
as clients to send requests for resources and as servers to provide web contents.
Users can retrieve web contents from multiple browsers simultaneously, instead
of the centralized server in the traditional model. This evolves the web from the
client-server model towards a new peer-to-peer model, which decentralizes the
web to provide better availability of web resources. Following the new trend
of pursuing the peer-to-peer (P2P) web, mainstream browsers, such as Google
Chrome, Firefox and Internet Explorer, have already supported real-time com-
munication (RTC) [27,59], which enables one browser to directly communicate
with another, forming a web overlay consisting of browsers as peers in a P2P
network. Moreover, various emerging browsers, including Maelstrom from Bit-
Torrent [28] and Mist from Ethereum [29], are designed to be decentralized and
support peer-to-peer communication.
However, web overlays bring not only the benefits of P2P techniques, but
also new threats. A web overlay can be abstracted as a P2P network, in which
browsers are the nodes connecting to others. Thus, the open problems in P2P
systems, such as privacy issues, are introduced into web overlays. One of most
critical threats is that due to the open (permissionless) nature of the new web
infrastructure, malicious nodes (or browsers) can easily join an overlay by con-
2
necting to another browser. Joining as legitimate peers in the overlay, malicious
nodes can either passively monitor the traffic to infer a benign user’s online ac-
tivities (e.g., requesting particular resources), or behave arbitrarily to disrupt the
execution of the given protocol. For instance, in a web overlay or a peer-assisted
CDN, a user’s online activities such as sending / requesting personalized web
pages and relevant resources are exposed to the other peers. Revealing a user’s
browsing history will significantly leak the user’s privacy. For example, a user’s
digital identity can be revealed when visiting social network websites [226];
visiting map service/political websites reflects a user’s geolocation/political ori-
entation [152]. Moreover, long-term traffic analysis through global monitor (i.e.,
observing all traffic of the whole network) is feasible in real P2P systems. For
example, many copyright-enforcement organizations and service providers are
reported to globally monitor BitTorrent traffic to identify illegal actions. It has
been shown that monitoring of BitTorrent traffic can reveal the data sent and re-
quested by the peers in the network [164, 200, 212]. Therefore, users in various
P2P systems have a risk of leaking private information (such as the resources
they upload or download) to a global adversary.
In the meantime, the robustness of P2P protocols is the basis of the core util-
ities and security / privacy properties provided by these protocols. However, the
presence of malicious (byzantine) adversaries is a major security concern in P2P
systems, as they can perform malicious behaviors, like forging, delaying and
dropping messages, to disrupt the protocol execution (robustness). For example,
recently, researchers have demonstrated that in a popular cryptocurrency — Bit-
coin — byzantine nodes can collude to eclipse or partition the honest nodes lead-
ing to double-spending and selfish mining attacks [146,189]. Further, byzantine
nodes in anonymous P2P networks can become the entry and exit nodes of an
honest node’s communication circuit, by advertising high-bandwidth connec-
tions and high-uptimes falsely [70]. These byzantine entry/exit nodes can se-
lectively deny service or severely weaken the core anonymity properties of such
3
systems as Tor, Cashmere and Hydra-Onions [47, 84].
To preserve privacy, like hiding their online traces, users typically employ
anonymous networks to conceal their digital identities. These anonymous sys-
tems include Mix network [100,117,183], Onion-routing/Tor-based systems [64,
123, 150, 204, 223], and other P2P anonymous systems [136, 178, 179, 187, 205,
207], which allow a user to be anonymous, so that the user is unidentifiable
within a set of users [199]. However, these existing applications rarely im-
pose stringent performance demands, such as in a real-time caching system.
Their primary goal is to preserve a high level of anonymity. Directly adopt-
ing these approaches may introduce non-negligible performance overhead for
clients, e.g., the client-side communication overhead for circuit setup in onion
routing-based and Crowds-based systems. On the other side, these anonymous
systems are susceptible to long-term traffic analysis, such as intersection or sta-
tistical disclosure attacks [63, 159] and end-to-end correlation attacks [49, 51].
Furthermore, these systems only consider passive adversaries but not malicious
(or byzantine) nodes, which can arbitrarily forge, delay, replay and drop mes-
sages to violate the given protocols and weaken the privacy guarantee [47, 84].
Therefore, designing robust P2P protocols continues to be an important research
problem due to the attacks possible in a byzantine setting.
Thesis Statement. The emerging web architecture that is based on web over-
lays results in new privacy and robustness issues. In this thesis, we design new
privacy-preserving P2P systems and robust P2P protocols using cryptographic
/ hardware primitives to resolve these issues.
Specifically, in this thesis, we aim to answer the following research ques-
tions: What are the real-world attacks on privacy in web overlays? How to
preserve adequate privacy as well as balance performance overhead in web over-
lays? Can we design privacy-preserving P2P systems against honest-but-curious
adversaries with global views? Further, can we devise robust P2P protocols
against byzantine adversaries?
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Our Approach. We first employ onion-routing techniques by adding interme-
diate hops in between browsers (users) to enable a user to be unidentifiable
among a set of users [150]. With preserving anonymity of users, we also pro-
pose region-based circuit selection algorithm to achieve desired performance
gains. Second, to hide access patterns of users (or links between users and re-
sources) against long-term traffic analysis of global adversaries, which the first
system APAC does not provide, we propose OBLIVP2P– a construction for a
scalable distributed ORAM protocol in the P2P setting [153]. Lastly, in contrast
to dealing with passive adversaries, we ensure the robustness of P2P protocols
against active adversaries (or byzantine nodes), which are not handled by APAC
and OBLIVP2P. We leverage a recent trusted computing mechanism, called In-
tel SGX, to reduce the byzantine model into the general-omission model, in
which faulty nodes can only omit to send / receive messages [154]. We show
two examples of fundamental P2P protocols are realizable securely using SGX
features. Since our approaches are generic and these issues are common in
conventional P2P systems, our solutions can also be smoothly ported to P2P
systems.
1.1 Thesis Overview
Next, we present the overview of the works constituting this thesis.
1.1.1 APAC: An Anonymous Peer-assisted CDN
As the first step, we systematically study the representative applications of web
overlays called peer-assisted CDNs. We present that the current designs of peer-
assisted CDNs expose clients to privacy-invasive attacks, enabling one client to
infer the set of browsed resources of another client. To resolve this privacy
issue, we propose an anonymous peer-assisted CDN (APAC), which employs
P2P content delivery while providing initiator anonymity (i.e., hiding who sends
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the resource request) and responder anonymity (i.e., hiding who responds to the
request) for peers. Previous anonymous systems [18, 22, 48, 117, 123, 136, 179,
183, 204, 205] focus on preserving high level of anonymity, but rarely impose
stringent performance demands, such as in a real-time caching system. In con-
trast to existing works, our locality-aware APAC is tunable to select interme-
diate nodes nearby the initiator/responder, which reduces the resource fetching
time (network latency) for peers. APAC can be a web service, compatible with
current browsers and requiring no client-side changes. Our anonymity analy-
sis shows that our APAC design can preserve a higher level of anonymity than
state-of-the-art peer-assisted CDNs. In addition, our evaluation demonstrates
that APAC can achieve desired performance gains.
1.1.2 OBLIVP2P: An Oblivious P2P Content Sharing System
In APAC, the adversary is considered to be non-global, which cannot monitor
all the traffic in the network. However, a global adversary is feasible in real
P2P systems, and previous anonymous systems are susceptible to long-term
global analysis, such as intersection attacks [63, 159] and end-to-end correla-
tion attacks [49,51]. To overcome these challenges, we propose a new approach
to protecting against persistent, global traffic analysis in P2P content-sharing
systems. Our approach advocates for hiding data access patterns, making P2P
systems oblivious. We propose OBLIVP2P— a construction for a scalable dis-
tributed ORAM protocol, usable in a real P2P setting. Our protocol achieves
the following results. First, we show that our construction retains the (linear)
scalability of the original P2P network w.r.t the number of peers. Second, the
experiments simulating about 16,384 peers on 15 Deterlab nodes can process
up to 7 requests of 512KB each per second, suggesting usability in moderately
latency-sensitive applications as-is. The bottlenecks remaining are purely com-
putational (not bandwidth). Third, the experiments confirm that in our construc-
tion, no centralized infrastructure is a bottleneck — essentially, ensuring that the
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network and computational overheads can be completely offloaded to the P2P
network. Finally, the construction is highly parallelizable, which implies that
remaining computational bottlenecks can be drastically reduced if OBLIVP2P
is deployed on a network with many real machines.
1.1.3 Robust Synchronous P2P Primitives Using SGX Enclaves
In APAC and OBLIVP2P, we consider that an adversary can only passively
monitor the traffic in the network, but in real scenarios, malicious (byzantine)
nodes can easily join the network and perform arbitrarily, like disrupting the
execution of the given protocol. Peer-to-peer (P2P) systems such as BitTor-
rent, Bitcoin, APAC and OBLIVP2P, are susceptible to serious attacks from
byzantine nodes that join as peers. Due to well-known impossibility results
for designing P2P primitives in unrestricted byzantine settings, research has ex-
plored many adversarial models with additional assumptions, ranging from mild
(such as pre-established PKI) to strong (such as the existence of common ran-
dom coins). One such widely-studied model is the general-omission model,
which yields simple protocols with good efficiency, but has been considered im-
practical or unrealizable since it artificially limits the adversary only to omitting
messages.
In this work, we study the setting of a synchronous network wherein peer
nodes have CPUs equipped with a recent trusted computing mechanism called
Intel SGX. In this model, we observe that the byzantine adversary reduces to
the adversary in the general-omission model. As a first result, we show that by
leveraging SGX features, we eliminate any source of advantage for a byzan-
tine adversary beyond that gained by omitting messages, making the general-
omission model realizable. Second, we present new protocols that improve the
communication complexity of two fundamental primitives — reliable broadcast
and common random coins (or beacons) — over the best-known results in the
synchronous general-omission model, by utilizing SGX features. Specifically,
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we present a reliable broadcast protocol that achieves O(N2) communication
complexity in bits and worst-case N
2
+ 2 round complexity while tolerating up
to N
2
byzantine nodes. As another example, we show a protocol to generate a
distributed common random coin that can be used as a random beacon. Our
protocol that generates an unbiased random number in presence of N
3
byzantine
peers having worst-case round and communication complexity of O(logN) and
O(N logN). We present proofs of correctness and security and confirm theoret-
ical efficiency claims with experimental evaluation on over 1000 nodes, running
on 40 machines on DeterLab. We discuss the application of both these protocols
in other P2P operations, such as random walks, shared key generation, random
beacons and load balancing protocols.
Summary of Contributions:
• We systematically analyze inference attacks on real-world web overlays or
peer-assisted CDNs, i.e., Swarmify, BemTV and P2PSP. We develop an anony-
mous peer-assisted CDN (APAC) for web applications, which involves browsers
as peers to distribute content. Our prototype implementation is available on-
line [4]. From our analysis, APAC can preserve high level of initiator/respon-
der anonymity even if 35% peers are compromised. Our evaluation demon-
strates that APAC can bring desired network latency reduction for peers and
bandwidth savings for deployed sites.
• We propose OBLIVP2P— a first candidate for an oblivious peer-to-peer pro-
tocol in content sharing systems against long-term traffic analysis of global
adversaries. Our main building block is a primitive which we refer to as
oblivious selection that makes a novel use of recent advances in Oblivious
RAM combined with private information retrieval techniques. Our prototype
implementation is available online [32]. We experimentally evaluate our pro-
tocol to measure the overall throughput of our system, latency for accessing
resources and the impact of optimizations on the system throughput.
• To deal with malicious nodes, we leverage SGX features to reduce the byzan-
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tine model to the general-omission model, where byzantine nodes have no
extra advantage than omitting messages. By enforcing our properties, we can
improve the efficiency of P2P protocols. As the first attempt, we propose ef-
ficient protocols for reliable broadcast (ERB) and unbiased random number
generation (ERNG) in synchronous settings. We provide security analysis
and proof for our protocol constructions. Our prototype implementation is
open source and available online [34]. Our experimental evaluation confirms
the theoretical expectations of our solutions.
Statement of Joint Work: The development of techniques, protocols and sys-
tems presented in Chapter 3 and Chapter 5 was led by Yaoqi Jia. In addition to
Yaoqi Jia, contributors to the work presented in Chapter 3 include Guangdong
Bai, Prateek Saxena and Zhenkai Liang. Contributors in addition to Yaoqi Jia
for the work presented in Chapter 5 include Shruti Tople, Tarik Moataz, Deli
Gong, Prateek Saxena and Zhenkai Liang. The development of OBLIVP2P pro-
tocol in Chapter 4 was joint work of Yaoqi Jia, Tarik Moataz and Shruti Tople.
The development of OBLIVP2P system was led by Yaoqi Jia. The contributors
to the work presented in Chapter 4 also include Prateek Saxena.
Organization: We first discuss the background of web overlays as well as re-
lated work on privacy-preserving systems and robust P2P protocols in Chapter 2.
We present inference attacks against privacy on representatives of web overlays
(peer-assisted CDNs), and propose APAC that preserve certain privacy and bal-
ance performance overhead in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, we design OBLIVP2P
to introduce ORAM to P2P systems to conceal data access patterns for the first
time. In contrast to the honest-but-curious setting, we present using SGX fea-
tures to devise robust P2P primitives against byzantine adversaries and improve
the efficiency of existing protocols in Chapter 5. Finally, we conclude and dis-





In this chapter, we first illustrate the background of web overlays. Then we
review related work on privacy-preserving systems and robust P2P protocols
including anonymous communication systems against partial adversaries, long-
term traffic analysis of global adversaries and robust P2P primitives against
byzantine adversaries.
2.1 Web Overlays
With the advent of P2P techniques in the web infrastructure, web browsers start
to be coordinated by servers to connect with each other. Each browser can act as
a client to send requests for web resources, such as HTML and JavaScript, and
also behave like a server to deliver these resources to other browsers. In terms of
distinct P2P web applications, all the involved browsers and servers form vari-
ous web overlays, which can be abstracted as P2P networks consisting of nodes
(represented by browsers / servers) and edges (represented by connections in
between nodes). Web overlays assist servers to offload resource-delivery tasks
to browsers, improving the availability of web resources and the efficiency of
transferring these resources. With the benefits brought by P2P overlays, browser
vendors provide active and substantial support to push forward the development










Figure 2.1: Illustration of content delivery in current peer-assisted CDNs. Peer
vA sends requests to the peer server for resources R1 and R2 (in 1©). The server
responds to vA with a list of peers, e.g., vB and vC havingR1 andR2 respectively
(in 2©). vA connects with vB/vC , and fetches resources from them (in 3© 4©).
such as Chrome and IE except Safari support WebRTC [27, 59], which em-
powers browsers with P2P real-time communication. In the meantime, assorted
emerging browsers are designed to support P2P communication including Mael-
strom from BitTorrent [28] and Mist from Ethereum [29].
The representative example of web overlays is the peer-assisted CDN, en-
gaging clients (like browsers) to deliver contents to other peers. Numerous peer-
assisted CDNs have been proposed in recent years [2, 37, 45, 62, 130, 134, 135,
149, 218, 222, 228, 231]. In contrast to traditional infrastructure-based CDNs,
peer-assisted CDNs offload content delivery tasks on clients (peers) to save the
bandwidth of servers [147, 156], and reduce the latency of fetching content at
the client side. For instance, NetSession can offload 70 − 80% of the traffic
to the peers [232]. For the thorough evaluation on Etsy, Maygh is able to re-
duce the 95th-percentile bandwidth due to image content at the operator by
over 75% [231]. In peer-assisted CDNs, the peers are the clients that fetch
and distribute contents, e.g., browsers in Maygh [231] and client programs in
NetSession [2]. In such design, a peer server coordinates peers to distribute
contents. As Figure 2.1 illustrates, after communicating with the peer server,
peers can fetch contents from other nodes. To reduce the network latency, the
peer server typically assigns the initiator a peer who has the requested resource
as the responder, based on the distance between their IP addresses or geoloca-
tions (called a locality-aware peer selection algorithm). Alternatively, the server
directly responds with a list of peers having the requested content, the initiator
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Systems [64, 123, 204, 223]
7 3 7 Partially
Crowds [205], & Morphmix [207],
etc. [136, 178–181, 187]
7 3 7 7
Hidden Service [48], I2P [22] &
Freenet [18], etc. [53, 71, 148, 209]
7 3 3 7
Table 2.1: Low-latency anonymous communication systems.
will contact these peers in parallel. After receiving the content, the initiator can
serve it to other peers.
Analogous to peer-assisted CDNs, other web overlays have the similar topol-
ogy, where a coordinator server instructs peers or browsers to communicate with
each other, like BitTorrent’s tracker model.
2.2 Related Work
2.2.1 Anonymous Communication Systems Against Partial Ad-
versaries
For peer-assisted CDNs, researchers have proposed solutions to preserve the
integrity and authenticity of contents [62, 218, 231]. For example, FireCoral
introduces signing service and tracker components to authenticate and verify
contents [218]. On the other hand, adversarial nodes in the network can infer
a victim node’s browsing history, i.e., what resources the victim has requested
and served. However, no systematic studies of inference attacks on peer-assisted
CDNs have been conducted yet and few defenses against such attacks are de-
ployed on peer-assisted CDNs.
Anonymous Communication Systems. One typical way to protect a user’s
privacy (like unlinking her identity and her browsing history) is to make her
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unidentifiable among a large set of users. To achieve such anonymity, anony-
mous communication systems are often the primary choice, as they are de-
signed to hide users’ identities from third parties. Anonymous communica-
tion systems can be classified into high-latency and low-latency systems. High-
latency anonymous communication systems, e.g., Mixminion [117] and Mix-
master [183], are designed to be against a global passive adversary who can ob-
serve all traffic in the network. However, the high-latency message transmission
(e.g., several hours) makes them unsuitable to be implemented in peer-assisted
CDNs.
As Table 2.1 shows, there are four design considerations for low-latency
communication systems from the system’s perspective. No installation indicates
that an approach does not require the client to install any software. initiator /
responder anonymity means that the initiator / responder is unidentifiable among
an set of peers. A system is locality-aware if its algorithm is based on the
locations of peers. Onion routing/Tor-based systems [64, 123, 204, 223], semi-
centralized systems [85, 86], and P2P low-latency anonymous systems [18, 22,
48, 53, 71, 136, 148, 178–181, 187, 205, 207, 209] provide initiator anonymity.
For instance, MorphMix creates paths on an unstructured overlay to forward
communications; ShadowWalker is based on a random walk over redundant
structured topologies and Pisces uses social networks to achieve anonymous
communications. Further, Hidden Service [48], I2P [22], Freenet [18], and other
approaches [53, 71, 91, 148, 209] also preserve responder anonymity.
2.2.2 Long-term Traffic Analysis of Global Adversaries
In reality, apart from the partial adversary in the previous section, a global
adversary capable of performing long-term analysis in the network is proven
to exist and not rare. For instance, globally monitoring of BitTorrent traf-
fic has shown to reveal the data requested and sent by the peers in the net-
work [164,200,212]. Nevertheless, anonymous systems, like mix networks and
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onion routing, are susceptible to long-term traffic analysis as shown in Sec-
tion 4.2. Statistical disclosure attacks, proposed by Danezis and enhanced by
other researchers, improve the likelihood of de-anonymizing users on these sys-
tems [114, 116, 119, 120, 173, 175, 197, 219]. Moreover, existing traffic analysis
attacks on onion routing based approaches [127, 128, 191, 224, 225] can reveal
users’ identities with observing multiple communication rounds. Other P2P sys-
tems like Crowds [205], Tarzan [136], MorphMix [207], AP3 [178], Salsa [187],
ShadowWalker [179], Freenet [18] offer anonymity for users. However, these
systems show limits against global adversary with long-term traffic analysis ca-
pabilities.
2.2.3 Robust P2P Primitives Against Byzantine Adversaries
As one of the fundamental P2P primitives, reliable broadcast has been exten-
sively studied in the byzantine setting.
Reliable Broadcast. Reliable broadcast has been extensively studied since the
1980s, and is closely related to the problem of byzantine agreement (BA). Sev-
eral excellent surveys on the problem are available [160,220]. Byzantine agree-
ment can also achieve reliable broadcast [88,92,94,155,176,185,201,220]. For
the asynchronous network, Bracha’s classic reliable broadcast protocol requires
O(N2) communication complexity and tolerates up to N
3
byzantine nodes [89,
90]. Cachin and Tessaro [95] leverage erasure codes to improve efficiency and
reduce communication complexity. However, as the time is not bounded, mes-
sages may incur arbitrary delays, and most protocols do not guarantee terminat-
ing runs, except under some special assumptions such as sharing a “common
coin” [88, 201].
Without any extra assumptions, reliable broadcast and byzantine agreement
in the synchronous setting can tolerate N
3
byzantine nodes at most, and with
min{f + 2, t + 1} round complexity [124, 162, 195]. Lamport et al. and Pease




byzantine nodes, but with exponential communication complexity [162,195].
Berman et al. achieve O(poly(N)) communication complexity but only tol-
erating upto N
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byzantine nodes [76]. Garay et al. later present a byzantine
agreement protocol terminating within min{f + 5, t+ 1} rounds [138, 139].
To tolerate a larger fraction of byzantine nodes, additional assumptions are
often needed. A common assumption is that of having a one-time trusted dealer
that pre-deploys PKI in the infrastructure. This assumption, for instance, allows
digital signatures to be used for authentication, wherein a message claimed to be
sent by a node A can be assured to be originating from A [125, 133, 157, 162].
This weakens the capabilities of the byzantine adversary, which cannot forge
messages on behalf of honest nodes. Researchers have proposed protocols to
use digital signatures to boost the resilience from N
3
to N − 1, but the commu-
nication complexity is still large, i.e., O(exp(N)) and O(N3) [125, 162]. Katz
et al. extend the work of Feldman and Micali [132] to employ authenticated
channels, and present protocols tolerating N
2
byzantine nodes with O(poly(N))
complexity [157]. Fitzi et al. also give an authenticated BA protocol that beats
this bound (N
2
) but under specific number-theoretic assumptions [133]. Abra-




Anonymity in Peer-assisted CDNs:
Inference Attacks and Mitigation
3.1 Introduction
Web overlays are used for various systems, and peer-assisted CDNs are one of
the representative applications. The peer-assisted CDN is a new content distri-
bution paradigm supported by CDNs (e.g., Akamai), which enables clients to
cache and distribute web content on behalf of a website. Content Delivery Net-
works (CDNs) were introduced a decade ago. To distribute data to end users in
a fast way, CDN operators (e.g., Akamai [1] and CloudFlare [11]) assist sites
to deliver content to end users with their multiple data centers across the world.
Complementary to these infrastructure-based approaches, numerous CDNs have
adopted peer-to-peer techniques to distribute content, e.g., Swarmify [45], Peer-
CDN [37] Akamai NetSession [2], Squirrel [149], CoralCDN [134, 135], Flow-
erCDN [130] and Maygh [231].
On one hand, involving end users as peers (client-side CDNs) to distribute
data in peer-assisted CDNs reduces the fetching time of resources and saves
the bandwidth of CDNs’ servers. For instance, Akamai NetSession can offload
over 70% of the traffic to peers with high reliability [232]. On the other hand, in
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contrast to infrastructure-based systems in which trusted centralized servers are
deployed, untrusted peers in peer-assisted CDNs can easily join the system. The
compromised or malicious peers can then a) modify content and inject unautho-
rized content; b) delay or deny content delivery to other peers; c) misreport their
contributions to manipulate the accounting for commercial services [62, 232];
d) infer which peer they deliver/fetch a resource to/from, and what content the
peers have requested.
In practice, peer-assisted CDNs introduce various measures to tackle these
security issues. For example, to protect the authenticity and integrity of the
content in peers, FireCoral introduces the signing service to authenticate con-
tent, and peers can verify the content with the hash information supplied by
the tracker [218]. In addition, Aditya et al. proposed RCA, a reliable client
accounting system for NetSession to discover all misreportings and protocol
violations by faulty or malicious clients and quarantine these potentially col-
luding clients [62]. However, privacy leakage in peer-assisted CDNs has not
been actively studied yet, and anonymity is also seldom considered by existing
peer-assisted CDNs.
Although the majority of resources (e.g., images) served on CDNs are pub-
licly accessible for all users, a user’s online activities (e.g., visiting personalized
web pages and fetching relevant resources) have been proven to be privacy-
sensitive. For example, a user’s digital identity can be revealed when visiting
social network websites [226]; visiting map service/political websites reflects a
user’s geolocation/political orientation [152]. Revealing a user’s browsing his-
tory will significantly leak the user’s privacy. To demonstrate this threat, we
present inference attacks on peer-assisted CDNs: by placing controlled peers
and observing the requested contents in the system, the adversary can effec-
tively infer content-access activities of benign peers.
To demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed inference attacks, we con-
duct inference attacks against widely used peer-assisted CDNs, including Swarmify,
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BemTV and P2PSP. From our experiments, we find that in any of these systems,
when a peer (i.e., an initiator) sends a request for a specific resource, the server
assists the initiator to directly fetch the content from another nearby peer (i.e.,
the responder) based on locality, without any mechanism to conceal the initia-
tor’s or the responder’s identity. Therefore, the adversary who controls a num-
ber of peers is capable of mounting inference attacks on existing peer-assisted
CDNs to identify the initiator or responder of a forwarded request. Through the
observed communication, the adversary can infer the user’s browsing history
and preferences. The adversary can then use this information for spear phish-
ing, personal targeted advertisements, and social engineering attacks [163].
The primary goal of peer-assisted CDNs is to save the server’s bandwidth
and reduce client-side network latency. It is quite challenging to conceal peers’
identities (IP addresses) to mitigate inference attacks as well as to preserve
reasonable responsiveness for the deployed site. On the other hand, although
anonymous mechanisms have been well studied in communication systems [18,
22, 48, 117, 123, 136, 179, 183, 204, 205], their previous applications rarely im-
pose stringent performance demands such as in a real-time caching system.
Their primary goal (e.g., onion routing [204], Tor [123], Mixminion [117] and
Crowds [205]) is to preserve high level of anonymity. Directly adopting these
approaches may introduce non-negligible performance overhead for clients, e.g.,
the client-side communication overhead for circuit setup in onion routing-based
and Crowds-based systems. For instance, Mixminion can introduce several-hour
latency for message transmission [117].
To address these challenges, we develop an Anonymous Peer-assisted CDN
(APAC) for web applications. APAC involves client-side browsers as peers to
distribute content without requiring any software installation for users. Once
users visit the deployed site, APAC’s client-side code will assist their browsers
to join APAC as peers and serve resources to other users. APAC is compatible
with mainstream browsers and requires negligible modification on the deployed
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websites. In practice, the adversarial peers can exist uniformly in the system
or densely surround the victim. To achieve an adequate level of anonymity in
different scenarios, we introduce a new region-based circuit selection algorithm
to construct a path (denoted as circuit) consisting of peers. Our APAC encap-
sulates the request with standard layered encryption and the initiator can fetch
the content via the constructed circuit.
Our goal is not to build a perfect anonymity-preserving system, as it may
introduce huge performance overhead, but we aim to enable the system to make
trade-off between performance and anonymity, which is significantly beyond
that of current peer-assisted CDNs. Using a standard measure of degree of
anonymity [122], we show that APAC can preserve a high degree of initiator/re-
sponder anonymity (i.e., at 0.8 degree of anonymity recommended for anony-
mous communication systems by Diaz et al. [122]), with only two intermediate
peers for a circuit even if 35% of all peers are under the adversary’s control. Our
locality-aware APAC is tunable to select intermediate nodes nearby the initia-
tor/responder, which reduces the resource fetching time (network latency) for
peers. Our evaluation in a city-wide network shows that with two intermediate
peers for a circuit, APAC can reduce 44.1% client-side network latency and
save 97.3% server-side bandwidth when fetching 2 MB1 resources via peers,
with 0.8 degree of anonymity.
Contributions. Compared to regular CDN services, APAC saves the bandwidth
of the CDNs edge server, and reduces the latency for peer when the edge server
and peers are not in the same city. In contrast to single-hop peer-assisted CDNs
such as Swarmify, APAC provides an adequate level of anonymity for peers, but
it trades off the performance, e.g., network latency. In summary, we provide
the following contributions:
• We systematically analyze inference attacks on real-world services, i.e., Swarmify,
BemTV and P2PSP.
1 Since the averaged total size of transferred data when loading a site is 2268 KB [50], we










Figure 3.1: Illustration of an inference attack to infer the responder of a request.
The adversarial peer vA sends a request for a resource R to the peer server (in
1©). Based on locality, the server replies vA with the nearby victim vB having R
(in 2©). vA fetches R from vB (in 3©), thus the adversary infers that the victim








Figure 3.2: Illustration of an inference attack to infer the initiator of a request.
The user vA fetches resources from peer vB and vC which are controlled by the
adversary (in 1© 2©). Therefore, by passively observing the requests from the
victim, the adversary can determine that the victim is looking for (interested in)
the requested content.
• We develop an anonymous peer-assisted CDN (APAC) for web applications,
which involves browsers as peers to distribute content. Our prototype imple-
mentation is available online [4]. From our analysis, APAC can preserve high
level of initiator/responder anonymity even if 35% peers are compromised.
• APAC is compatible with current browsers, and requires no client-side in-
stallation. Our evaluation demonstrates that APAC can bring desired net-
work latency reduction for peers and bandwidth savings for deployed sites.
APAC can customize and balance between three considerations: anonymity,
performance and compatibility with browsers.
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3.2 Motivation & Problem Statement
3.2.1 Inference Attacks & Real-world Examples
As shown in Figure 2.1, a typical peer-assisted CDN does not conceal the ini-
tiator’s/responder’s identity (IP address) for each request. By observing the for-
warded requests from the controlled peers in the system, the adversary can effec-
tively infer the initiator/responder of each request, and further infer the victim’s
browsing history and preferences (as shown in Figure 3.1 and 3.2). We term
such attacks as inference attacks. In an inference attack, when any of the adver-
sarial peers is the responder/initiator of a request, the adversary can definitely
determine which peer is the initiator/responder of the request. By profiling a
user’s browsing history and preferences with the inference attack, the adversary
can infer the victim’s digital identity [226] and precise geolocation [152], as
well as further abuse the sensitive information for spear phishing, personally
targeted advertisements, or even social engineering attacks [163].
Inference attacks in peer-assisted CDNs have not been carefully studied.
We analyze inference attacks on three real-world services, including Swarmify,
BemTV and P2PSP, to show the prevalence and effectiveness of such attacks2.
Swarmify. Swarmify [45] assists the deployed site to deliver content to users
from other peers based on locality. It requires sites to include a service-specific
library based on WebRTC [59] and deploy optional changes on resources. Al-
though all communications between peers in Swarmify are encrypted, our study
demonstrates that it does not guarantee anonymity for peers.
We have mounted an inference attack as follows. We first deployed Swarmify
on a website and set 10 images and 2 videos as the targeted resources. For the
first time, we launched a Chrome browser as the victim’s peer. The victim’s peer
randomly fetched part of resources (unknown to the attacker) from the remote
2 Previous work [231, 232] mentions that peers can learn the IP addresses of the connect
peers in numerous peer-assisted CDNs, e.g., NetSession, FireCoral, FlowerCDN and Maygh.
Thus, these services are conceptually vulnerable to inference attacks too.
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server. To infer what content the victim has requested, we located the adver-
sarial node nearby the victim’s peer in the same local area network (LAN), and
used Wireshark [58] to eavesdrop on the network traffic from/to the controlled
node. When the malicious peer requested all resources, we clearly observed that
the peer server replied with the victim’s IP address and instructed the malicious
node to fetch particular resources from the victim’s peer. Therefore, the attacker
can infer the responder’s identity (the victim’s IP address) and what content
the responder holds. For the second time, the adversarial peer first fetched and
buffered all content from the site. When the victim’s peer requested several re-
sources, the controlled peer was instructed to distribute the particular resources
to the victim’s peer. Observing the traffic from the controlled peer, the adver-
sary identified the victim’s IP address and the requested resources. Hence we
conclude that Swarmify is vulnerable to inference attacks.
BemTV & P2PSP. BemTV [5] is a hybrid CDN and P2P infrastructure for
streaming live videos over HTTP, which is also built upon WebRTC with the aim
of utilizing clients’ web browsers to relay the streamed media files. BemTV re-
quires additional setup on the server side to manage connections between peers,
but this is completely transparent to peers.
We have tested BemTV to live-stream a sample video that had been accessed
by several computers located within a university network infrastructure. While
streaming out the media files, we observed the incoming and outgoing traffic of
requests from a computer that acted as an adversary. For each media file, the
attacker was able to figure out which specific users (determined by the mapping
of IP address) fetched/delivered the media content from/to the adversarial peer.
Based on this information, the adversary is capable of determining who is the
initiator/responder and further infer the exact video that the victim is watching.
In addition, it turns out that BemTV does not guarantee the content integrity
between peers in the network, which opens up possibilities for content pollution
attacks [137, 151, 186]. Besides BemTV, we have also carried out inference
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attacks on another video streaming service called P2PSP [35]. We find that
P2PSP suffers the same anonymity issues as BemTV does.
Key findings. Our analysis (in Section 3.6.2) reveals that existing peer-assisted
CDNs (including Swarmify, BemTV and P2PSP) cannot preserve an adequate
level of anonymity when over 20% peers in the network are malicious. Our
analysis is conservative, as we assume that the peer-assisted CDN’s server ran-
domly assigns a peer having the requested resource as the responder for the
request. In reality, if the CDN is locality-aware and instructs the peers to fetch
content from nearby peers, it is even easier for the adversary to identify the peers
near her controlled peers. Hence the existing peer-assisted CDNs provide much
worse anonymity for users than that in our conservative analysis.
3.2.2 Problem Statement
In this chapter, for a particular message (i.e., resource request), we call the peer
who initiates the request the initiator, and call the peer who responds the request
the responder. We define initiator/responder anonymity to mean that the adver-
sary cannot identify the initiator/responder among peers for a resource request.
The assumptions on the adversary are:
• Internal: The adversary controls some of peers, which are part of the system
and can observe the information about forwarded packets.
• Partial: The adversary controls a limited number of peers (e.g., a fraction f ),
and cannot perform any traffic analysis on the rest of the system.
• Non-adaptive: The adversary places nodes first, and then the system con-
structs a circuit for the request. Once the request is in progress, the adversary
cannot alter the placement of peers.
We consider an honest-but-curious adversary, which follows the protocol and
places nodes randomly in the network or nearby a victim to increase their chance
to determine whether the victim initiates/responds a request. We assume that
existing accounting mechanisms [62] can be deployed to discover protocol-
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violating peers, e.g., massively sending or delaying/denying content delivery re-
quests [62]. Sybil attacks [118,126,229] and denial-of-service attacks (DOS) [196]
are out of scope in this chapter.
The adversary’s goal is to identify the initiator/responder of a request with
high probability. At the beginning of the request, any benign peer is indistin-
guishable as the initiator/responder. When the request is in progress, the adver-
sarial peers may be chosen as hops for the request. Hence the adversary can
make some observations of the request and gain more knowledge to infer the
initiator/responder with higher probability. An anonymous system is required
to guarantee that the adversary’s observations give minimal advantage to deter-
mine the initiator/responder. Such an adversary’s advantage can be quantified
as an entropy metric — the amount of uncertainty in determining the initia-
tor/responder of a request to be a specific victim node. Considering the initiator
anonymity, we define the system’s entropy as:
Definition 3.2.1. Given a request in the system, where Ψ is the set of peers, and
pu is the probability that the peer u is the initiator of the request, the entropy




pu log2 (pu) (3.1)
If the adversary has no a priori information on the request, the system pre-
serves the maximum entropy HM . With some observations, e.g., the respon-
der is adversarial and monitors the forwarded packets, the adversary has higher
probability to infer the initiator, as well as the system’s entropy decreases. Let
O be the set of all observations for the adversary. When an observation o ∈ O
occurs with the probability P (o), the corresponding entropy is H(I|o).





P (o) ·H(I|o) (3.2)
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The advantage gained by the adversary with observation O is the differ-
ence in the entropy before and after O, that is: HM − H(I|O). The degree of
anonymity is defined as the normalized value of this difference in certainty of
the adversary’s guesses about a victim being the initiator:
Definition 3.2.3. The degree of initiator anonymity provided by a system is
defined by:






The larger D(I|O) is, the higher level of anonymity a system provides.
D(I|O) = 0 or D(R|O) = 0 means absolutely no anonymity, i.e., the adver-
sary knows with 100% the initiator or responder of a request; When the initiator
or responder is not identifiable among all peers, D(I|O) = D(R|O) = 1. To
preserve an adequate level of anonymity, the degree of anonymity for a system
is at least  ( = min{D(I|O)}). In this chapter, we set  as 0.8, which is sug-
gested by a previous study [122]. Hence, if D(I|O) and D(R|O) in a system
are over 0.8, we consider the system preserve an adequate level of initiator/re-
sponder anonymity. Analogous to H(I|O) and D(I|O), we define H(R|O) and
D(R|O) to quantify the responder anonymity in a system.
3.3 Anonymous Peer-assisted CDN
In this section, we present our anonymous CDN system APAC that provides
protections against inference attacks as well as balances the performance over-
head. To build practical anonymous peer-assisted CDNs, we have three goals
below.
Anonymity: In a peer-assisted CDN, the adversary may control a fraction f
of peers. The adversarial peers can be uniformly scattered in the network or
densely surround the victim. When a benign peer sends/responds a request to
another peer to fetch/deliver a resource, our system should conceal its identity
and the linkability to the requested resource. Therefore, other peers do not know
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who is the initiator/responder of the request.
Performance: Peer-assisted CDNs are designed to assist customers (e.g., sites)
to save bandwidth of servers and reduce latency of delivering content to users.
Our system should not sacrifice this merit. Therefore, one important goal for us
is to balance performance and anonymity.
Compatibility: Our design should introduce no (or minor) changes on websites
and clients, such that our system can be easily deployed on various web ap-
plications and is user-friendly. Compared with other peer-assisted CDNs (e.g.,
NetSession) that require the end users to install standalone software, our system
can attract more users to join as peers for content delivery.
3.3.1 Design of APAC
Overview. APAC consists of two primary components: a peer server run by the
site operator, and the client-side code implemented in JavaScript and executed
in each peer, i.e., a user’s web browser. Independent of the site’s content server
(or the CDN’s edge server), the peer server does not directly deliver content, but
maintains the connections with peers and coordinates peers to fetch data either
from the content server or other peers. At the beginning, when peers request
resources, the peer server instructs them to retrieve the content from the content
server. The peers who have retrieved the content will store it and be ready to dis-
tribute it. When the total number of joined peers and the number of peers having
resources are sufficient to preserve the required anonymity based on proper con-
figurations, the peer server will construct circuits for new requests. The server
chooses nodes based on our selection algorithm, and arranges them into a path
(or circuit), through which the request and content will be transmitted. Then
the initiators of requests fetch content from other peers via the circuits. After
receiving the content from other peers, peers first verify its integrity, then store
and serve it to other peers. We detail the functionalities and implementation in
Section 3.4. As Figure 3.3 illustrates, analogous to current peer-assisted CDNs,
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APAC Peer Server 
APAC APAC 
Figure 3.3: The overview for the deployment of APAC.
APAC can be deployed for different edge (content) servers, and serves users far
from the nearest edge server. We show the performance of APAC in a city-wide
scale in Section 3.5. Next, we demonstrate how APAC achieves the three design
goals.
Anonymity: We introduce a new region-based circuit selection algorithm that
APAC’s peer server uses to construct circuits for requests. A circuit consists
of three categories of nodes: nodes nearby the initiator and the responder, and
nodes chosen globally (not included in the first two categories). To provide ini-
tiator/responder anonymity, APAC’s peer server communicates with peers and
constructs a circuit for each requests, instead of letting the initiator to construct
the circuit in conventional onion routing-based approaches, which only preserve
initiator anonymity. Each request in APAC is encrypted as a layered encryption
packet with the keys of selected nodes for the circuit in the peer server, and is
transferred through the circuit. In this way, the initiator and responder know
what resource is requested, but cannot identify each other. Any intermediate
node only knows its predecessor and successor, but does not know the transmit-
ted content, or determine which peer is the initiator or responder. In contrast to
the current peer-assisted CDNs, in which controlling one node in a request is
enough to identify the initiator/responder, it is difficult for the adversary to infer
the initiator when only controlling the responder or several intermediate peers.
To preserve higher level of anonymity, APAC can set a longer length for the
circuit. APAC can also be adjusted to select all intermediate nodes globally to
avoid choosing disproportionate number of adversarial peers.
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For a given circuit, by controlling the first relay, the responder and at least
half of the intermediate peers alternatively in the circuit, the adversary can de-
termine the initiator [230]. We show that an adversarial placement of peers
(e.g., placing more peers nearby the victim) does not give significant advan-
tage over a randomized placement by an honest-but-curious adversary (details
in Section 3.6.1). Even in the analysis of the worst case that the adversary
can learn the distance between any two controlled peers, our system can still
preserve an adequate level of anonymity with proper configurations (details in
Section 3.3.4.1).
Performance: We design APAC to be locality-aware to achieve good perfor-
mance. With APAC’s peer server, we can avoid the non-negligible overhead for
the circuit setup on the client. Furthermore, based on the locality information
of all peers maintained by the server, we utilize the region-based circuit selec-
tion algorithm to balance the anonymity and performance. Instead of randomly
choosing intermediate peers, our algorithm can reduce the network latency by
selecting peers nearby the initiator/responder. By adjusting the maximum length
of the circuit and the distribution factors (controlling the number of intermediate
nodes in each region), APAC can provide significant network latency reduction
and bandwidth savings as well as preserve a high degree of anonymity. We
discuss the design of circuit construction in the next section, and evaluate the
performance in Section 3.5.
Compatibility: We provide a web overlay with WebRTC [59] supported by
mainstream browsers (e.g., Firefox and Chrome) to achieve the peer-to-peer
communication and data transmission among different peers (browsers). Thus
when visiting a deployed website as usual, the user’s browser will automatically
join APAC as peers to fetch/distribute content from/to other peers in a transpar-
ent manner. Meanwhile, APAC’s client-side code only requires the retrofitted
website to specify the targeted resources. No specification means all static re-
sources on the page can be distributed via peers. We demonstrate the details in
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Algorithm 1: Region-based Circuit Selection Algorithm in APAC
input : N− number of peers, vinit− initiator, vres− responder, R− requested
resource, Lmax− the maximum number of intermediate nodes (or relays),
αinit, αres(0 ≤ αinit + αres ≤ 1)− distribution factors, Ninit− number of
peers nearest to vinit, Nres− number of peers nearest to vres, SR− set of peers
having R, NR = |SR|, G− topology graph of peers
output: cir−selected circuit
1 vres ← randomSelect(SR)
2 l← random(1, Lmax)
3 cirinit ← 〈〉; cirim ← 〈〉; cirres ← 〈〉
4 if bαinitlc ≥ 1 then
5 G′ ← removeFrom(G, {vres})
6 Sinit ← selectNearest(G′, vinit, Ninit)
7 cirinit ← randomSelectNodes(Sinit, bαinitlc)
8 end
9 if bαreslc ≥ 1 then
10 G′ ← removeFrom(G,Sinit)
11 Sres ← selectNearest(G′, vres, Nres)
12 cirres ← randomSelectNodes(Sres, bαreslc)
13 end
14 if l − bαinitlc − bαreslc ≥ 1 then
15 G′ ← removeFrom(G,Sinit ∪ Sres)
16 Sim ← getNodes(G′)
17 cirim ← randomSelectNodes(Sim, l − bαinitlc − bαreslc)
18 end




The key technique of our approach is the locality-aware circuit selection algo-
rithm. Given a set of parameters of the anonymity requirements and threat lev-
els, the algorithm selects a circuit with optimized performance. In this section
we discuss the algorithm, and discuss parameter selection in the next section.
When other peers have already cached the requested resources, a peer can
fetch content from them. We propose the circuit selection algorithm for APAC
to choose intermediate peers from three categories: near-initiator, globally ran-
dom (not nearby the initiator/responder) and near-responder nodes as a circuit
for each request. Every request in APAC is encapsulated in layers of encryption
(like onions) and transferred via the circuit.
Algorithm 1 describes our region-based circuit selection algorithm. In APAC,
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Notation Description
lcir The circuit’s length (number of nodes including the ini-
tiator and responder in the circuit - 1)
l, Lmax Number of intermediate peers or relays (l = lcir−1), the
maximum l
Sinit The set of Ninit peers nearest to the initiator
Sres The set of Nres peers nearest to the responder
S,SR,Sim The set of all peers in the system, the set of peers having
a resource R, S− Sinit − Sres
N , Ninit, Nres, NR Number of peers in S, Sinit, Sres, SR
αinit, αres Fraction of nodes for the circuit in Sinit, Sres
f , fR, finit, fres, fim Fraction of peers are compromised in the system, SR,
Sinit, Sres, Sim
Table 3.1: Notations for anonymity analysis.
the peer server maintains certain information about the current network (e.g., the
total number of peers). The input parameters Lmax, αinit , αres, N, NR, Ninit,
andNres are decided by the peer server based on the trade-off between anonymity
and performance, defined in Table 3.1.
• The peer server randomly chooses one peer as the responder from the set of
peers having the requested resource R (line 1),
• Based on the range from 1 to Lmax, the number of intermediate nodes (l) is
determined (line 2).
• According to the distribution factor αinit, the peer server randomly picks
nodes nearby the initiator as the first part of the circuit3 (line 4 - 7).
• According to another distribution factor αres, the peer server selects nodes
nearby the responder as the last part of the circuit (line 8 - 11).
• The remaining nodes of the circuit are randomly chosen from the rest of all
peers (line 12 - 15).
3The distances between the chosen peers and the initiator/responder are measured based on
the peers’ geographical coordinates, which can be obtained via navigator.geolocation [19] or











Figure 3.4: A 8-node (6-relay) circuit from the initiator to the responder in
APAC.
Figure 3.5: The network latency reduction (based on the loading time without
APAC) decreases when increasing the degree of anonymity of the system.
• The peer server concatenates all the nodes (including the initiator, intermedi-
ate nodes and responder) in sequence as the circuit for the request (line 16).
Figure 3.4 demonstrates a 8-node circuit constructed by the peer server in APAC.
3.3.3 Parameters Selection
Depending on the requirement of anonymity/performance for the deployed web
application, the input parameters for Algorithm 1 can be adjusted based on the
analysis in Section 3.3.4 and 3.5. In this section, we briefly illustrate the primary
factors to select these parameters.
The maximum number of intermediate nodes Lmax. The distribution of peers
in the network, the required anonymity, the fraction of adversarial peers and
other factors affect the selection of Lmax. As an in-advance conclusion, to
achieve better anonymity, the system is supposed to select largerLmax (as shown
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in Figure 3.6, 3.7 & 3.8). On the other hand, to achieve better performance of the
system, the smaller Lmax is preferred (as shown in Figure 3.13). As Figure 3.5
shows, by adjusting the setting of APAC at the sweet spot, the system can pre-
serve an adequate level of anonymity (i.e., 0.8 degree of anonymity) with minor
performance overhead4. In our experiment, setting two intermediate nodes for
the circuit makes the system at the sweet spot.
Distribution factors αinit & αres. To provide higher level of anonymity for
peers even when adversarial peers are densely near the initiator/responder, the
system can select smaller αinit/αres andNinit/Nres to diversify the intermediate
nodes on the circuit. Thus the probability to choose an adversarial node as
the intermediate node is approximate to f , which does not give the adversary
significant advantage. APAC can enlarge αinit & αres to reduce client-side
network latency for peers (as shown in Figure 3.15 & 3.16).
The other parameters N, NR, Ninit & Nres. By increasing the total number
of peers N and the number of peers having requested resources NR, the system
can preserve higher level of anonymity, but it requires more users to join the
system to start the content delivery via peers. To reduce the client-side network
latency, the system can set small Ninit & Nres to let intermediate nodes nearby
the initiator/responder.
The security parameters such as the maximum number of intermediate nodes
Lmax and distribution factors αinit & αres can be tuned to adjust the anonymity
level of APAC. To achieve higher level of anonymity for peers, the developer
can select larger Lmax to increase the length of a circuit and larger N /NR to in-
crease the threshold of starting using APAC, as well as choose smaller αinit/αres
and Ninit/Nres to diversify the intermediate nodes on the circuit. To preserve
initiator/responder anonymity for peers, currently peers cannot overrule the se-
curity parameters set by the developer; otherwise, adversarial nodes may choose
4 The figure is based on our anonymity analysis in Section 3.3.4 (Figure 3.6) and perfor-
mance analysis in Section 3.5 (Figure 3.13). We consider that 100 peers (35% are adversarial)
join APAC in one city, increasing the circuit’s length can provide higher level of anonymity to
benign peers but introduce more network latency.
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Figure 3.6: Effect of varying Lmax: Increasing the maximum number of inter-
mediate nodes increases the degree of initiator anonymity.









f= 0.25, Lmax = 2
f= 0.25, Lmax = 3
f= 0.35, Lmax = 2
f= 0.35, Lmax = 3
f= 0.45, Lmax = 2
f= 0.45, Lmax = 3
D(I|O) = 0.8
Figure 3.7: Effect of varying N : Increasing the total number of joined peers
increases the degree of initiator anonymity.
low level of anonymity to easily infer the identity of the initiator/responder for a
circuit. In the extreme scenario where a peer seeks an even higher privacy guar-
antee, it can opt out APAC to directly fetch resources from the resource server
as fallback.
3.3.4 Anonymity Analysis
In this section, we analyze the anonymity of APAC in a mathematical way
and demonstrate the way to choose proper parameters for the circuit selection
algorithm based on the requirement of anonymity.
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fres= 0.35, Lmax = 2
fres= 0.35, Lmax = 3
fres= 0.35, Lmax = 4
fres= 0.45, Lmax = 2
fres= 0.45, Lmax = 3
fres= 0.45, Lmax = 4
D(I|O) = 0.8
Figure 3.8: Effect of varying fR: Increasing the number of adversarial peers
having the requested resource decreases the degree of initiator anonymity.
3.3.4.1 Analysis of Initiator Anonymity
Considering the initiator vinit issues a request for a resource R, the peer server
sets up a (l+ 2)-node circuit based on the selection algorithm (in Algorithm 1),
and the responder vres delivers R. Our analysis follows the definitions in Sec-
tion 3.2.2 and the notations in Table 3.1.
In APAC, each intermediate node in a circuit only knows its predecessor
and successor. To identify the initiator of a circuit and link the requested re-
source to it, the adversary has to infer the circuit’s length, control the responder
(i.e., to know which resource is requested) and the first relay (i.e., to identify
the predecessor as the initiator). The padding for each encryption layer makes
the adversary difficult to infer the relative positions of the controlled peers in
a circuit. Thus to confirm one of the controlled nodes is the first relay (only
when the adversary knows the length), the adversary has to control the respon-
der and some intermediate nodes in the circuit to reconstruct the circuit. For a
given circuit, by controlling the first relay, the responder and at least half of the
intermediate peers alternatively in the circuit, the adversary can determine the
initiator [230]. However, we consider the worst case that the adversary can learn
the distance between any two controlled peers by passively logging forwarded
requests and transmitted data as well as timing attacks5. Thus by determining
5 To precisely determine the distance between two peers is difficult but possible for the ad-
versary with timing attacks [66,97]. To show the effectiveness of APAC against the adversary,
we analyze the initiator anonymity in this worst case.
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the correct circuit’s length as well as compromising the first relay and the re-
sponder, the adversary can infer that the first relay’s predecessor is the initiator.
We assume that OI is the observation that the adversary can identify the
initiator for a circuit with the probability P (OI) that OI occurs. Based on the




= (1− P (OI)) log2 ((1− f)N)
log2N
(3.4)
In practice, the adversarial peers can exist uniformly in the system or densely
around the initiator/responder. Next, we discuss the degree of initiator anonymity
in these two scenarios.
Randomly placing peers in the system. In this case, the fractions of adversarial
peers are equal in three different regions, i.e., finit = fres = f . If fR = f ,
the probability for the adversary to identify the initiator of the circuit (proved




Lmax−l+1 . Therefore, the degree of













To quantify the effects of Lmax and N to the degree of initiator anonymity, we
plot Equation 3.6.2 as Figure 3.6 and 3.7. LetN = 100, Lmax = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,
Figure 3.6 shows that increasing the maximum circuit length can increase the
degree of initiator anonymity. The first plot (Lmax = 0) represents the degree of
anonymity for current peer-assisted CDNs (derivation in Section 3.6.2). We can
see that the system does not hold 0.8 degree of anonymity even when f < 0.2.
On the contrary, APAC preserves 0.8 degree of anonymity when Lmax = 2 and
over 35% peers are compromised. As shown in Figure 3.7, increasing the to-
tal number of joined peers can slowly increase the initiator anonymity. From
Figure 3.6 and 3.7, we can see that when Lmax ≥ 2 and N ≥ 100, APAC can
preserve the suggested degree of anonymity (i.e., 0.8), even if 35% of all peers
are under the adversary’s control.
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Placing peers nearby the initiator/responder. For a targeted peer, the adver-
sary may increase fR by storing the requested resource in more controlled peers
and enlarge finit/fres by locating controlled peers nearby the initiator/responder.
As we discussed in Section 3.3.1, without considering the worst case, the place-
ment of peers nearby the initiator/responder does not help the adversary to gain
significant advantage. Next we discuss the influence of this placement of peers
in the worst case. If the first relay is in the initiator’s region or the responder’s




·∑Lmaxl=1 finitfRLmax−l+1 or P (OI) = 1Lmax ∑Lmaxl=1 fresfRLmax−l+1 . The de-













To quantify the effects of fR and Lmax to the degree of initiator anonymity,
we plot Equation 3.3.4.1 as Figure 3.8. Let N = 100, f = 0.35, as shown in
Figure 3.8, increasing fR and fres can decrease the initiator anonymity. How-




·∑Lmaxl=1 fimfRLmax−l+1 . If we also setNinit = Nres = 0, then fim = f .
Hence increasing fres does not directly decreaseD(I|O). On the contrary, when
fres or finit increases, fim may decrease accordingly as f is the same. In this
case, if fim = 0.35, the first, second and fourth plots in Figure 3.8 can represent
the degree of initiator anonymity accordingly. Thus when Lmax = 2, APAC
can preserve over 0.8 degree of the initiator anonymity if fR is around 0.45.
3.3.4.2 Analysis of Responder Anonymity
Analogous to initiator anonymity, in order to identify the responder of a given
circuit, the adversary has to determine the circuit’s length as well as control
the last relay and the initiator. We assume that OR is the observation that the
adversary can identify the responder for a circuit with the probability P (OR)
that OR occurs. The degree of responder anonymity can be computed as (details
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of the derivation in Section 3.6.1):
D(R|O) = H(R|O)
HM
= (1− P (OR)) log2 ((1− f)N)
log2N
(3.7)
The analysis for the two scenarios: adversarial peers uniformly exist in the
system and more adversarial peers near the initiator/responder, is similar to the
analysis for the degree of initiator anonymity. As a result, if we properly tune the
parameters, e.g., Lmax = 2, N = 100, bαinitlc = 0 and bαreslc = 0, APAC can
preserve 0.8 degree of initiator/responder anonymity even if 35% of all peers
are adversarial and have different distributions.
3.4 Implementation of APAC
In this section, we discuss the implementation details of APAC. We implement
APAC with 2600+ lines of code as well as several libraries and frameworks.
APAC’s client-side code is written in JavaScript with 1000+ lines of code, apart
from three libraries [13, 38] The peer server is also written in JavaScript with
1600+ lines of code based on Node.js platform and PeerServer [38]. Our pro-
totype implementation is available online [4]. APAC is compatible with main-
stream browsers (e.g., Chrome, Firefox and Opera) and various operating sys-
tems (e.g., Mac OS, Linux and Windows). Similar to other peer-assisted CDNs
(e.g., Swarmify), APAC is designed not to violate the same-origin policy —
APAC is deployed “per website” along with the client-side scripts.
3.4.1 Components in APAC
In APAC, the communications between the peer server and peers are over HTTPS
(e.g., TLS protocol [52]), and the data transmission among peers are over We-
bRTC which uses DTLS protocol [15] as shown in Figure 3.9. TLS and DTLS
protocols ensure that communication channels are secure and the adversary can-
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Figure 3.9: Overview of the communication channels in APAC.
not eavesdrop or tamper with any message in the communications among peers
and servers. APAC utilizes Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN) [43] to
deal with Network Address Translator (NAT) [30] traversal. In this way, even
behind NAT a peer can communicate with another peer with a public IP address
or also behind NAT.
Resources in APAC. Similar to other CDNs, e.g., Swarmify and NetSession,
only static resources (e.g., files, images and videos) are delivered in APAC.
To ensure content integrity, we use flat naming mechanism for resources, i.e.,
naming the resource with its hash value. Alternatively, we can attach the hash
value for each resource request, then the peer can verify the content with the
value at the client side. Since the content server is trusted, the peer only needs
to verify the integrity of the resource fetched from other peers. To preserve
authenticity, peers are limited to fetch resources provided/authenticated by the
content server from other peers. The content server in APAC is the website’s
server or the CDN’s edge server, which stores the website’s pages and resources.
To retrofit a website to deploy APAC, developers only need to append APAC’s
client-side code on pages. Optionally, developers can explicitly specify several
shared resources instead of sharing all resources in the page.
Peer Server in APAC. The peer server is in charge of maintaining the con-
nections with peers, the properties of each peer (e.g., identity, IP address, peer
key, locality and names of stored resources) and the properties of each resource
(e.g., location in the content server and identities of peers having the resource).
Meanwhile, when a peer requests a resource, the peer server either assists the
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peer to fetch the content from the server or constructs a circuit for the peer to
retrieve the resource from another peer. Key management and path choosing
are done by the peer server, and peer servers can be distributed to improve fault
tolerance.
Peers in APAC. To achieve our third goal (compatibility), APAC is designed
to support a plug-and-play style joining/leaving without any solicited action.
When a user visits the retrofitted site, APAC’s client-side code automatically
assists the user’s browser to join APAC as peers to fetch/deliver content from/to
other peers, without any additional installation of extensions or software. Users
leave APAC’s network when closing tabs, like Swarmify.6 The client-side code
is purely based on JavaScript and compatible with all mainstream browsers.
With WebRTC [59], the code enables browser-based real-time communication
and data transmission for peers. It also helps peers to store the requested con-
tents in indexedDB [24] (i.e., a high-performance client-side storage), which
enables peers to directly load the same resources from indexedDB without is-
suing new requests. With data URI scheme [14] 7, the client-side code appends
the content fetched from the server, another peer or indexedDB to the specific
location in the visiting page.
3.4.2 Content Delivery in APAC
In this section, we illustrate how peers fetch content from the content server,
other peers and indexedDB in APAC.
Initiation of peers. When a user first visits the site deployed with APAC, the
client-side code will negotiate with the peer server to assist the user’s browser
to join the system as a peer. The user’s browser issues an initiation request to
the peer server with the current IP address or coordinates obtained from nav-
6 To support opt-out in APAC for users, the website can host two copies, i.e., the original one
and the retrofitted one. A user can explicitly choose which one to visit via setting preferences in
the site’s first page.
7 The data URI scheme encodes data with base64, which introduces certain overhead. We
use other serialization techniques for data transmission to reduce the overhead, and only use














Figure 3.10: Overview of how a peer fetches content from another peer via three
nodes in APAC.
igator.geolocation [19]. After receiving the request, the server recognizes the
user’s browser as a new peer, and responds the peer with an identity and a peer
key (symmetric key). Meanwhile, the server records the peer with its proper-
ties, i.e., identity, IP address, peer key and locality (derived from IP addresses
or coordinates). As for the peer key, after a period of time, each peer will com-
municate with the peer server to update a new key. After the initiation, the
new peer can take advantage of the service provided by APAC to fetch/deliver
resources from/to other peers.
Fetching content from the content server. When the total number of peers and
the number of peers having the requested resource do not meet the requirement
for anonymity (the input parameters in the circuit selection algorithm), the peer
server will instruct peers to retrieve resources directly from the content server.
In this case, the peer server responds the peer with the requested resource’s
original URL on the content server. Then the peer issues another request to the
content server to retrieve the resource. After receiving the resource, the peer
stores it in indexedDB, appends it to the page and updates the caching status to
the peer server.
Fetching content from other peers. Content delivery via peers can start to
operate when the system is sufficient to preserve the required anonymity as dis-
cussed in Section 3.3.4. We illustrate how peer vA fetches a resource R from vC
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via a 3-node circuit (as shown in Figure 3.10) step by step8
• 1©: Peer vA issues a request for a resource R to the peer server vP ;
• 2©: After receiving the request, vP first searches for online peers having R.
Then vP sets up a 3-node circuit based on the configuration, constructs the













KvA , KvB and KvC are peer keys for vA, vB and vC respectively. IDvB and
IDvC are the identities for vB and vC . KR is the key generated by vP for
vA and vC to encrypt/decrypt R. Rname is the requested resource’s name.
NoncevB and NoncevC contain the timestamp and padding, which make any
intermediate node difficult to determine its relative position on the circuit.
With Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [113], the data (i.e., Rname, KR
andNoncevC ) is encrypted byKvC (denoted by {...}KvC ),KvB andKvA layer
by layer.
• 3©: Peer vA receives the packet, decrypts it with KvA , and obtains IDvB (i.e.,
the next peer to contact),KR and the remaining cipher text. Then vA forwards
the remaining data to vB.
• 4©: While receiving the packet from vA, vB obtains IDvC and NoncevB by
decrypting it with KvB . After verifying the timestamp in NoncevB , vB for-
wards the remaining packet to vC .
• 5©: Peer vC receives the packet from vB, strips off the layer withKvC , and ob-
tains Rname, KR and Noncevres . vC verifies the timestamp in Noncevres and
searches Rn in its indexedDB. If the timestamp is not out of date and R exists






8 Alternatively, the peer server can also construct a circuit and instruct the responder to
deliver the requested resource to the initiator via the circuit. However, in this way every two
nodes also have to set up a connection first and then perform data transmission, which is the
same as the original design and does not save extra time for content delivery.
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responds to vB with an empty packet.
• 6©: After receiving the response from vC , vB directly forwards the packet to
vA.
• 7©: When receiving {R,NonceR}KR from vB, vA decrypts it with KR and
obtains R. vA verifies the integrity of R. If the obtained packet is empty or R
is bogus, vA issues another request for R to vP . Otherwise, vA stores R in its
indexedDB and issues a request to vP to update the status that vA has R.
Fetching content from indexedDB. Once a peer successfully fetches a re-
source from the content server or another peer (with verifying the integrity)
and stores it in the indexedDB, the peer will directly load the resource from its
indexedDB instead of issuing a new request afterwards. APAC is compatible
with the current browser cache, i.e., the default cache and HTML5 application
cache. The APAC’s client-side code typically appends resources using data URI
scheme. Since these cache mechanisms support to cache resources with data
URI scheme, they can help to speed up the loading time for these resources.
3.5 Performance Evaluation
To demonstrate the effectiveness of APAC, we evaluate the network throughput
of the deployed site’s server, and the network latency of fetching resources in
APAC. We investigate the following research questions in this section.
• What is the bandwidth saving of APAC compared with non-peer-to-peer
client/server system?
• What is the latency reduction of APAC with various configurations (e.g., cir-
cuit’s length and distribution factors)?
3.5.1 Measurement Setup
We have deployed APAC on a website that provides images of different sizes
in a range of 1 KB - 2 MB. APAC supports all standard text and media for-
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Figure 3.11: Total outgoing network traffic size of a server in response to a re-
quest in APAC setting (APAC) and in the client-server setting (BASELINE),
measured in KB.
mats, e.g., html, JavaScript, jpg, ogg and mp4. Since the majority of requests in
popular websites are for images [231], we use images as the representatives of
distributed resources in our experiment. Both the site’s content server (i.e., edge
server) and the peer server are located in City A9. Considering a typical scenario
that peers and the content/peer server are in different cities, we place peers in
City B different from City A. We launch over 100 different browser instances
with located across City B. When browsing the same site deployed with APAC,
these browsers join the system as peers.
To measure the network throughput, we deploy a performance measurement
tool called iftop on the content server as well as the systems hosting browser
instances. To measure the client-side network latency in various situations, we
adjust the settings in the circuit selection algorithm. We vary the number of
nodes on the circuit from 2 (no intermediate node) to 6 by changing Lmax, and
diversify the locations of intermediate nodes (tuning distribution factors αinit
and αres) in City B. We demonstrate how these settings for circuit construction
affect the performance of APAC.
Comparison to other CDNs. CDN operators can increase the geo-density of
edge servers up to a point (e.g., placing edge servers in major cities of various
countries), but fetching resources for users far away from an edge server has
9 In this chapter, City A represents New York City, and B represents Singapore. In our
evaluation, we deployed one peer server, which is adequate for our experiments of 100 peers.
For a large scale of users, e.g., 1 million, multiple peer servers can be deployed to handle
requests in parallel.
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major latency. Considering this typical scenario, we place peers and the peer/-
content server (or CDN’s edge server) in different cities in our experiment set-
ting. In this setting, compared to regular CDN services that clients directly fetch
resources from the CDN’s edge server, APAC can reduce network bandwidth
and network latency. We show the details of bandwidth savings in Figure 3.11
and 3.12, and network latency reduction in Figure 3.13. For example, when ev-
ery circuit has up to 4 nodes, APAC can reduce 97.3% bandwidth for the CDN’s
edge server and reduce 27.4% to 44.1 network latency of fetching 2 MB re-
sources for peers. Naturally, a single-hop peer-assisted CDN, such as Swarmify,
can achieve higher network latency reduction (e.g., 69.4% for Swarmify case)
than APAC does. However, it does not preserve the anonymity guarantee which
APAC aims to provide. We provide the detailed comparison on latency reduc-
tion in Figure 3.13.
3.5.2 Bandwidth Saving
First, we measure how much bandwidth can be saved by deploying APAC on
the server side. We record the total size of network packets that go out from the
content/peer server after the circuit (Lmax = 2 for this experiment) has been es-
tablished and the initiator starts fetching a specific resource (labeled asAPAC).
As a baseline, we also measure the size of outgoing network traffic from the con-
tent server in the typical client-server environment (labeled as BASELINE).
We define the bandwidth saving (labeled as BS) as the percentage reduction
from BASELINE.
Figure 3.11 shows the total size of outgoing network traffic from the server
in client-server and APAC settings. The total size of outgoing packets from
the server in APAC (APAC) is much smaller than the size of network traffic
in the normal client-server setting (BASELINE), and this applies to all re-
sources with different sizes. The reason is that peers in APAC can fetch a large
fraction of resources from other peers instead of the server. When the initiator
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Figure 3.12: When the number of requests increases, the total outgoing network
traffic for BASELINE significantly increases, but the traffic for APAC only
slowly increases.
fetches a resource of 2 MB1, APAC can save 97.3% of the server’s bandwidth10.
When the total number of requests increases, APAC can significantly save the
bandwidth as shown in Figure 3.1211.
3.5.3 Network Latency
Next, we measure the network latency when fetching content in APAC with dif-
ferent peer placements. According to the statistics until 15th February 2016 [50],
the averaged total size of transferred data when loading a site is 2268 KB. Thus
in our experiment, we use the loading time of 2 MB resources (i.e., images) as
the representative. With fixing the size of the resource to 2 MB, we evaluate
APAC under the settings where the initiator, responder and intermediate nodes
are located in: 1) the same LAN, 2) the same WLAN and 3) different LANs
but in the same city (i.e., City B, labeled as “WAN-City”). We then vary the
length of circuit as well as distribution factors and compare those results with
a baseline: the network latency for a browser in City B to directly fetch the
resource from the content server without APAC12. Analogous to BS, we de-
fine the client-side network latency reduction NLR as the percentage reduction
from BASELINE. The higher the percentage of NLR is, the better is the
10 BASELINE = 2020 KB, APAC = 55.1 KB, and BS = 97.3%.
11 We set the requirement for the total number of peers as 100, thus the content delivery via
peers starts to operate when 100 peer join the system.
12 During the initial investigation, we observed the baseline latency (BASELINE) to be
9420 ms.
46














Figure 3.13: Network latency reduction (NLR) of an initiator peer in Swarmify
and APAC under three network configurations, as compared to the baseline. All
data are based on a resource with size of 2 MB and averaged over 30 runs with
95% confidence intervals for each of them.
performance (0% = BASELINE). All our results are the average of 30 runs
with 95% confidence intervals for each of them.
Varying the circuit’s length. In Figure 3.13, “Swarmify” represents the Swarmify
system, and “2-node” represents the non-anonymous peer-to-peer setting in APAC,
i.e., 2 nodes without any intermediate nodes. Since they do not have any inter-
mediate nodes to route data, they have the largest network latency reduction, i.e.,
69.4% for Swarmify in WAN and 76.1% for APAC in LAN respectively. Due to
the implementation issue, Swarmify does not properly support P2P data trans-
mission in LAN and WLAN, so the NLR for Swarmify in LAN and WLAN
are quite small in Figure 3.13. We have reported this issue to their developer
team. Since APAC involves more intermediate nodes than a single-hop non-
anonymous system like Swarmify, APAC naturally shows a less latency im-
provement than Swarmify. This is illustrated in Figure 3.13, for a 4-node circuit
where APAC provides a latency reduction (49.7%) lower than the performance
obtained for Swarmify (69.4%) and non-anonymous setting (76.1%). Notably,
APAC still outperforms the baseline. In general, with the increase of the cir-
cuit’s length, the network latency reduction decreases, as more hops are required
to route the transmitted data. In the three configurations, the latency in LAN is
the smallest, as all the peers in the circuit are nearby. Since the bandwidth in
WLAN is limited, the latency in WLAN is larger than the other two settings.
We also evaluate the setup latency of a circuit for various number of interme-
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Figure 3.14: The percentage of the network latency for setup overhead of a
circuit in three configurations.










Figure 3.15: Network latency reduction (NLR) varies when intermediate nodes
are in different regions. “a-b-c” means the number of nodes in the initiator’s
region (a = bαinitlc), nodes randomly chosen (b = l − bαinitlc − bαreslc) and
nodes in the responder’s region (c = bαreslc).
diate nodes. As Figure 3.14 shows, the setup latency of a circuit is only a small
fraction of the network latency. For example, the setup latency of a circuit for 2
to 6 nodes is 11.6 ms, 83.8 ms, 152.7 ms, 227.3 ms, and 308.5 ms respectively
in the LAN setting. The percentage of the network latency for each of them is
0.52%, 2.28%, 3.22%, 3.77%, and 3.98% respectively.
Varying the distribution factors αinit and αres. In addition to adjusting the
circuit’s length, we can also tune the distribution factors αinit and αres to reduce
the latency in APAC. For a 5-node circuit, we place the initiator and respon-
der in two different regions (different LANs across City B), and we diversify
the locations of intermediate peers to change αinit and αres. As Figure 3.15
illustrates, setting more intermediate nodes around the initiator/responder (in-
creasing αinit/αres) for a circuit, the system further reduces the network latency.
Thus for the circuit construction, the system can select larger αinit and αres to
reduce performance overhead. For the best case in our experiment, the system
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Figure 3.16: The network latency reduction (NLR) for 50 requests(sorted in
ascending order) when 100 joined peers are in APAC.
can reduce 27.8% latency only by adjusting the distribution factors. The sys-
tem can be set as not “locality-aware” and randomly chooses all intermediate
nodes (i.e., 0-3-0 setting) for the circuit. This configuration causes the worst
performance, but it enables the system to preserve the best level of anonymity
comparing to other settings.
Overall performance. We evaluate the overall performance in APAC for the
deployed site, when 100 peers (browsers) have joined APAC and are available
for content delivery. We set the maximum number of intermediate nodes on a
circuit as 2 (Lmax = 2), and record each 50 different resource requests in APAC
when all intermediate nodes are randomly chosen (0-2-0/0-1-0 for bαinitlc =
bαreslc = 0) and all relays are nearby the initiator (2-0-0/1-0-0 for bαinitlc = l)
respectively. The average NLR for the 0-2-0/0-1-0 and 2-0-0/1-0-0 settings are
27.4% and 44.1% respectively. The 0-2-0/0-1-0 setting has the considerable
network latency reduction, though it holds the worst performance comparing to
other settings analogous to Figure 3.15. The 0-2-0/0-1-0 setting provides the
higher level of anonymity than the 2-0-0/1-0-0 one, which makes the adversary
that places peers near the victim gain limited advantage over the honest-but-
curious adversary as discussed in Section 3.3.4.1. As Figure 3.16 demonstrates,
the latency reduction in the 2-0-0/1-0-0 setting is much larger than the other one,
which reflects that tuning distribution factors αinit and αres can assist APAC to
provide reasonable performance.
Key findings. As we discussed in Section 3.3.4, when the circuit has up to
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two relays (Lmax = 2), and adversarial peers uniformly exist in the network
(f = finit = fres = fR), APAC can preserve the adequate degree of initiator/re-
sponder anonymity (i.e., 0.8). As we show in this section, with intermediate
peers up to 2 (Lmax = 2) and proper setting for distribution factors (αinit/αres),
APAC can save 97.3% bandwidth for the site’s server and reduce 27.4%/44.1%
network latency of fetching 2 MB resources for peers within one city. Therefore,
APAC can preserve initiator/responder anonymity with considerable bandwidth
saving and latency reduction.
3.5.4 Performance under Churn
By default, APAC is deployed without any browser extensions, so once a user
closes the tab for the retrofitted site, her browser (or peer) will leave APAC’s
network. If the peer happens to be a node in a circuit, its departure will break
down the circuit, and the initiator has to issue another request. Therefore, as a
part of the dynamics of peer participation or churn [216], the departure of peers
in the duration of a request/circuit (i.e., from the creation of the circuit to its
teardown) influences the success of data transmission through the circuit. To
quantify the success rate of circuits under Churn, we mathematically analyze
this issue based on a previous study conducted by Liu et al. [169]. It shows
that the time users spend on a web page follows Weibull distribution [60]. We
assume that the stay time of users on the deployed site’s pages also follows
Weibull distribution, and we detail our analysis in Section 3.6.3.
As an in-advance conclusion, we show that the success rate of a circuit de-
creases when its length l or its duration t′ increases in Figure 3.17. We can
see that if data transmission via a circuit is finished quickly (i.e., the circuit has
short duration), e.g., a small-size resource transferred in a high-speed network,
the success rate of the circuit is quite high, e.g., over 90% when the median
stay time is 39.8 s and t′ = 2. This indicates that over 90% requested resources
can be successfully transmitted via circuits for the first time without issuing ad-
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Figure 3.17: The success rate decreases when the length of the circuit increases.








λ = 70, k = 0.65λ = 70, k = 0.35λ = 95, k = 0.65λ = 95, k = 0.35λ = 120, k = 0.65λ = 120, k = 0.35
Psuccess = 0.8
Figure 3.18: The success rate increases when the stay time follows the Weibull
distribution with larger λ and smaller k. (The circuit has 2 intermediate nodes.)
ditional requests. In some cases, e.g., fetching 2 MB resources via a 4-node
circuit, the duration of the circuit is similar to the fetching time directly from
server (9.42 s), the success rate is still around 80%. If the site can incentivize
users to stay longer on the page, the success rate can increase a lot, e.g., over
95% with 42.1 s median stay time (as plotted in Figure 3.18). Alternatively, the
site operator can create several backup circuits for one request, and the complete
data transmission through any circuit is counted as the success for the request.
This can drastically increase the success rate, e.g., over 2 backup circuits can
make the success rate over 99% (details in Section 3.6.3).
3.5.5 Load on Peers
We consider CPU and bandwidth for APAC to evaluate the load on peers. The
size of the client side code of APAC is 9.5 KB, and 68KB when including all
additional libraries. This is significantly smaller than the average-transfer data
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(2268 KB [50]) when loading websites. APAC would not affect the client-side
performance much. Notably, most of the JavaScript files are static and cached.
We instrumented the htop and iftop tools [21, 23] to measure the average
CPU usage and bandwidth for peers in a 3-node circuit for 10 times. Each client
runs on a machine with a typical PC configuration Intel i7-2600 CPU of 3.4
GHz and 8 GB memory. We find that APAC only incurs a reasonable 0.88% of
CPU overhead and 4.21MB bandwidth per circuit for the clients. Further, the
site operator can also limit the maximum number (e.g., 10) of joining circuits
for one peer in one cycle of completing data transmission in a circuit, to avoid
exhausting the peer’s available bandwidth.
3.6 Security Analysis
3.6.1 Degree of Initiator/Responder Anonymity in APAC
Initiator Anonymity. In our analysis, we consider the worst case for the system
that the adversary can learn the distance between any two controlled peers by
passively logging and timing attacks. We assume that peers are compromised
independently. Let OI be the observation that the adversary can determine the
initiator for a given circuit with probability P (OI). For a given circuit in APAC,
the probability of identifying the initiator of the circuit equals to the probability
that the adversary determines the correct circuit’s length as well as controls the
first relay and the responder. Due to the distribution factors αinit and αres, the
first relay may be in Sinit, Sim or Sres. Based on Algorithm 1, for a circuit
in APAC, the responder is randomly chosen in SR. Following the notations
in Table 3.1, for a given circuit with l intermediate nodes, the probability of
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controlling the first relay and the responder can be computed as:
P (QI |L = l) =

finitfR if l1 ≥ 1
fimfR if l1 = 0, l2 ≥ 1
fresfR if l1 = l2 = 0, l3 ≥ 1
(3.9)
where l1 = bαinitlc, l2 = l − bαinitlc − bαreslc, l3 = bαreslc, and fim =
fN−finitNinit−fresNres
N−Ninit−Nres .
In APAC, the length of the circuit is variable, and number of intermedi-
ate nodes is randomly chosen from 1 to Lmax. Thus the probability that the
number of intermediate nodes is l can be computed as P (L = l) = 1
Lmax
.
For a specific circuit with l relays, when the adversary controls the first relay
and the responder, he still cannot precisely determine the predecessor of the
first relay as the initiator, as he does not know the exact length of the circuit.
Therefore, l, l + 1,..., Lmax can be considered as the number of intermedi-
ate nodes, and the probability that the adversary guesses the correct length is
P (L′ = l|(QI |L = l)) = 1Lmax−l+1 . The probability that OI occurs when L = l
can be represented as P (OI |L = L) = P (L′ ∩ QI |L = l) = P (QI |L =
l)P (L′ = l|(QI |L = l)) = P (QI |L = l) 1Lmax−l+1 . Generally, for a specific










P (QI |L = l)
Lmax − l + 1
(3.10)
Under this condition, the adversary can precisely to determine which peer is the
initiator. Thus the entropy for identifying the initiator is H(I|OI) = 0.
When the adversary does not have the observation OI as above, it is im-
possible for the adversary to directly identify the circuit’s initiator. From the
adversary’s perspective, the initiator anonymity set is (1 − f)N . Therefore the








log2 ((1− f)N). From the adversary’s observation O (i.e., OI and ¬OI), the
overall entropy for the system can be represented asH(I|O) = (1−P (OI)) log2
((1− f)N). For the ideal case, every peer has the equal probability of 1
N
to be
identified as the initiator. The maximum entropy HM = log2N . Therefore, the
degree of initiator anonymity for the system can be computed as:
D(I|O) = H(I|O)
HM
= (1− P (OI)) log2 ((1− f)N)
log2N
(3.11)
Responder Anonymity. Analogous to derivation for degree of initiator anonymity,
we can derive Equation 3.3.4.2 for degree of responder anonymity. We briefly
illustrate the derivation for degree of responder anonymity. Let OR be the ob-
servation that the adversary can determine the responder for a given circuit with
probability P (OR) to occur. For a given circuit in APAC, the probability of
identifying the responder of the circuit equals to the probability that the adver-
sary determines the correct circuit’s length and controls the last relay and the
initiator. Following the notations in Table 3.1, we show the difference between
P (QR|L = l) and P (QI |L = l) below. For a given circuit with l intermedi-
ate nodes, the probability of controlling the last relay and the initiator can be
computed as:
P (QR|L = l) =

fresf if l3 ≥ 1
fimf if l3 = 0, l2 ≥ 1
finitf if l3 = l2 = 0, l1 ≥ 1
(3.12)
where L1, l2, l3 and fim are defined same as Equation 3.6.1, and we assume that
every peer is equally to be the initiator for a request.
In APAC, the length of the circuit is variable, and number of intermediate
nodes is randomly chosen from 1 to Lmax. Analogous to Equation 3.6.1, for
a specific circuit, the probability that the adversary can identify the responder




Lmax−l+1P (QR|L = l). From the
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adversary’s observationO (i.e.,OR and ¬OR), the overall entropy for the system
can be computed as H(R|O) = (1− P (OR)) log2 ((1− f)N). Therefore, the
degree of responder anonymity for the system can be computed as:
D(R|O) = H(R|O)
HM
= (1− P (OR)) log2 ((1− f)N)
log2N
(3.13)
The adversary’s advantage on placement of peers. In the normal analysis,
for a 8-node circuit (l = 6) as shown in Figure 3.4, the initiator, intermediate
peers and responder are vinit, v1, v2, v3, v4, v5, v6, and vres respectively. By
controlling v1 (nearby the initiator), v3 (globally), v5 (nearby the responder) and
vres, the adversary can definitely determine that vinit is the initiator. Referring
to the notations in Table 3.1, we assume that the adversary controls a fraction
f of N peers in APAC, a fraction finit/fres of Ninit/Nres peers nearby the
initiator/responder are adversarial, and fR is the fraction of adversarial peers
having the requested resource. If the adversary randomly places adversarial
peers in APAC, then f = finit = fres, and the adversary has the probability
Prand = f
3fR to infer the initiator. If the adversary places more peers around
the initiator/responder to increase finit/fres, she has the probability Pnear =
finitfres
fN−finitNinit−fresNres
N−Ninit−Nres fR to determine the initiator. Let f = fR = 0.35,
N = 1000, Ninit = Nres = 300, we find that the adversary’s advantage of using
the second strategy over the first one is quite limited: ∆adv = max{Pnear} −
Prand = 0.0154 − 0.0150 = 0.004, where Pnear = max{Pnear} when finit =
fres = 0.39.
3.6.2 Degree of Anonymity in Current Peer-assisted CDNs
For a given request in peer-assisted CDNs, the initiator can be identified when
the responder is adversarial. We assume that OI is the observation when the
responder of a particular request is under the adversary’s control with the prob-
ability P (OI) that OI occurs. Analogous to Section 3.6.1, we can derive the
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same Equation 3.6.1, but the meaning of P (OI) is different. The entropy for the
system with different observations (OI and ¬OI) can be computed as:
H(I|O) = P (OI)H(I|OI) + (1− P (OI))H(I|¬OI)
= (1− P (OI)) log2 ((1− f)N)
(3.14)
where N is the number of all peers. When OI occurs, the adversary can defi-
nitely identify the initiator, thus H(I|OI) = 0; otherwise, from the adversary’s
perspective, the initiator anonymity set is (1 − f)N . The probability that a
benign peer in the system is the initiator is 1
(1−f)N . Thus the entropy for the







log2 ((1− f)N). For the ideal case, every peer has the equal probability of
1
N
to be identified as the initiator. The maximum entropy HM can be calcu-








= log2N . Therefore, the degree of responder
anonymity can be computed as:
D(I|O) = H(I|O)
HM
= (1− P (OI)) log2 ((1− f)N)
log2N
(3.15)
When the adversarial peers are uniformly scattered in the system, then an adver-
sarial peer having the resource has the probability f to be chosen as the respon-
der, i.e., the probability that the responder is adversarial P (OI) = fR = f . As
the first plot (Lmax = 0) in Figure 3.6 shows, the degree of initiator anonymity
is less than 0.8 when f ≥ 0.2. Analogous to the initiator anonymity, the current
peer-assisted CDNs cannot preserve an adequate degree of responder anonymity
when over 20% peers are adversarial.
3.6.3 Analysis of Churn in APAC
A user joins APAC when visiting the deployed site from her web browser, and
leaves APAC when closing the tab. As an inherent property of peer-to-peer
systems, the dynamics of peer participation, or churn [216], especially the stay
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Figure 3.19: λ becomes larger and k turns smaller, when more users stay longer
on the page.
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Figure 3.20: The stay rate decreases when the duration of a circuit and k in-
crease, as well as λ decreases.
time of peers, affect the success rates of data transmission for circuits. To pro-
vide a mathematical understanding of users’ page-leaving behaviors, Liu et al.
analyzed page-visit stay time for 205,873 different pages for which they had
captured upwards of 10,000 visits, and showed that the time users spend on a
web page follows Weibull distribution [169]. Based on their finding, we can
assume that the stay time13 of users on our deployed site also follows Weibull
distribution. We further calculate the stay rate of users in the duration of a cir-
cuit, and then compute the success rate of the circuit, i.e., all intermediate nodes
and the responder stay in the network till data transmission via the circuit is
completed.
The cumulative distribution function for the Weibull distribution is







t ≥ 0 (3.16)
13In this chapter, we treat Dwell time studied in Liu et al.’s work as the stay time of users on
a page.
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Figure 3.21: The success rate increases when the number of created circuits
increases.
with t, λ and k are the stay time (dwell time), the scale and shape parameters,
respectively. As shown in Figure 3.19, the longer of the average stay time is, the
larger λ is and the smaller k is. For a (l + 2)-node circuit created at time T , we
assume that the duration of the circuit is t′ and the average number of page visits
is Nv. It takes t′ seconds for the circuit to complete data transmission, and thus
the minimal duration requirement for all nodes in this circuit is t′. For users who
visit the site t seconds ahead the creation of the circuit, (1− ω(t+ t′|k, λ))Nv
of them are remaining after the teardown of the circuit, and (1− ω(t|k, λ))Nv
users stay on the page at least till T . Since the peer server selects nodes for the
circuit at T , we can compute the stay rate for users existing at T and lasting for
t′ below:
Pstay(t
′|k, λ) = INIT
+∞
0 (1− ω(t+ t′|k, λ))Nv dt
INIT+∞0 (1− ω(t|k, λ))Nv dt
(3.17)
Furthermore, the probability that all intermediate nodes and the responder stay
for t′ or the success rate of the circuit is14:
Psuccess(t
′, l|k, λ) = Pstay(t′|k, λ)l+1 (3.18)
Based on the study of Liu et al. [169], λ for 80% of stay-time distributions is
no more than 70, and the median value of k vary from 0.65 to 0.80. Figure 3.20
shows that when the duration t′ and k are larger, or λ is smaller, then the stay
14We assume that the number of peers for the creation of a circuit is large enough to ignore
the probability that the same peer is selected as the intermediate node for multiple circuits.
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rate is lower, more users existing at T may leave before the teardown of the
circuit. For λ = 70 and k = 0.65, 0.80 (representing that the median stay time
is 39.8 s or 44.3 s15), the stay rate is always over 90% when the duration of
the circuit is 9.42 s (i.e., the fetching time of a 2 MB resource from the remote
server). Figure 3.17 presents that with λ = 70 and k = 0.65 (the median stay
time is 39.8 s), the longer length of the circuit may cause the success rate of
data transmission lower. For a 4-node circuit, the success rate is always over
75% even if t′ = 10. If the duration t′ is short enough (e.g., 2 s), the success
rate is always over 90%, which means over 90% circuits can be successfully
completed. For the retrofitted site of APAC, the site can incentivize users to stay
longer on the page, then the stay-time distribution can have larger λ and smaller
k, further the success rate becomes higher, e.g., over 95% when λ = 120 and
k = 0.35 (the median stay time is 42.1 s) in Figure 3.18.
Once the site operator observes that the distribution of stay time does not
provide a proper success rate for a circuit (e.g., 80%), the site operator can
suspend the circuit-based data transmission and reuse the client-server mode.
Alternatively, as a relaxation of anonymity, the site operator can create several
backup circuits for one request, and the complete data transmission through any
circuit is counted as the success for the request. In this case, the success rate can
be represented as:
P ′success(Nc, t
′, l|k, λ) = 1− (1− Psuccess(t′, l|k, λ))Nc (3.20)
with the number Nc of circuits for one request. Figure 3.21 shows that with
λ = 70, k = 0.65 and l = 2, 1 backup circuit16(in total 2 circuits) for one
request can drastically increase the success rate (e.g., over 90%). For over 2
15 The median stay time for Weibull distribution is:
Tmedian(k, λ) = λ (ln 2)
1
k (3.19)
16 In Figure 3.21, we use the same-length circuits as backup circuits for one request. In fact,
the peer server can set up backup circuits of any length (not larger than Lmax).
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backup circuits, the success rate of one request is always over 99% even the
duration is 10 s. In the worst case, as a relaxation of compatibility, the site can
employ APAC in an extension and ask users to install it. The extension checks
whether the client is in any circuit whenever the client is attempting to leave
APAC. If so, the extension will take over and complete data transmission for
the pending circuits.
3.7 Related Work
In this section, we discuss recent work related to security & privacy in peer-
assisted CDNs and anonymous communication systems.
3.7.1 Security & Privacy in Peer-assisted CDNs
Numerous peer-assisted CDNs have been proposed in recent years [2,37,45,62,
130, 134, 135, 149, 218, 222, 228, 231]. In contrast to traditional infrastructure-
based CDNs, peer-assisted CDNs offload content delivery tasks on clients (peers)
to save the bandwidth of servers [147, 156], and reduce the latency of fetching
content at the client side. For instance, NetSession can offload 70− 80% of the
traffic to the peers [232]. For the thorough evaluation on Etsy, Maygh is able
to reduce the 95th-percentile bandwidth due to image content at the operator by
over 75% [231].
Meanwhile, researchers also propose solutions to preserve the integrity and
authenticity of content [62, 218, 231]. For example, FireCoral introduces sign-
ing service and tracker components to authenticate and verify content [218].
All content in Maygh is self-certifying [231]. Aditya et al. proposed RCA
for NetSession to detect and quarantine malicious clients [62]. On the other
hand, no systematic studies of inference attacks on peer-assisted CDNs have
been conducted yet and few defenses against such attacks are deployed on peer-
assisted CDNs. In this work, we systematically analyze inference attacks on
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Systems [64, 123, 204, 223]
7 3 7 Partially
Crowds [205], & Morphmix [207],
etc. [136, 178–181, 187]
7 3 7 7
Hidden Service [48], I2P [22] &
Freenet [18], etc. [53, 71, 148, 209]
7 3 3 7
APAC 3 3 3 3
Table 3.2: Comparison with low-latency anonymous systems.
peer-assisted CDNs, and have mounted attacks on three popular systems, i.e.,
Swarmify, BemTV and P2PSP. Furthermore, we propose APAC to mitigate this
class of attacks with minor performance overhead. We raise the bar significantly
beyond what the current peer-assisted CDNs have.
3.7.2 Anonymous Communication Systems
As we have discussed in Chapter 2, researchers have proposed numerous anony-
mous communication systems to provide anonymity for users as shown in Ta-
ble 3.2. Nevertheless, the primary goal for these approaches is to preserve
high level of anonymity. They typically require users to install client-side soft-
ware and are not locality-aware by default17. In Tor-based approaches, typically
the initiator creates/constructs the circuit and selects the intermediate nodes for
each request. Therefore these approaches preserve initiator anonymity, but can-
not hide the responder’s identity. Furthermore, together with the peer-to-peer
anonymous communication systems, these systems introduce non-negligible
circuit setup latency when the initiator indirectly communicates with interme-
diate nodes to set up the circuit. For example, the circuit setup latency for a
4-hop circuit in ShadowWalker is 1820 ms [179]. Therefore, we cannot directly
apply previous mechanisms (as shown in Table 2.1) to achieve our predefined
17The relay selection algorithm in Tor can be adjusted to be locality-aware [64].
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three goals. In APAC, we utilize the peer server (instead of peers) to construct
the circuit for each request, which avoids the non-negligible overhead and pre-
serves responder anonymity. Further, based on the locality information of all
peers maintained by the server, we optimize the onion routing’s circuit selection
algorithm in APAC by introducing distribution factors, which can be tuned to
locate intermediate peers nearby the initiator/responder to reduce network la-
tency. Comparing to previous low-latency approaches, APAC can achieve all
the primitives listed in Table 3.2.
3.8 Summary
In this chapter, we systematically study inference attacks on peer-assisted CDNs.
Further, we developer an anonymous peer-assisted CDN called APAC, which
preserves a high degree of anonymity that is significantly beyond what current
peer-assisted CDNs have. Our performance evaluation shows that the locality-
aware APAC can bring desired network latency reduction for content fetching







In this chapter, we cope with such global adversary in the generic content shar-
ing P2P systems, in which web overlays are included. In the last chapter, we
consider a partial adversary, but a global adversary capable of long-term traffic
analysis is feasible in real-world P2P systems. Content sharing P2P systems,
especially P2P file-sharing applications such as BitTorrent [7], Storj [44] and
Freenet [18] are popular among users for sharing files on the Internet. More
recently, peer-assisted CDNs such as Akamai Netsession [1] and Squirrel [149]
are gaining wide adoption to offload web CDN traffic to clients. The conve-
nient access to various resources attract millions of users to join P2P networks,
e.g., BitTorrent has over 150 million active users per month [56] and its file-
sharing service contributes 3.35% of all worldwide bandwidth [36]. However,
the majority of such P2P applications are susceptible to long-term traffic anal-
ysis through global monitoring; especially, analyzing the pattern of commu-
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nication between a sender and a receiver to infer information about the users.
For example, many copyright enforcement organizations such as IFPI, RIAA,
MPAA, government agencies like NSA and ISP’s are reported to globally mon-
itor BitTorrent traffic to identify illegal actors. Monitoring of BitTorrent traf-
fic has shown to reveal the data requested and sent by the peers in the net-
work [164,200,212]. Unfortunately, while detecting copyright infringements is
useful, the same global monitoring is applicable to any user of the P2P network,
and can therefore collect benign users’ data. Thus, users of such P2P systems
are at a risk of leaking private information such as the resources they upload or
download.
To hide their online traces, users today employ anonymous networks as a so-
lution to conceal their digital identities or data access habits. Currently, anony-
mous networks include Mix networks [100, 117, 183], and Onion routing/Tor-
based systems [64,123,204,223], as well as other P2P anonymity systems [136,
178, 179, 187, 205, 207]. Such systems allow the user to be anonymous, so that
the user is unidentifiable within a set of users [199].
Although above solutions provide an anonymity guarantee, they are vulner-
able to long-term traffic pattern analysis attacks, which is an important threat
for P2P systems like BitTorrent [63, 127, 128, 159, 224, 225]. Researchers have
demonstrated attacks targeting BitTorrent users on top of Tor that reveal infor-
mation related to the resources uploaded or downloaded [8, 80]. Such attacks
raise the question - is anonymizing users the right defense against traffic pattern
analysis in P2P content sharing systems?
In this chapter, we investigate a new approach to solve the problem of persis-
tent analysis of data communication patterns. We advocate that data / resource
access pattern hiding is an important and necessary step to thwart leakage of
users data in P2P systems. To this end, we present a first candidate solution,
OBLIVP2P— an oblivious protocol for peer-to-peer content sharing systems.
Hiding data access patterns or making them oblivious unlinks user’s identity
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from her online traces, thereby defending against long-term traffic monitoring.
4.1.1 Approach
For hiding data access patterns between a trusted CPU and an untrusted memory,
Goldreich and Ostrovsky proposed the concept of an Oblivious RAM (ORAM) [142].
We envision providing similar obliviousness guarantees in P2P systems, and
therefore select ORAM as a starting point for our solution. To the best of our
knowledge, OBLIVP2P is the first work that adapts ORAM to accesses in a P2P
setting. However, directly employing ORAM to hide access patterns in a P2P
system is challenging. We outline two key challenges in designing an oblivious
and a scalable P2P protocol using ORAM.
Obliviousness. The first challenge arises due to the difference in the setting of a
standard ORAM as compared to a P2P content sharing system. Classical ORAM
solutions consists of a single client which securely accesses an untrusted storage
(server), wherein the client is eventually the owner and the only user of the data
in the memory. In contrast, P2P systems consist of a set of trusted trackers
managing the network, and multiple data owners (peers) in the network. Each
peer acts both as a client as well as a server in the network i.e., a peer can either
request for a data or respond to other peer’s request with the data stored on its
machine. Hence, adversarial peers present in the network can see the plaintext
and learn the data requested by other peers, a threat that does not exists in the
traditional ORAM model where only encrypted data is seen by the servers.
Scalability. The second challenge lies in seeking an oblivious P2P system that
1) the throughput scales linearly with the number of peers in the network, 2)
has no centralized bottleneck and 3) can be parallelized with an overall accept-
able throughput. In standard ORAM solutions, the (possibly distributed) server
is responsible for serving all the data access requests from a client one-by-one.
In contrast, P2P systems operate on a large-scale with multiple peers (clients)
requesting resources from each other simultaneously without overloading a par-
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ticular entity. To retain scalability of P2P systems, it is necessary to ensure
that requests can be served by distributing the communication and computation
overhead.
Solution Overview. We start with a toy construction (OBLIVP2P-0) which di-
rectly adapts ORAM to a P2P setting, and then present our main contribution
which is a more efficient solution (OBLIVP2P-1).
Centralized Protocol (OBLIVP2P-0): Our centralized protocol or OBLIVP2P-
0, is a direct adaptation of ORAM in a P2P system. The peers in the network
behave both like distributed storage servers as well as clients. They request a
centralized, trusted tracker to access a particular resource. The tracker performs
all the ORAM operations to fetch the resource from the network and returns it
to the requesting peer. However, this variant of OBLIVP2P protocol has limited
scalability as it assigns heavy computation to the tracker, making it a bottleneck.
Distributed Protocol (OBLIVP2P-1): As our main contribution, we present
OBLIVP2P-1 which provides both obliviousness and scalability properties in
a tracker-based P2P system. To attain scalability, the key idea is to avoid any
single entity (say the tracker) as a bottleneck. This requires distributing all the
ORAM operations for fetching and sharing of resources among the peers in
the network, while still maintaining obliviousness guarantees. To realize such
a distributed protocol, our main building block, which we call Oblivious Se-
lection (OblivSel), is a novel combination of private information retrieval with
recent advances in ORAM. Oblivious Selection gives us a scalable way to se-
curely distribute the load of the tracker. Our construction is proven secure in the
honest-but-curious adversary model. Constructions and proofs for arbitrarily
malicious fraction of peers is slated for future work.
4.1.2 System and Results
We provide a prototype implementation of both OBLIVP2P-0 and OBLIVP2P-
1 protocols in Python. Our source code is available online [32]. We exper-
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imentally evaluate our implementation on DeterLab testbed with 15 servers
simulating up to 214 peers in the network. Our experiments demonstrate that
OBLIVP2P-0 is limited in scalability with the tracker as the main bottleneck.
The throughput for OBLIVP2P-1, in contrast, scales linearly with increase in
the number of peers in the network. It attains an overall throughput of 3.19
MBps for a network of 214 peers that corresponds to 7 requests per second for a
block size of 512 KB. By design, OBLIVP2P-1 is highly parallelizable over the
computational capacity available in a real P2P network. Further, our protocol
exhibits no bottleneck on a single entity in experiment, thereby confirming that
the network and the computational overhead can be completely offloaded to the
P2P network.
Contributions. We summarize our contributions below:
• Problem Formulation. We formulate the problem of making data access
pattern oblivious in P2P systems. This is a necessary and important step
in building defenses against long-term traffic analysis.
• New Protocols. We propose OBLIVP2P— a first candidate for an obliv-
ious peer-to-peer protocol in content sharing systems. Our main building
block is a primitive which we refer to as oblivious selection that makes
a novel use of recent advances in Oblivious RAM combined with private
information retrieval techniques.
• System Implementation & Evaluation. Our prototype implementation
is available online [32]. We experimentally evaluate our protocol to mea-
sure the overall throughput of our system, latency for accessing resources
and the impact of optimizations on the system throughput.
4.2 Problem
Many P2P applications are not designed with security in mind, making them
vulnerable to traffic pattern analysis. We consider BitTorrent as our primary
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case study. However, the problem we discuss is broadly applicable to other
P2P file sharing systems like Gnutella [20], Freenet [18] and Storj [44] or peer-
assisted CDNs such as Akamai Netsession [1], Squirrel [149] and APAC [150].
4.2.1 BitTorrent: A P2P Protocol
The BitTorrent protocol allows sharing of large files between users by dividing
it into blocks and distributing it among the peers. It has a dynamic network,
made up of a number of nodes that join the network and volunteer themselves
as peers. Each peer holds data blocks in its local storage and acts both as a client
/ requester and server / sender simultaneously. There exists a tracker that tracks
which peers are downloading / uploading which file and saves the state of the
network. It keeps information regarding the position or the IP addresses of peers
holding each resource but does not store any real data blocks. A peer requests
the tracker for a particular resource and the tracker responds with a set of IP
addresses of peers holding the resource. The requester then communicates with
these IP addresses to download the blocks of the desired resource. The peers
interact with each other using a P2P protocol1. The requester concatenates all
the blocks received to construct the entire resource.
4.2.2 Threat Model
In our threat model, we consider the tracker as a trusted party and peers as
passive honest-but-curious adversaries i.e., the peers are expected to correctly
follow the protocol without deviating from it to learn any extra information.
In P2P systems including CDNs (content delivery networks) and BitTorrent,
passive monitoring is already a significant threat on its own. We consider the
following two types of adversaries:
1We want to emphasize that there are other models of P2P networks without tracker based
on DHT that we are not addressing in this work.
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Global Passive Adversary. Since BitTorrent traffic is public, there exist tools
like Global BitTorrent Monitor [42] or BitStalker [72] that support accurate and
efficient monitoring of BitTorrent. Previous research has shown that any BitTor-
rent user can be logged within a span of 3 hours, revealing his digital identity
and the content downloaded [104]. Further, the adversary can log the commu-
nication history of the network traffic to perform offline analysis at a later stage.
Hence, we consider it rational to assume the presence of a global adversary with
the capability to observe long term traffic in the network.
Passive Colluding Peers. Some of the peers in the P2P network can be con-
trolled by the global adversary. They can further collude to exchange data with
other adversarial peers in the system. While colluding these “sybil” peers can
share information such as observed / served requests and the contents stored at
their local storage. Their goal is to collectively glean information about other
peers in the network. A formal definition of passive colluding peers is as fol-
lows:
Definition 4.2.1. (Passive Colluding peers) We say that a peer Pi passively col-
ludes with peer Pj if both peers share their views without any modification,
where a view consists of: a transcript of the sequence of all accesses made by
Pi, a partial or total copy of peer’s private storage, and a transcript of the ac-
cess pattern induced by the sequence of accesses. We denote by C(Pi) the set of
colluding peers with Pi.
Note that from the above definition, we have a symmetric relation such that
if Pi ∈ C(Pj) for i 6= j, then Pj ∈ C(Pi) and further C(Pi) = C(Pj). It follows
that if Pi /∈ C(Pj), then C(Pi) and C(Pj) are disjoint.
Our protocol tolerates a fraction of c adversarial peers in the network such
that c ∈ O(N ), where N is the total number of peers in the network and  < 1.
Although the P2P network undergoes churn, we assume the fraction of adversar-
ial peers c remains within the asymptotic bounds of O(N ). Our choice of the
upper bound for c ensures an exponentially small advantage to the attacker; for
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an application that can tolerate higher attacker’s advantage, a larger malicious
fraction can be allowed.
4.2.3 Insufficiency of Existing Approaches
Existing techniques propose anonymizing users to prevent traffic pattern analy-
sis attacks. However, these solutions are not sufficient to protect against a global
adversary with long term access to communication patterns.
Unlinkability Techniques (e.g. Mixnet). Existing anonymity approaches “un-
link” the sender from the receiver (see survey [115]). Chaum proposed the first
anonymous network called mix network [100], which shuffles messages from
multiple senders using a chain of proxy servers and sends them to the receiver.
Another recent system called Riposte guarantees traffic analysis resistance by
unlinking a sender from its message [109]. However, all these systems are prone
to attack if an adversary can observe multiple request rounds in the network.
For example, consider that Alice continuously communicates with Bob us-
ing a mixnet service. A global adversary observes this communication for a
couple of rounds, and records the recipient set in each round. Let the senders’
set consists of S1 = {Alice, a, b, c} and S2 = {a′, b′, Alice, c′}, and the recipi-
ents’ set consists of R1 = {x, y, z, Bob} and R2 = {x′, y′, Bob, z′} for rounds
1 and 2 respectively. The attacker can then infer the link between sender and
receiver by intersecting S1∩S2 = {Alice} and R1∩R2 = {Bob}. The attacker
learns that Alice is communicating with Bob, and thus breaks the unlinkabil-
ity. This attack is called the intersection, hitting set or statistical disclosure at-
tack [63,159]. Overall, one time unlinkability is not a sufficient level of defense
when the adversary can observe traffic for arbitrary rounds.
Path Non-Correlation (e.g. Onion routing). Another approach for guar-
anteeing anonymity is to route the message from a path such that the sender
and the receiver cannot be correlated by a subset of passive adversarial nodes.
Onion-routing based systems like Tor enable anonymous communication by us-
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ing a sequence of relays as intermediate nodes (called circuit) to forward traf-
fic [69, 123]. However, Tor cannot provide sender anonymity when the attacker
can see both the ends of the communication, or if a global adversary observes
the entire network. Hence, if an attacker controls the entry and the exit peer then
the adversarial peers can determine the recipient identity with which the initiator
peer is communicating [127, 128, 224, 225]. This is a well-known attack called
the end-to-end correlation attack or traffic confirmation attack [49, 51].
4.2.4 Problem Statement
Our goal is to design a P2P protocol that prevents linking a user to a requested re-
source using traffic pattern analysis. Section 4.2.3 shows how previous anonymity
based solutions are susceptible to attacks in our threat model. In this work, we
address this problem from a new viewpoint, by making the communication pat-
tern oblivious in the network. We advocate that hiding data / resource access
pattern is a necessary and important step in designing traffic pattern analysis
resistant P2P systems.
In a P2P system such as BitTorrent, a user accesses a particular resource by
either downloading (Fetch) or uploading (Upload) it to the network. We propose
to build an oblivious P2P content sharing protocol (OBLIVP2P) that hides the
data access patterns of users in the network. We formally define an Oblivious
P2P protocol as follows:
Definition 4.2.2. (ObliviousP2P): Let (P1, · · · , Pn) and T be respectively a set
of n peers and a tracker in a P2P system. We denote by −→xi = (xi,1, · · · , xi,M)
a sequence of M accesses made by peer Pi such that xi,j = (opi,j, fidi,j, filei,j)
where opi,j = {Upload,Fetch}, fidi,j is the filename being accessed, and filei,j is
the set of blocks being written in the network if opi,j = Upload.
We denote by A(−→xi ) the access pattern induced by the access sequence −→xi
of peer Pi. The access pattern is composed of the memory arrays of all peers
accessed while running the sequence −→xi . We say that a P2P is oblivious if for
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any two equal-length access sequences −→xi and −→xj by two peers Pi and Pj such
that
• Pj /∈ C(Pi)
• ∀k ∈ [M ] : xi,k = Fetch ⇔ xj,k = Fetch ∧ xi,k = Upload ⇔ xj,k =
Upload
• ∀k ∈ [M ], |filei,k| = |filej,k|
are indistinguishable for all probabilistic poly-time adversaries except for
C(Pi), C(Pj), and tracker T .
Scope. OBLIVP2P guarantees resistance against persistent communication traf-
fic analysis i.e., observing the path of communication and thereby linking a
sender to a particular resource. OBLIVP2P does not prevent against:
a) Active Tampering: An adversarial peer can tamper, alter and deviate from
the protocol to learn extra information. Admittedly, this can have an impact on
obliviousness, correctness and availability of the network.
b) Side Channels: An adversary can monitor any peer in the system to infer its
usage’s habits via side channels: the number of requests, time of activity, and
total number of uploads. In addition, an adversary can always infer the total
file size that any peer is downloading or uploading to the P2P network. Litera-
ture shows that some attacks such as website fingerprinting can be based on the
length of file requested by peers [191].
c) Orthogonal Attacks: Other attacks in P2P file sharing systems consist of
threats such as poisoning of files by uploading corrupted, fake or misleading
content [161] or denial of service attacks [129]. However, these attacks do not
focus on learning private information about the peers and hence are orthogonal
to our problem.
Admittedly, our assumption about honest-but-curious is less than ideal and
simplifies analysis. We hope that our construction spurs future work on tack-
ling the active or arbitrary malicious adversaries. Emerging trusted computing
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primitives (e.g., Intel SGX [25]) or cryptographic measures [192] are promising
directions to investigate. Lastly, OBLIVP2P should not be confused with tra-
ditional anonymous systems where a user is anonymous among a set of users.
OBLIVP2P does not guarantee sender or receiver anonymity, but hides data ac-
cess patterns of the users.
4.3 Our Approach
As a defense against traffic pattern analysis, we guarantee oblivious access pat-
terns in P2P systems. We consider Oblivious RAM as a starting point.
4.3.1 Background: Tree-Based ORAM
Oblivious RAM, introduced by Goldreich and Ostrovsky [142], is a crypto-
graphic primitive that prevents an adversary from inferring any information via
the memory access pattern. Tree-based ORAM introduced by Shi et al. [210] of-
fers a poly-logarithmic overhead which is further reduced due to improvements
suggested in the follow up works [87, 112, 121, 182, 206, 213]. In particular, we
use Ring ORAM, [206], one of the latest improvements for tree-based ORAM in
our protocol. In Ring ORAM, to store N data blocks, the memory is organized
in a (roughly) logN -height full binary tree, where each node contains z real
blocks and s dummy blocks. Whenever a block is accessed in the tree, it is as-
sociated to a new randomly selected leaf identifier called, tag. The client stores
this association in a position map PosMap along with a private storage (stash).
To read and write to the untrusted memory, the client performs an Access fol-
lowed by an Evict operation described at a high level as follows:
• Access(adr): Given address adr, the client fetches the leaf identifier tag
from PosMap. Given tag, the client downloads one block per every node
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Figure 4.1: Mapping of a client / server ORAM model to a P2P system
client decrypts the retrieved blocks, and retrieves the desired block. This
block is appended to the stash.
• Evict(A, ν): After A accesses, the client selects a path P(ν) based on a
deterministic reverse lexicographic order, downloads the path, decrypts
it and appends it to the stash. The client runs the least common ancestor
algorithm to sort the blocks as in [213]. Finally, the client freshly encrypts
the blocks and writes them back to the nodes in the path.
The stash is upper bounded by O(logN). The overall bandwidth may reach
' 2.5 logN , forN blocks stored. In Ring ORAM, eviction happens periodically
after a controllable parameter A = 2z accesses where z is the number of blocks
in each bucket [206].
4.3.2 Mapping an ORAM to a P2P setting
We start from a traditional ORAM in a client / server model where the client
is trusted and the server is not, and simulate it on a tracker / peers setting. In
particular, we consider that the server’s memory is organized in a tree structure,
and we delegate every node in the tree to a peer. That is, a full binary tree of
N leaves is now distributed among Np = 2N − 1 peers (refer to Figure 4.1).
In practice, many nodes can be delegated to many peers based on the storage
capacity of each peer.
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Contrary to the client / server setting where the client is the only one who
can fetch, modify or add a block, in P2P, the peers can also request and add
new blocks. In addition, the peers are volatile, i.e, many peers can join or leave
the network. Moreover, from a security perspective, the network peers do not
trust each other, and an adversarial peer can always be interested in finding out
the block being retrieved by other peers. To avoid this, the tracker instructs the
peers in a P2P system to save encrypted blocks in their local memory (different
from the conventional BitTorrent model). Our construction ensures that the peer
neither has the keys necessary to decrypt its storage nor can it collude with
other adversarial peers to recover it. In this setting, we first present a strawman
approach that guarantees our security goal but is restricted in terms of scalability.
4.3.3 OBLIVP2P-0 : Centralized Protocol
Almost all ORAM constructions are in a client / server setting and not designed
for a P2P setting. A simple approach is to map the role of the trusted client in
an ORAM setting (refer to Figure 4.1) to the trusted tracker in a P2P system.
The client in ORAM is simulated by the trusted tracker (storing the position
map, private keys and the stash) and the server by the untrusted peers (storing
the encrypted blocks). With such a mapping from an ORAM model to a P2P
setting, a peer (initiator) can request for a resource to the tracker. To access a
particular resource, the tracker fetches the blocks from a path in the tree and
decrypts them to get the desired block. It then returns the requested resource
to the initiator peer. This simple plug-&-play construction satisfies all our P2P
security requirements.
In OBLIVP2P-0, the trusted tracker behaves as the client in traditional ORAM
model. Whenever a peer requests a block, the tracker performs all the ORAM
access work, and then sends the plaintext block to the initiator. The tracker
downloads the path composed of a logarithmic number of nodes, writes back
the path with a fresh re-encryption before routing the block to the initiator. As
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long as the tracker is trusted, this ensures the obliviousness property of peers’
accesses, as stated by definition 4.2.2.
Upload algorithm. To upload a file, the peer divides it into data blocks and
sends the blocks to the tracker. The tracker appends the block to the stash stored
locally while generating new random tags. The tracker updates accordingly
TagMap, and FileMap (refer to Table 4.1).
Fetch algorithm. To fetch a file, the peer sends the file identifier, as an instance
a filename, to the tracker. The tracker fetches from the FileMap and TagMap the
corresponding blocks and sends requests to the corresponding peers to retrieve
the blocks, following the Ring ORAM Access protocol. For every retrieved
block, the tracker sends the plaintext block to the requesting peer.
Sync algorithm. The synchronization happens after everyA ' 2z accesses [206]
(e.g., nearly 8 accesses) at which point the tracker evicts the stash.
Tracker as Bottleneck. In OBLIVP2P-0, the tracker has to transmit / encrypt
a logarithmic number of blocks on every access. The tracker requires a band-
width of O(logN · B) where B is the block size and the computation cost of
O(logN · E) where E is time for encrypting / decrypting a block. Moreover,
our evaluation in Section 4.5 shows that the eviction step is network-intensive.
In a P2P setting with large number of accesses per second, the tracker creates a
bottleneck in the network.
4.3.4 OBLIVP2P-0 Analysis
Our analysis follow from Ring ORAM construction. To access a block the
tracker has to transmit ∼ 2.5 logN · B bits per access. During a block access
or eviction, any peer at any time transmits O(B) bits. The tracker’s main com-
putational time consists of decrypting and encrypting the stash. Since the stash
has a size of O(logN) blocks, the tracker does O(logN) blocks encryption/de-
cryption. In terms of storage, every peer has (z + s) blocks to store, where z is
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number of real blocks and s is a parameter for dummy blocks. From a security
perspective, it is clear that if there are two sequences verifying the constraints of
Definition 4.2.2, a malicious peer monitoring their access pattern cannot infer
the retrieved blocks, since after every access the block is assigned to a random
path in the simulated ORAM.
4.4 OBLIVP2P-1: Distributed Protocol
In this section, we describe our main contribution, OBLIVP2P-1 protocol that
provides both security and scalability properties. In designing such a protocol,
our main goal is to avoid any bottleneck on the tracker i.e., none of the real
blocks should route through the tracker for performing an access or evict opera-
tions of ORAM. We outline the challenges in achieving this property while still
retaining the obliviousness in the network.
4.4.1 Challenges
First Attempt. A first attempt to reduce tracker’s overhead is to modify OBLIVP2P-
0 such that the heavy computation of fetching the path of a tree and decrypting
the correct block is offloaded to the initiator peer. On getting a resource request
from a peer, the tracker simply sends information to the peer that includes the
path of the tree to fetch, the exact position of the requested block and the key
to decrypt it. However, unlike standard ORAM, the peer in our model is not
trusted. Giving away the exact position of the block to the initiator peer leaks
additional information about the requested resource in our model, as we explain
next.
Recall that in a tree-based ORAM, blocks are distributed in the tree such that
the recently accessed blocks remain in the top of the tree. In fact, after every
eviction the blocks in the path are pushed down as far as possible from the root
of the tree. As an instance, after N deterministic evictions, all blocks that were
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never accessed are (very likely) in the leaves. Conversely, consider that an ad-
versarial peer makes two back-to-back accesses. In the first access, it retrieves
a block from the top of the tree while in the second access it retrieves a block
from a leaf. The adversarial peer (initiator) learns that the first block is a pop-
ular resource and is requested before by other peers while the second resource
is a less frequently requested resource. This is a well known issue in tree-based
ORAM, and is recently formulated as the block history problem [208]. Dis-
closing the block position, while hiding the scheme obliviousness requires to
address the block history challenge in ORAM. Unfortunately, an ORAM hides
the block history only if the communication spent to access a block dominates
the number of blocks stored in the entire ORAM. This would be asymptotically
equivalent to downloading the entire ORAM tree from all the peers. We refer
readers to [208] for more details.
Second Attempt. Our second attempt is a protocol that selects a block while
hiding the block position from the adversary i.e., to hide which node on the
path holds the requested block. Note that in a tree-based ORAM, disclosing the
path does not break obliviousness, but leaking which node on the path holds the
requested block is a source of leakage. One trick is to introduce a circuit, a set
of peers from the P2P network, that will simulate the operations of a mixnet.
That is, the peers holding the path of the tree send their content to the first peer
in the circuit, who then applies a random permutation, adds a new encryption
layer, and sends the permuted path to the second peer and so on. The tracker,
who knows all the permutations, can send the final block position (unlinked
from original position) to the initiator, along with the keys to decrypt the block.
The mixing guarantees that the initiator does not learn the actual position of the
block. We note that mixing used here is for only one accessed “path”, which
is already randomized by ORAM. Hence, it is not susceptible to intersection
attack discussed in Section 4.2.3. Finally, the initiator then peels off all layers
of the desired block to output the plaintext block.
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Structure Mapping Purpose
FileMap file id fid to block addresses {adri}i∈[ fB ] Blocks identification
TagMap block address adr to tag $←− [NB ] Path identification
NetMap
peer id pid to network info(
IP, port
) ∈ {0, 1}128+16 Network representation
PosMap
block address adr to path and bucket
position pos ∈ [Np]× [L · z + |stash|]
Block exact localization
KeyMap block address adr to key value k $←− Zq
Input of key block
generation
StashList peers’ identifiers {pidi}i∈[|stash|] Stash localization
Table 4.1: Various meta-information contained in the state s, for OBLIVP2P-0
and OBLIVP2P-1. B is the block size in bits, NP the number of peers, NB
number of blocks, L the path length, and z the bucket size.
However, there is an important caveat remaining in using this method. Note
that the initiator has the keys to peel off all the layers of encryption and hence it
has access to the same encrypted block fetched from the path in the tree. Thus,
it can determine which peer’s encrypted block was finally selected as the output
of the mixnet. Hence, delegating the keys to the initiator boils down to giving
her the block position. One might think of eliminating this issue by routing the
block through the tracker to peel off all layers, but this will just make the tracker
again a bottleneck.
So far, our attempts have shown limitations, but pointed out that there is a
need to formally define the desired property. Considering a tracker, the initiator,
and the peers holding the path, we seek a primitive that given a set of encrypted
blocks, the initiator can get the desired plaintext block, while no entity can in-
fer the block position but the tracker. We refer to this primitive as Oblivious




























Figure 4.2: Oblivious Selection protocol using IT-PIR and Seed Homomorphic
PRG as base primitives
4.4.2 Oblivious Selection
4.4.2.1 Definitions
We define OblivSel and its properties as follows:
Definition 4.4.1. (Oblivious Selection). OblivSel is a tuple of two probabilistic
algorithms (Gen, Select) such that:
• (~σ,~r) ← Gen(k, pos): a probabilistic algorithm run by the tracker, takes
as input a key k and the block position pos, picks uniformly at random
m peers (P1, · · · , Pm), and outputs (~σ,~r) where ~σ = {σ1, · · · , σm} and
~r = {r1, · · · , rm} such that (σi, ri) is given to the ith peer Pi.
• ∆ ← Select(~σ,~r,Enc(k1, block1), · · · ,Enc(kL, blockL)): a probabilistic
algorithm run by m peers, takes as input ~σ, ~r, and a set of encrypted
blocks Enc(ki, blocki), for i ∈ [L], and outputs the value ∆.
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Definition 4.4.2. OblivSel, is correct, if
Pr[∀ pos ∈ [L], k ∈ {0, 1}λ, (~σ,~r)← Gen(k, pos);
∆← Select(~σ,~r,Enc(k1, block1), · · · ,Enc(kL, blockL));
∆ = Dec(k,Enc(kpos, blockpos))] = 1
For instance, if (Enc,Dec) is a private key encryption, OblivSel returns a
decrypted block when the key given as input to the Gen function is the same as
the private key of the block i.e., ∆ = blockpos if k = kpos.
Definition 4.4.3. (Position Hiding.) We say that OblivSel is a position hiding
protocol if for all probabilistic polynomial time global adversaries, including
the initiator and the m peers, guess the position of the block pos with a negligi-
ble advantage in the implicit security parameter.
4.4.2.2 OblivSel Overview
The intuition for constructing OblivSel stems from the fact that the tracker can-
not give the position or private key of the desired block to the peers in the net-
work.
To privately select a block from the path without leaking its position, we pro-
pose to use an existing cryptographic primitive, called information-theoretical
private information retrieval (IT-PIR) [103]. IT-PIR requires a linear compu-
tation proportional to the data size that makes it expensive to use for real time
settings. However, note that in our setting, we want to obliviously select a block
from a logarithmic number of blocks (i.e., a path of the tree). Thus, applying
IT-PIR over tree-based ORAM comes with significant computational improve-
ment, hence making it practical to use in our protocol. The high level idea is
to apply IT-PIR primitive only on one path since the obliviousness is already
guaranteed by the underlined tree-based ORAM construction.
Figure 4.2 shows the steps involved in our OblivSel primitive. As a first step,
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the tracker randomly samples m peers from the network. For a bounded num-
ber of colluding adversarial peers in the system, this sample will contain at least
one honest peer with high probability. The blocks of the path are fetched by all
of the m peers. Each of the m peers then locally computes an encrypted share
of the desired block using IT-PIR from the set of input blocks. Note that the
tracker must not download the shares or it will violate our scalability require-
ment. On the other hand, we require to decrypt the block without giving away
the private key to the network’s peers. For this purpose, we make use of a sec-
ond cryptographic primitive — a seed homomorphic pseudo-random generator
(SH-PRG) [81]. The tracker generates a valid key share for each of the m peers
to be used as seeds to the PRG function. Each peer decrypts (or unblinds) its
encrypted share using its own key share such that the combination of decrypted
shares results in a valid decryption of the original encrypted block in the tree.
This property is ensured by SH-PRG and explained in detail in Section 4.4.2.3.
Finally, each peer submits its decrypted share to the initiator peer who combines
them to get the desired plaintext block. The colluding peers cannot recover the
private key or the encrypted block since there is at least one honest peer who
does not disclose its private information. This solves the issues raised in our
second attempt.
Remark. OblivSel primitive can be used as a black box in different settings such
as distributed ORAMs to decrease the communication overhead. We further
show in Section 4.4.2.4 that OblivSel is highly parallelizable and can leverage
peers in the network such that the computation takes constant time.
4.4.2.3 Base Primitives
Information-theoretic PIR. Information-theoretic private information retrieval
(IT-PIR) [103] is a cryptographic primitive that performs oblivious read oper-
ations while requiring multiple servers m ≥ 2. In the following, we present
the details of one of the first constructions of IT-PIR by Chor et al. [103] which
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Algorithm 2: IT-PIR protocol by Chor et al. [103]
1 (r1, · · · , rm)← Query(q, L, pos)
• randomly generate m− 1 random vectors such that ri $←− ZLq
• compute rm such that for all j ∈ [L] \ {pos}, set rm,j = −
∑m−1
k=1 rk,j ,




• parse database such as DB = (block1, · · · , blockL)
• compute Ri =
∑L
j=1 ri,jBlockj
blockpos ← Recover(R1, · · · ,Rm): compute blockpos =
∑m
j=1Ri
is secure even when m− 1 among m servers collude passively, i.e., the servers
collude in order to recover the retrieved block while not altering the protocol. An
IT-PIR is a tuple of possibly randomized algorithms IT− PIR = (Query,Compute,
Recover). Query takes as an input the block position pos to be retrieved, and
outputs an IT-PIR query for m servers. Compute runs independently by ev-
ery server, takes as input the corresponding IT-PIR query and outputs a share.
Recover takes as inputs all shares output by all m servers, and outputs the plain-
text block. We give the construction in Algorithm 2.
Seed homomorphic PRG (SH-PRG). A seed homomorphic PRG,G, is a pseudo-
random generator over algebraic group with the additional property that if given
G(s1) and G(s2), then G(s1 ⊕ s2) can be computed efficiently. That is, if the
seeds are in a group (S,⊕), and outputs in (G,⊗), then for any s1, s2 ∈ S,
G(s1 ⊕ s2) = G(s1)⊗G(s2). We refer to [188] for more details.
Decryption / Re-encryption using SH-PRG. Leveraging the property of SH-
PRG, we explain the encryption, decryption and re-encryption of a block in our
protocol. Every block in the tree is encrypted as Enc(k1, block) = block +
G(k1). The decryption of the block can be then represented as block = Dec(k1,
Enc(k1, block)) = block + G(k1)− G(k1) For re-encrypting the encrypted block
with a different key k2, the tracker decrypts the encrypted block with a new
secret key of the form k1 − k2 such that, Dec(k1 − k2,Enc(k1, block)) = block+
G(k1)− G(k1 − k2) = block + G(k2) = Enc(k2, block).
83
Algorithm 3: OblivSel with seed-homomorphic PRG
1 (~σ,~r)← Gen(k, pos)
• set ~r = (r1, · · · , rm)← IT− PIR.Query(q, L, pos);
• set ~σ = (σ1, · · · , σm), s.t., (σ1, · · · , σm−1) $←− Sm−1, and σm = k−
∑m−1
i=1 σi;
block← Select(~σ,~r,DB) // Every peer Pi
• compute Esharei ← IT− PIR.Compute(ri,DB);
• set Dsharei = Esharei −G(σi);
// Initiator
• compute ∆ = ∑mi=1Dsharei;
4.4.2.4 OblivSel Instantiation
In the following, we present an instantiation of OblivSel. We consider a set of
L encrypted blocks. Each block blocki is a vector of elements in a finite group
G of order q. For every block, the key is generated at random from Zq. The
tracker has to keep an association between the block key and its position. An
algorithmic description is given in Algorithm 3.
The tracker runs the Gen algorithm, which takes as inputs the secret key
k with which the block is encrypted and the block’s position pos, and outputs
a secret shared value of the key, ~σ, as well as the IT-PIR queries, ~r. Every
peer Pi holds a copy of the L encrypted blocks and receives a share of the
key, σi, as well as its corresponding query, ri. Next, every peer runs locally
an IT− PIR.Compute on the encrypted blocks and outputs a share, Esharei.
After getting the encrypted share Esharei, each peer subtracts the evaluation
of the SH-PRG G on σi from Esharei (Esharei −G(σi)) to get the decrypted
share Dshare. Finally, initiator outputs the sum of all the Dsharei’s received
from the m peers to get the desired decrypted block. As long as there is one
non-colluding peer among the m peers and G is a secure PRG, the scheme is
position hiding.
Highly Parallelizable. Notice that, in Algorithm 3, each of the m peers per-
forms scalar multiplications proportional to the number of encrypted input blocks.

































O( logNN ) − O( log
4N
N · E) O(burst) −
Table 4.2: Comparison of OBLIVP2P instantiation per access. B the block size,
N the number of blocks in the network, E the overhead of a block encryption,
E a multiplication in elliptic curve group, burst the number of versions.
peer performs constant number of scalar multiplications. Given the availability
of enough peers in the network, OblivSel is extremely parallelizable and there-
fore provides a constant time computation.
OblivSel as a building block. OblivSel protocol can be used as a building block
in our second and main OBLIVP2P-1. For fetching a block, an invocation of
OblivSel is sufficient as it obliviously selects the requested block and returns it
in plaintext to the initiator. Additional steps such as re-encrypting the block and
adding it to stash are required to complete the fetch operation. The details of
these steps are in Section 4.4.3.
However, the eviction operation in ORAM poses an additional challenge.
Conceptually, an eviction consists of block sorting, where the tracker re-orders
the blocks in the path (and the stash). Fortunately, our protocol can perform
eviction by several invocation of OblivSel primitive. Given the new position for
each block, the P2P network can be instructed to invoke OblivSel recursively
to output the new sorted path. The encryption of blocks has to be refreshed,
but this is handled within OblivSel protocol itself when refreshing the key, using
seed homomorphic PRG. We defer the concrete details of performing oblivious
eviction to Section 4.4.3.
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4.4.3 OBLIVP2P-1: Complete Design
In a P2P protocol for a content sharing system the tracker is responsible for
managing the sharing of resources among the peers in the network. To keep a
consistent global view on the network, the tracker keeps some state information
that we formally define below:
Definition 4.4.4. P2P network’s state consists of: (1) number of possible net-
work connections per peer, and (2) a lookup associating a resource to a (set of)
peer identifier.
The tracker can store more information in the state depending on the P2P
protocol instantiating the network. We start first by formalizing a P2P protocol.
Definition 4.4.5. A P2P protocol is a tuple of four (possibly interactive) algo-
rithms P2P = (Setup,Upload,Fetch, Sync) involving a tracker, T , and a set of
peers, (P1, · · · , Pn), such that:
• s′ ← Setup(s, {pid}): run by the tracker T , takes as inputs a state s and
a (possibly empty) set of peers identifiers {pid}, and outputs an updated
state s′.
• (out, (A′1, · · · , A′m), s′) ← Upload((fid, file), (A1, · · · ,Am), s): is an in-
teractive protocol between an initiator peer, a (possibly randomly se-
lected) set of m ≥ 0 peers, and a tracker T . The initiator peer has as
input a file identifier fid, and the file file, the peers’ input is memory ar-
ray Ai each, while for the tracker its state s. The initiator’s output is
out ∈ {⊥, file}, the peers output each a modified local memory A′i, while
the tracker outputs an updated state s′.
• (file,⊥, s′) ← Fetch(fid, (A1, · · · ,Am), s): is an interactive protocol be-
tween an initiator peer, a (possibly randomly selected) set ofm ≥ 0 peers,
and a tracker T . The initiator peer has as input a file identifier fid, the
peers’ input is a memory array Ai each, while for the tracker its state
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s. The initiator outputs the retrieved file file, each peer gets ⊥, while the
tracker outputs an updated state s.
• ((A′1, · · · , A′m), s′) ← Sync((A1, · · · ,Am), s): is an interactive protocol
between the tracker and a (possibly randomly selected) set of m ≥ 0
peers. The peers’ input is a memory array Ai each, while for the tracker
its state s. The peers output each a (possibly) modified memory array A′i,
while the tracker outputs an updated state s′.
Note that a modification of a file already stored in the network is always
considered as uploading a new file.
Setup Algorithm. In a P2P network, different peers have different storage ca-
pacities and hence we differentiate between the number of blocks, NB, and the
number of physical peers NP . For this, we fragment the conceptual ORAM tree
into smaller chunks where every peer physically handles a number of buckets
depending on its local available storage. In addition, to keep a consistent global
view on the network, the tracker keeps some state information. In OBLIVP2P-1,
the state is composed of different meta-information that are independent of the
block size: FileMap, PosMap, TagMap, NetMap, KeyMap, and StashMap. Ta-
ble 4.1 gives more details about the metadata. The state also contains a counter
recording the last eviction step, and ∼ B
log q
points sampled randomly from a
q-order elliptic curve group G to be used for DDH seed homomorphic PRG,
where B is the block size. The number of points in the generator needs to be
equal to those in the data block. These points are publicly known to all peers
in the network. The tracker randomly distributes the stash among the peers and
records this information in the StashList.
Fetch Algorithm. The Fetch process is triggered when a peer requests a partic-
ular file. The tracker determines the block tag and position from its state for all
the blocks composing the file. The m peers, the tracker, and the initiator runs
OblivSel protocol such that the initiator retrieves the desired block. The OblivSel
is invoked a second time to add a new layer to the retrieved block and send it
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Algorithm 4: Fetch(fid, s): OBLIVP2P-1 fetch operation
Input: file id fid, and state s
Output: file {block}, and updated state s
// Initiator requests tracker for a file
1 {adr} ← FileMap(fid);
2 for adr in {adr} do
3 (tag, pos)← (TagMap(adr),PosMap(adr));
4 k← KeyMap(adr);
5 compute (~σ,~r) := OblivSel.Gen(k, pos);
6 set A =
(
stash,P(tag, 1), · · · ,P(tag, L));
// Initiator retrieves the block
7 compute block := OblivSel.Select(~σ,~r,A);
// Re-encryption with a new secret
8 compute k $←− Zq;
9 compute (~σ,~r) := OblivSel.Gen(k, pos);
10 append ∆ := OblivSel.Select(~σ,~r,A) to the stash, and update state s;
11 end
to the peer who will hold the stash. The tracker updates its state, in particular,
update KeyMap with the new key, update the PosMap with the exact position
of the block in the network (in the stash), and TagMap with the new uniformly
sampled tag. We provide an algorithmic description of the Fetch process in
Algorithm 4.
Sync Algorithm. The Sync in OBLIVP2P-1 consists of: (1) updating the state
of the network, but also, (2) evicting the stash. The tracker determines the path
to be evicted, tag = ν mod 2L and then fetches the position of all blocks in
the stash and the path, P(tag). The tracker then generates, based on the least
common ancestor algorithm (LCA), a permutation pi that maps every block in
A =
(
stash,P(ν mod 2L, 1), · · · ,P(ν mod 2L, L)) to its new position in A′, a
new array that will replace the evicted path and the stash. The block A[pi(i)] will
be mapped obliviously to A′[i], for all i ∈ [|stash|+z ·L]. The oblivious mapping
between A and A′ is performed by invoking OblivSel between the tracker, the
peers in the path and m peers, |stash|+z ·L times. Note that (1) the blocks in A′
are encrypted with a freshly-generated key, and (2) the mapping is not disclosed
to any peers in the path as long as there is one non-colluding peer. Refer to
Algorithm 5 for more detail about the Sync algorithm.
Upload Algorithm. A peer can request the tracker to add a file. For this, the
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Algorithm 5: Sync(s): OBLIVP2P-1 sync operation
Input: tracker state s
// Fetch necessary parameters
1 ν ← s;
2 {adr} ← PosMap−1(ν mod 2L);
3 for adr in {adr} do
4 set T = T ∪ tag← TagMap(adr);
5 end
6 set A =
(
stash,P(ν mod 2L, 1), · · · ,P(ν mod 2L, L));
7 Initialize an array A′, pi ← LCA(T, ν);
// tracker generates key shares
8 for l from 1 to z · L+ |stash| do
9 if ∃adr, l = PosMap(adr) then
10 set k← KeyMap(adr);
11 set k′′ = k′ − k, k′ $←− Zq;
12 compute (~σl, ~rl) = OblivSel.Gen(k′′, pi(l));
13 else
14 set k′′ $←− Zq , compute (~σl, ~rl)= OblivSel.Gen(k′′, pi(l));
15 end
16 end
// Peers generate the new array A′
17 for j from 1 to z · L+ |stash| do
18 set A′[j] = OblivSel.Select(~σj , ~rj ,A);
19 end
20 for j ∈ [m], send A′j [1, · · · , |stash|] and A′j [|stash|+ 1, · · · , L] to peers in P(ν) and
the stash, and update state s;
tracker selects uniformly at random a set of m peers. The peer sends the file
in a form of blocks. Every block is secret shared such that every peer in the m
peers receives a share. The tracker generates a secret unique to the block, k. The
tracker secret shares k to the m peers. The peers evaluate a seed-homomorphic
PRG on the received shares and add it to the block share. Finally, the block is
appended to a randomly selected peer in the network to hold a part of the stash.
4.4.4 Optimization: Handling Bursts
OBLIVP2P-1 has a functional limitation inherited by ORAMs. Any access can-
not be started unless the previous one has concluded 2. In our case, the tracker
can handle fetching several blocks before starting the Sync operation. In our
setting, we target increasing the P2P network throughput while leveraging the
network storage and communication. In order to build a scalable system, we




O1: Replication. In Ring ORAM, A = 3 accesses can be performed before an
eviction is required. To support A parallel accesses, we replicate every block A
times in the tree. This absorbs the fetching access time and allows A simulta-
neous accesses, even for requests to the same resource. Additionally, we may
replicate every block over A times on different peers, in case that the peer hold-
ing the block is offline due to churn, and cannot serve the block to the other
peers. Lastly, the network operator can deploy multiple trackers to serve peers
simultaneously, which leads to the throughput of OBLIVP2P-1 proportional to
the number of trackers.
O2: Pipelining. While the eviction is highly parallelizable in OBLIVP2P-1, an
eviction can take a considerable amount of time to terminate. If we denote by
f the average number of fetch requests in the P2P network, and by t the time
to perform an eviction, then the system can handle all the accesses if t < 1
f
.
However, in practice t > 1
f
and therefore the accesses will be queued and creates
a bottleneck. To address this issue, we create multiple copies of the buckets that
are run with different instances of OBLIVP2P-1 protocol which overlays on the
same network. In the setup phase, every node creates l copies of its bucket
space. Every bucket will be associated to different versions of OBLIVP2P-
1 instantiations. For example, with replication we can handle A accesses in
parallel on the (same) ith version of the buckets, but the upcoming accesses
will be made on the (i + 1)th version. This will absorb the eviction time. To
sum up, having different versions will increase the throughput of the system
to l
f
. In order to prevent pipeline stalls, we need to choose l ≥ t · f in our
implementation.
Another aspect (not considered for our implementation) for further opti-
mizations in our versioning solution is to distribute the communication over-
head of the peers in the network. In fact, the peers holding blocks at the higher
level of the tree will be accessed more often compared to lower levels. In order
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to distribute the communication load on the network peers, peers’ location can
be changed for different versions such that: the peer at the ith level of the tree
in the jth version will be placed at the (L − i + 1)th level of the tree in the
(j + 1)th version.
O3: Parallelizing Computation across m Peers. The scalar multiplication in
the elliptic curve is expensive and can easily delay the fetch and sync time. For
this, we consider every peer in the OblivSel as a set of peers. Whenever there is a
need to perform scalar multiplication over a path, several peers participate in the
computation and only the representative of the set will perform the aggregation.
This optimization speeds up the OblivSel to be proportional to the number of
peers’ used to parallelize a single peer.
4.5 Implementation and Evaluation
Implementation. We implement a prototype of OBLIVP2P-0 and OBLIVP2P-1
in Python. The implementation contains 1712 lines of code (LOC) for OBLIVP2P-
0 and 3226 for OBLIVP2P-1 accounting to a total of 4938 lines measured using
CLOC tool [10]. Our prototype implementation is open source and available
online [32]. As our building block primitives, we implement the Ring ORAM
algorithm, IT-PIR construction and seed-homomorphic PRG. For Ring ORAM,
we have followed the parameters reported by authors [206]. Each bucket con-
tains z = 4 blocks and s = 5 dummy blocks. The eviction occurs after every 3
accesses. The blocks in OBLIVP2P-0 are encrypted using AES-CBC with 256
bit key from the pycrypto library [40]. For implementing IT-PIR and seed ho-
momorphic PRG in OBLIVP2P-1, we use the ECC library available in Python
[41]. We use the NIST P-256 elliptic curve as the underlying group.
Experimental Setup. We use the DeterLab network testbed for our experi-
ments [16]. It consists of 15 servers running Ubuntu 14.04 with dual Intel(R)
Xeon(R) hexa-core processors running at 2.2 Ghz with 15 MB cache (24 cores
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each), Intel VT-x support and 24 GB of RAM. The tracker runs on a single server
while each of the remaining servers runs approximately 2400 peers. Every peer
process takes up to 4 − 60 MB memory which limits the maximum network
size to 214 peers in our experimental set up. The tracker is connected to a 128
MBps link and the peers in each server share a bandwidth link of 128 MBps as
well. We simulate the bandwidth link following the observed BitTorrent traffic
rate distribution reported in [79]. In our experimental setting, multiple peers are
simulated on a single machine hence our reported results here are conservative.
In the real BitTorrent setting, every peer has its own separate CPU.
Evaluation Methodology. To evaluate the scalability and efficiency of our sys-
tem, we perform measurements for a) the overall throughput of the system b)
the latency for Fetch and Sync operations and c) the data transferred through
the tracker for both OBLIVP2P-0 and OBLIVP2P-1. All our results are the av-
erage of 50 runs with 95% confidence intervals for each of them. Along with
the experimental results, we plot the theoretical bounds computed based on Ta-
ble 4.2. This helps us to check if our experiments match our theoretical expec-
tations. In addition, we perform separate experiments to demonstrate the effect
of our optimizations on the throughput of our OBLIVP2P-1 protocol. For our
experiments in this section, we leverage the technical optimization introduced
in Section 4.4.4.
We vary the number of peers in the system from 24 to 214 peers (capacity of
our testbed) and extrapolate them to 221 peers. Note that, when increasing the
number of peers, we implicitly increase the total data size in the entire network
which is computed as the number of peers × the block size. That is, our P2P
network handles a total data size that spans from 16 KB to 32 GB. For our eval-
uation, we consider each peer holds one ORAM bucket because of the limited
available memory. In reality, every peer can hold more buckets. Note that, we
linearly extrapolate our curves to show the expected results for larger number






















Figure 4.3: Theoretical (Th) and experimental (Ex) comparison of OBLIVP2P-
0 and OBLIVP2P-1 parameters for block size of 512 KB. The throughput for
OBLIVP2P-1 linearly scales with the increase in network size.
larger data size in the network. Aligned to the chunks in BitTorrent, we select
our blocksize as 128 KB, 512 KB and 1 MB.
4.5.1 Linear Scalability with Peers
The throughput is an important parameter in designing a scalable P2P protocol.
We define the throughput, as the number of bits that the system can serve per
second.
From Figure 4.3, we observe that the throughput of OBLIVP2P-0 decreases
with the increase in the total number of peers in the network. For a network
size of 214 peers, the experimental maximum throughput is 0.91 MBps. As we
extrapolate to larger network size, the maximum throughput decreases, e.g., for
221 peers, the throughput is 0.64 MBps. This shows that as the network size
increases, the tracker starts queuing the requests that will eventually lead to a
saturation. However, for OBLIVP2P-1, the maximum throughput for network
size of 214 is 3.19 MBps and is 3.29 MBps when extrapolated to 221 peers. The
throughput increases as there are more peers available in the network to dis-
tribute the computation costs. The throughput shows a similar behaviour for






















Figure 4.4: The latency for fetching a block for OBLIVP2P-1 reduces up to 213



















Figure 4.5: The latency for sync operation for OBLIVP2P-1 reduces up to 213





















Figure 4.6: The data transferred through the tracker for OBLIVP2P-0 increases



















Figure 4.7: The throughput for blocksize 128 KB and 1 MB increases with






















Figure 4.8: Impact of optimizations (O1-O3) on the throughput of OBLIVP2P-1
for 214 peers and blocksize of 512 KB.
OBLIVP2P-1 to provide better throughput in a real setting where more com-
putational and communication capacity for each peer can be provisioned. The
throughput values for OBLIVP2P-1 are calculated after applying all the 3 opti-
mizations discussed in Section 4.4.4. The behaviour of the theoretical through-
put matches our experimental results. The theoretical throughput has higher
values as it does not capture the network latency in our test environment.
Result 1. Our results show that the centralized protocol is limited in scalability
and cannot serve a large network. Whereas, the throughput for OBLIVP2P-1
linearly scales (0.15 − 3.39 MBps) with increasing number of peers (25 − 221)
in the network.
Result 2. For a block of size 512 KB and 214 peers, OBLIVP2P-1 serves around
7 requests / second which can be enhanced with multiple copies of ORAM trees
in the network.
Remark. The throughput may be acceptable to privacy-conscious users (e.g.,
whistleblowers), where privacy concerns outweigh download / upload latencies.
As long as the number of request initiators is small, the perceived throughput
remains competitive with a non-oblivious P2P system. Further, the network
operator can deploy multiple trackers to serve peers simultaneously, which leads
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to the throughput of OBLIVP2P-1 proportional to the number of trackers.
4.5.2 Latency Overhead and Breakdown
We define the latency as the time required to perform one ORAM operation in
our P2P protocol. We measure the latency for the following operations:
Fetch. Figure 4.4 shows that the average time for fetching a block of 512 KB in-
creases for OBLIVP2P-0 with increase in the size of the network. This is due to
the increased computation and bandwidth overhead at the tracker. However, for
OBLIVP2P-1, the latency initially reduces with the increasing number of peers
(from 25 to 211 ) and then becomes constant after the network is large enough
(around 213) to distribute the computation cost in the network3. OBLIVP2P-1
has a higher latency for fetch as compared to OBLIVP2P-0 due to the expensive
computation required for performing scalar multiplication. The average time for
fetching a block of size 512 KB is around 0.31 s for a network size of 214 peers
and remains steady with increase in the number of peers.
Sync. We measure the time for performing a sync operation for different net-
work sizes. Figure 4.5 shows that the time for performing a sync operation
increases in OBLIVP2P-0 with increase in the number of peers. Whereas for
OBLIVP2P-1, the sync time reduces gradually at first and then becomes steady
after the network size reaches 213 peers which is as expected through our theo-
retical calculation. OBLIVP2P-1 uses the peers in the network to distribute the
computation load and hence the sync time tends to be steady for large network
sizes.
Data transferred through tracker. Figure 4.6 shows the amount of data that
is transferred through the tracker per request. We perform this measurement to
show that the centralized tracker becomes a bottleneck in OBLIVP2P-0. The
3 Since a large number of nodes (e.g., over 1000 nodes) share one physical machine, its
limited computation power drastically affects our result. Therefore, to be more realistic, we use
the ideal computing time for each node solely in one physical machine as the computing time
per node, and simulate our experiments for OBLIVP2P-1.
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amount of data that the tracker has to process increases with increase in the
number of peers. At 221 peers, the amount of data is 118 MB (almost) reaching
the bandwidth limit (128 MBps) of the tracker. Whereas, for OBLIVP2P-1 the
amount of data transferred is around 1 MB for 221 peers. This implies that the
tracker could manage up to 128 copies of ORAM tree in parallel, which will
increase the overall throughput by 128 times.
Result 3. OBLIVP2P has no centralized infrastructure as a bottleneck, ensuring
that communication and computational overhead can be completely offloaded
to the network.
4.5.3 Optimization Measurements
We perform incremental experiments to quantify the impact of each of the in-
troduced optimizations on the overall throughput in Section 4.4.4, as shown in
Figure 4.8. We fix the number of peers in the network to be equal to 214 and
the block size to 512 KB. We chose our optimization parameters based on our
results in section 4.5.3. We fix the number of replicas to be equal to A = 3,
i.e., the same data block is replicated three times. The burst parameter needs to
be in O( B
log q
logNp), where Np is the number of peers, B the block size, and q
the elliptic curve group order. Finally, we fix the number of parallel peers in the
OblivSel.Select algorithm to be in O( B
log q
logNp).
O1: Replication. Replication enables to perform A = 3 fetch operations in
parallel. This implies that the throughput theoretically increases 3 times when
compared to our baseline without any optimizations. Our experimental results
show that we have 2.55 times improvement over the baseline, as expected theo-
retically.
O2: Pipelining. We evaluate the effect of our optimization (O2) that absorbs the
eviction time by pipelining the fetch requests to different versions of the ORAM
tree in the P2P network. We show that this optimization, when coupled to (O1),
has theoretically increased the overall throughput by 23.05 times if compared
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to the baseline. Our experiments are aligned to our theoretical results and show
17.2 times improvement over the baseline with a burst parameter of 17. Clearly,
if the number of versions increases beyond 17, then OBLIVP2P-1 can handle
parallel accesses, hence increasing the system throughput.
O3: Parallelizing m peers. We measure the effect of parallelizing the compu-
tation load of m peers by leveraging more peers in the network on the overall
throughput of the system. We increase the number of peers to 116 peers that
are used to compute the fetch and sync operations. Our theoretical result shows
an improvement of 4398 times over the baseline, when coupled with (O1) and
(O2). Our experiments support this result and demonstrates 1589 times im-
provement, the difference is due to the real network latency are not considered
in our theoretical calculation.
Result 4. OBLIVP2P-1 is subject to several optimizations due to its highly
parallelizable design.
4.6 OBLIVP2P-1 Analysis
In this section, we present the theoretical analysis on computation / communi-
cation overhead of tracker / peers and security analysis for OBLIVP2P-1.
4.6.1 Performance
We report OBLIVP2P-1 computation and communication overhead for the tracker
and the network in Table 4.2. In particular, OBLIVP2P-1’s tracker transmits a
number of bits independent of the block size, the tracker does not perform any
computation on the blocksize or store any block locally.
Tracker overhead. To fetch a block, the tracker invokes OblivSel twice. While
for the eviction, the tracker performs OblivSel
(
L · z + |stash|) times. That is,
it is sufficient to first analyze OblivSel overhead and than just conclude for the
overall tracker overhead.
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Within one instance of OblivSel, the tracker computes an IT− PIR.Query
that outputsm vectors form peers, each of sizeL·z+|stash|. Each IT− PIR.Query
vector costs log q(L · z + |stash|) bits, where q is the group order. The tracker
also needs to generate shares for the key, where the shares are in Zq. That is,
one OblivSel costs the tracker O
(
m · log q · (L · z + |stash|)).
That is, the tracker has to transmit O
(
m · log q · (L · z + |stash|)2) bits.
Considering L, |stash| ∈ O(logN), q the group order in poly(N), m the num-
ber of peers and z the bucket size as constants, then the tracker needs to send
O(log3N) bits independently of the block size. That is, if block ∈ Ω(log3N),
the tracker has a constant communication work per block. Moreover, the tracker
is very lightweight as it does not perform any heavy computation like encryption
/ decryption of blocks, which permits the tracker to handle frequent accesses.
Peers overhead. Considering the communication between the peers, the main
communication overhead comes from block transfer from the peers holding the
path to the selected m peers. The m peers are selected uniformly at random.
Each peer receives (z · L + |stash|) blocks from the peers in the selected path










blocks per peers in the network. Considering
z constant and L, |stash| ∈ O(logN), implies that every peer is expected to
transmit O( logN
N
) blocks per access.
In terms of computation, the main computational bottleneck consists of the
scalar multiplication from the seed homomorphic PRG. For every OblivSel, ev-
ery peer needs to perform (z ·L+ |stash|) · B
log q
scalar multiplications per block.
The second term, B
log q
, represents the number of points that a block contains.
We also have (z ·L+ |stash|) instances of OblivSel during the eviction. That is,
the total number of scalar multiplication equals O
(












We show that OBLIVP2P-1 is an oblivious P2P as stated by Definition 4.2.2.
For this, it is sufficient to show that an adversary cannot distinguish between
a randomly generated string and the access pattern leaked by any peer’s real
access. This underlines the fact that the access pattern is independent of the
address of the requested block. In our threat model, the adversary can have
access to the content of buckets, monitors the communication between the peers,
and has a total view of the internal state of dishonest peers. Buckets’ content is
assumed to be transmitted without any additional layer of encryption.
We present our address-tag experiment AT that captures our security defi-
nition. Let OBLIVP2P = (Setup,Upload,Fetch, Sync) represents an oblivious
P2P protocol. Let E = (Gen,Enc,Dec) be an IND$− CPA encryption scheme.
Let G be a secure pseudo-random generator. ATOblivP2PA,E,G refers to the instantia-
tion of the address-tag experiment by algorithms OBLIVP2P, E , G, and adver-
sary A. We denote by Col the event that m peers in the network collude and set
Pr[Col] = δm, by Bδm the Bernoulli distribution, and λ the security parameter.
In the following, we fix the number of colluding peers c ∈ O(N ), for 0 <
 < 1. We consider every peer in the network as a random variable distributed
based on a Bernoulli distribution with probability equal to c
N
∈ O(N −1). Let
us denote by (X1, · · · , Xm) the random variables of the selected peers for every
instantiation of OblivSel. Note that Pr[Col] = Pr[X1 = 1 AND · · · Xm = 1].




is, δm = ( cN )
m which implies under our assumptions that δm ∈ O(2logN ·m·(−1)).
In the following experiment, we only consider the Fetch algorithm for obliv-
iousness analysis. In our model, Upload sequences are indistinguishable by con-
struction assuming that peers uploads blocks that are randomly distributed, and
using random key for every block encryption. The experiment ATOblivP2PA,E,G (λ, b)
consists of:
• The adversary A picks one access operation (Fetch, adr,⊥) and sends it
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to the challenger C
• If b = 1, pick X Bδm←−− {0, 1}, if X = 1, then set var = adr , otherwise
var = ⊥ and set
pi1 ={
(P(tag, 1), · · · ,P(tag, L)), tag← TagMap[adr],(
Enc(q1), · · · ,Enc(qm)
)
,
(q1, · · · , qm)← IT− PIR.Query(pos),
pos← PosMap[adr], var}
If b = 0, set pi0 = {
(
P1, · · · , PL
) $←− Gz×L,(
q1, · · · , qm
) $←− {0, 1}λ×m,⊥}
• Adversary A has access to an oracle OOblivP2P that issues the access pat-
terns for polynomial number of accesses (while paths are re-encrypted for
every request)
• A outputs b′
• The output of the experiment is 1 if b = b′, otherwise 0. If ATOblivP2PA,E,G (λ, b′) =
1, we say that A won the experiment.
The experiment differentiates between a realistic setting where the adver-
sary can see the access pattern, and in which a possible colluding setting can
happen with a pre-fixed probability, δm, and an ideal setting where the adver-
sary receives a random string. We slightly re-formulate Definition 4.2.2 below.
Definition 4.6.1. We say that a P2P is oblivious iff for all PPT adversaries A,
there exists a negligible function negl such that:
Pr[ATOblivP2PA,E,G (λ, 1) = 1]− Pr[ATOblivP2PA,E,G (λ, 0) = 1] ≤ negl(λ)
Theorem 4.6.1. If ∀N > 1, and ∀ < 1, ∃m > 1 s.t. 2logN ·m·(1−) ∈ negl(λ), G
is a secure pseudo-random generator, E is IND$− CPA secure, then OBLIVP2P-
1 is an oblivious P2P as in Definition 4.6.1.
Proof. To prove our theorem, we proceed with a succession of games as follows:
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• Game0 is exactly the same as ATOblivP2PA,E,G (λ, 1)
• Game1 is the same as Game0 except that the blocks in the bucketsP(tag, i)
are replaced with random points from G
• Game2 is the same as Game1 except that the the encrypted IT− PIR queries
are replaced with random strings
From games’ description, we have
Pr[Game0 = 1] = Pr[AT
OblivP2P
A,E,G (λ, 1) = 1], (4.1)
For Game1, we can build a distinguisher B1 that reduces security of G to PRG
security such that:
Pr[Game0 = 1]− Pr[Game1 = 1] ≤ AdvPRGB1,G (λ), (4.2)
Similarly for Game1, we can build a distinguisherB2 that reduces E to IND$− CPA
security such that:
Pr[Game1 = 1]− Pr[Game2 = 1] ≤ AdvIND$−CPAB2,E (λ), (4.3)
We need now to compute Pr[Game2].
Pr[Game2] = Pr[Col] · Pr[Game2 = 1| Col]+
Pr[Col] · Pr[Game2 = 1| Col]
=δm + (1− δm) 1
N
On the other side Pr[ATOblivP2PA,E,G (λ, 0) = 1] =
1
N
, since the tag is generated
uniformly at random for every access.





From equations 4.6.2, 4.6.2, 4.6.2, and 4.6.2 we obtain:
Pr[ATOblivP2PA,E,G (λ, 1)]− Pr[ATOblivP2PA,E,G (λ, 0) = 1] ≤
δm(1− 1
N
) + AdvIND$−CPAB2,E + Adv
PRG
B1,G .
Since δm ∈ O(2logN ·m·(−1)), this ends our proof.
Quantitatively, if the number of peers in the network equals 220, number
of colluding peers in the network is c = N
1
2 and m = 12, then δ12 = 2−120.
Given the number of colluding peers and total number of peer, the value of m
can always be adjusted to handle the desired colluding probability δm. In case
of churn, the fraction c can vary and therefore the length of the circuit m has
to be adapted to the new value. Furthermore, we implicitly assumed so far that
no peer among the m selected leaves in the middle of the OblivSel process. If
that occurs, the entire process has to abort, re-calculates the number of required
peers m, and perform the OblivSel from scratch.
4.7 Discussion
Existing approaches. A valid question to investigate is whether existing solu-
tions such as unlinkability or path non-correlation techniques can be extended
to handle global adversaries and therefore prevent traffic analysis at the cost of
providing more resources. It is easy to see that unlinkability techniques (e.g.,
mixnet) can provide better security in a P2P network under some assumptions.
As an instance, assuming the case where a large number of peers behave as
senders and issue requests that will be mixed by sufficient network peers before
being answered by corresponding receivers’ peers. Also, assuming that there
is at least one honest peer in the mixing network, this solution would provide
slightly the same level of security as OBLIVP2P where a global adversary can-
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not distinguish the senders’ peers access pattern. However, this solution suffers
from two downsides. First, there is a need to have sufficient number of senders’
peers on-line in order to prevent intersection attacks. That is, in order to prevent
traffic analysis, the number of senders represents a security parameter of the
system that has to be maintained throughout the entire run of the system. Sec-
ond, as the receivers’ contents are theirs and are not encrypted, plus, all peers
are considered honest-but-curious, a global adversary can easily find out what
content is being accessed independently of the sender identity. This therefore
does not achieve obliviousness as defined in our work but only a weaker version
of it. On the other hand, path non-correlation techniques conceptually cannot
prevent against global adversary as we have detailed in Section 4.2. To sum up,
it is not clear if existing techniques, even if given enough resources, can provide
similar security insurances as those in OBLIVP2P.
Does better network & computation help? As empirically demonstrated in
our evaluation section, the throughput of OBLIVP2P is around 3.19 MBps while
considering only one tracker in the network. In a plaintext version of P2P system
such as BitTorrent, the network leverages multiple trackers in order to handle
more queries, and therefore increase the overall throughput. In OBLIVP2P, if
we consider multiple copies of the entire network, we can also handle multiple
trackers, and the throughput is expected to increase linearly with the number
of trackers. However, as we delegate computation to the peers in OBLIVP2P,
increasing the number of trackers beyond a particular threshold might turn out
to be useless as the computation would represent a bottleneck of the system. As
future work, we plan to investigate the asymptotic and empirical implications
of including multiple trackers in the system. Moreover, it would be interesting
to find out the relation between the number of trackers, number of peers for an
ideal throughput of OBLIVP2P.
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4.8 Related Work
Previous work has shown possible attacks by leveraging side channels such as
packet sizes, number of packets and timing. These side channels leak users’ pri-
vate information, e.g., illnesses/medications/surgeries, income and investment
secrets [102]. An attacker can employ machine learning techniques (e.g., Sup-
port Vector Machines) on network traffic to identify the user’s browsing web-
sites [127, 191, 224, 225]. However, our focus in this paper is to only prevent
long-term pattern traffic analysis. The aforementioned side-channels of traf-
fic analysis are out of scope. Although high-latency anonymous systems (e.g.,
mixed network) provide unlinkability between users and messages, these sys-
tems are prone to intersection or disclosure attacks if an adversary can observe
multiple request rounds in the network [63,114,116,119,159,173,175,197,219].
For P2P content sharing systems, e.g., BitTorrent, studies have shown that
monitoring BitTorrent traffic reveals users’ private information, e.g., the data
requested and sent by them [164, 200, 212]. Researchers also show that BitTor-
rent users on top of Tor still leak information related to the resources uploaded
or downloaded [8, 80, 174] to a long-term traffic analysis attacker. With all the
facts, long-term traffic analysis is still a major security concern and challeng-
ing problem for P2P content sharing systems. In this paper, we propose a new
approach to hiding data access patterns, making P2P systems oblivious, and
further to protecting against persistent, global traffic analysis in P2P content-
sharing systems.
Multi-servers and parallel ORAM. There have been works on how to opti-
mize ORAM constructions while leveraging multiple servers [171, 214, 215],
multiple CPUs [87, 101], computational servers [121, 182], or distributed under
a weaker threat model [112] . However, none of these recent constructions fit to
a P2P setting as is. This is mainly due to the inherent client / server setting that
results on a single entity bottleneck. The client has to either perform non-trivial
computation or/and transmit several amount of bits.
106
OblivStore [215], Lu and Ostrovsky [171], and Stefanov and Shi [214] demon-
strate how to decrease the communication overhead while leveraging multiple
ORAM nodes and servers. However, all these constructions are centralized and
route the block through the tracker. This leads to a single entity bottleneck.
Recently, researchers have proposed oblivious parallel RAM (OPRAM) [87,
101]. This was motivated by current multi-cpu architectures that can access
the same or multiple resources in parallel. However, OPRAM does not de-
crease the communication overhead making it as well a single-entity bottleneck.
Dachman-Soled et al. introduced oblivious network RAM (ONRAM) [112].
ONRAM can reduce the communication overhead between the client and mul-
tiple banks of memory to be constant in the number of blocks. However, it
assumes a weak threat model, and cannot achieve obliviousness in the case of a
global adversary.
4.9 Summary
We advocate hiding data access patterns as a necessary step in defenses against
long-term traffic pattern analysis in P2P content sharing systems. To this end,
we propose OBLIVP2P— an oblivious peer-to-peer protocol. Our evaluation
demonstrates that OBLIVP2P is parallelizable and linearly scalable with in-





Primitives Using SGX Enclaves
5.1 Introduction
The robustness of P2P protocols is the basis of the core utilities and security /
privacy properties provided by these protocols. In APAC and OBLIVP2P, we
consider that an adversary passively monitors the traffic in the network and fol-
lows the given protocol. However, in reality, malicious (byzantine) nodes can
easily join these P2P systems, and the presence of such adversaries is a major
security concern in P2P systems, as they can disrupt the protocol execution or
robustness. In this chapter, we propose robust P2P primitives against byzantine
adversaries in P2P systems. Peer-to-peer systems such as BitTorrent [7], Sym-
form [46], CrashPlan [12], StorJ [44], Tor [47] and Bitcoin [6] are becoming
popular among users due to ease of accessibility. In such P2P systems, online
users can simply volunteer as peers (nodes) to join the network. However, this
exact property allows adversarial or Sybil peers to be a part of the network and
exhibit a byzantine behavior. Such byzantine adversaries introduce lots of seri-
ous security issues to P2P systems. For example, researchers have demonstrated
that in Bitcoin byzantine nodes can collude to eclipse or partition the honest
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nodes leading to double-spending and selfish mining attacks [146, 189]. Fur-
ther, byzantine nodes in anonymous P2P systems can selectively deny service
to weaken the anonymity guarantee of such systems as Tor [47, 84]. In addi-
tion, byzantine nodes in the network can selectively forge, divert, delay or drop
messages to disrupt the protocol execution. Therefore, designing robust P2P
protocols in a byzantine setting continues to be an important research problem.
Researchers have extensively worked in the byzantine model to design so-
lutions for fundamental P2P problems such as reliable broadcast and agreement
among the peers [61, 65, 76, 78, 138, 139, 162, 195]. There are well-known im-
possibility results in the standard model of byzantine setting, such as the in-
ability to achieve reliable broadcast or agreement when over 1
3
of the network
is byzantine [162, 195]. In a quest for efficient protocols that tolerate a larger
fraction of malicious nodes, several failure models have been proposed which
limit the capabilities of the byzantine adversaries. For instance, one such model
is the general-omission model where the byzantine node can only omit mes-
sages that are either sent or received by it during the execution of a proto-
col [193, 198]. In this weaker adversarial model, it is possible to tolerate N
2
adversarial nodes and design relatively simple and efficient protocols for reli-
able broadcast [99, 145, 193, 198]. However, many of these adversary models
make strong assumptions, which are not always realistic and have not had a
concrete basis for implementation.
Our approach. To this end, we study the possibility of using recent hardware-
root-of-trust mechanisms for making previous adversarial models realizable in
practical systems. We observe that emerging hardware, specifically Intel SGX,
provides stronger trusted computing capabilities, which allow running hardware-
attested user-level enclaves on commodity OSes [25,26,110]. Enclaves provide
hardware-isolated execution environment which guarantees that an application
executing in an enclave is tamper-resistant and can be attested remotely. Assum-
ing that SGX-like capabilities become commodity and widescale in end hosts,
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we ask if it is feasible to build robust P2P protocols. Our main observation is
that by leveraging the capabilities of such a trusted hardware, one can restrict the
behavior of byzantine adversaries to the general-omission model in synchronous
networks [99, 145, 193, 198].
Specifically, we use four SGX features, i.e., enclave execution (F1), unbi-
ased randomness (F2), remote attestation (F3) and trusted elapsed time (F4)1.
Based on these hardware features, we enforce six security properties (P1 - P6).
First, we enforce execution integrity (P1), message integrity & authenticity (P2)
and blind-box computation (P3), thus the attacker cannot forge messages or
deviate from the execution of the given protocol. Thus, the adversarial node
can only delay, replay and omit messages. We further leverage lockstep exe-
cution (P5) and message freshness (P6) to reduce the adversarial model to the
general-omission model, where byzantine nodes have no additional advantage
than omitting to send / receive messages2. In such model, P3 disallows the
adversary to selectively omit messages based on the content. Lastly, the halt-
on-divergence (P4) allows us to detect and eliminate peers that selectively omit
messages based on identities of senders / receivers, thus in turn reducing round
complexity and “sanitizing” the network. Leveraging these properties we can
further achieve improvement for the efficiency of protocols. We present efficient
designs for reliably broadcasting messages called Enclaved Reliable Broadcast
(ERB) protocol and an unbiased common random generator called Enclaved
Random Number Generator (ERNG) protocol. Both ERB and ERNG primi-
tives can be used as building blocks to solve a wide range of problems in dis-
tributed systems, such as random beacons [202], voting schemes [184], random
walks [144], shared key generation [140, 141], cryptocurrency protocols [172]
and load balancing protocols [111, 203] (details in Section 5.10.2).
Results. Our work targets synchronous network where every machine is run-
1These are available in Intel SGX and are commonly provided by other trusted hardware
mechanisms [3, 55].
2A node’s crash failure is equivalent to omitting all messages for the rest of the execution for
the protocol.
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ning an SGX-enabled CPU. As shown in Table 5.1 and Table 5.2, both of our
protocols asymptotically reduce the round and communication complexity as
compared to previous works in the byzantine model, and match with (or outper-
form) the results in general-omission model. For a network of size N , the round
and communication complexity for ERB are min{f + 2, t + 2} and O(N2),
where t and f (f ≤ t) are the number of byzantine peers and peers actually
behaving maliciously for one execution of ERB, respectively. The round and
communication complexity for basic ERNG are O(N) and O(N3), and for the
optimized ERNG are O(logN) and O(N logN), respectively. We implement a
prototype of our solution and the source code is available online [34]. We eval-
uate our implementation for both ERB and ERNG and our experimental results
match our theoretical claims.
Contributions. The main contributions of this chapter are:
• Realizable General-Omission Model - We leverage SGX features to reduce
the byzantine model to the general-omission model, where byzantine nodes
have no extra advantage than omitting messages.
• Better Synchronous P2P Protocols - By enforcing our properties, we can
improve the efficiency of P2P protocols. As the first attempt, we propose
efficient protocols for reliable broadcast (ERB) and unbiased random number
generation (ERNG) in synchronous settings.
• Security Analysis & Evaluation - We provide security analysis and proof for
our protocol constructions. Our experimental evaluation confirms the theo-
retical expectations of our solutions.
3Some of these protocols are designed for byzantine agreement, but it is proved that they can
be easily transformed to achieving reliable broadcast with only introducing additional message
complexity of O(N) [220].
4They assume that every byzantine node only sends a bounded number of messages per
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BGP [78] min{f + 2, t+ 1}
BG [76] 4t+ 1 t+ 1
O(poly(N))GM [138, 139]
3t+ 1
min{f + 5, t+ 1}
AD15 [61] min{f + 2, t+ 1}
AD14 [65] Byzantine4 2t+ 1 3t+ 4 O(N4)
ERB Byz. + SGX 2t+ 1 min{f + 2, t+ 2} O(N2)
Table 5.1: Round complexity and communication complexity for reliable broad-








AS [67] 6t+ 1 O(N) O(N3)
AD14 [65] 2t+ 1 O(N) O(N4)
Basic ERNG 2t+ 1 O(N) O(N3)
Optimized ERNG 3t+ 1 O(logN) O(N logN)
Table 5.2: Round / communication complexity for random number generation
protocols in synchronous distributed systems.
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5.2 Problem
Designing efficient solutions for P2P protocols in the byzantine setting is a
widely-recognized problem with limited solutions [61,65,76,138,139,195]. Our
goal is to shed light on how SGX can aid to improve efficiency of synchronous
P2P protocols. In this work, we take two fundamental problems as examples:
1) reliable broadcast and 2) common unbiased random number generator.
5.2.1 Problem Definition
In light of the previous works, we recall the standard definition of reliable broad-
cast [99, 193] and common unbiased random number [67] in the synchronous
network:
Definition 5.2.1. (Reliable Broadcast). A protocol for reliable broadcast in
synchronous settings satisfies the following conditions:
• (Validity) If the sender is honest and broadcasts a message m, then all honest
nodes eventually accept m.
• (Agreement) If an honest node accepts m, then all honest nodes eventually
accept m.
• (Integrity) For any message m, every honest node accepts m at most once, if
m was previously broadcast by the sender.
• (Termination) Every honest node eventually accepts a message (m or ⊥).
In order to define a common unbiased random number generator, we define
the bias of any multi-variate function in a standard way [67].
Definition 5.2.2. (Unbiasedness). Let G : {0, 1}k×N → {0, 1}k be a determin-
istic multi-variate function that maps N elements in {0, 1}k to one element in













where EG[S] is the expected number of values in G(x1, · · · , xN) ∈ S, and
E[S] = |S|
2k
, which is the expected value when the output of G is distributed
uniformly at random.
Definition 5.2.3. (Common Unbiased Random Number). A protocol G gen-
erates a common unbiased random number r among N nodes if it satisfies the
following conditions with high probability (w.h.p.) 5:
• (Agreement) At the end of the protocol, all the honest nodes agree on the same
value r.
• (Unbiasedness) The bias of β(G) = 1.
For the analysis of protocols, we define the following complexities with re-
spect to a single execution of the protocol.
• The message / communication complexity is defined as the total number of
messages / bits transferred among all nodes in the worst case.
• The round complexity is defined as the number of executed rounds (or steps)
in the worst-case.
5.2.2 Attacker Model
We consider a widely-studied standard synchronous model of P2P systems [61,
65, 76, 138, 139, 195]. In this model, our only new requirement is that every
peer6 in the network uses an SGX-enabled CPU to run the P2P protocols. In a
network of N nodes, the number of byzantine nodes t is strictly bounded under
a fraction of N
2
. The number of peers that actually behave maliciously for a
particular execution of the protocol is f(≤ t). Thus, a P2P network P is com-
posed of N peers P = {p1, · · · , pN} such that N = 2t + 1. Every peer pi
in the P2P overlay has an identifier idi and can communicate with other peers
5For the rest of the chapter, unless otherwise stated, if some probability p is negligible, it
means that the event occurs with a probability of at most O(e−λ) for some security parameter
λ. Analogously, if some event occurs with high probability (w.h.p), the probability is at least
1−O(e−λ).
6We use the word peer and node interchangeably in this work.
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using their ids. The underlying TCP/IP substrate is assumed to provide reliable
message delivery within a known bounded delay say ∆. Moreover, we con-
sider a round-based synchronous model where each round is equal to the time
an honest node requires to send a message and receive a response. Every peer
is directly connected to all other peers in the network and knows the network
size N . To summarize, we assume: the network size is N (S1); the protocol
starts synchronously (S2); the round time is 2∆ (S3); the number of byzantine
nodes is limited upto N
2
(S4); the peers are connected to each other (S5). This
is a prominently used model in the previous literature of distributed P2P sys-
tems [61, 65, 67, 144, 193, 198]. We discuss the validity of these assumptions in
Section 5.10.1.
Our Model using SGX. In our model, a byzantine peer has a compromised or
malware-ridden operating system but executes protocols using SGX enclaves [25,
26, 110]. Enclaves guarantee untampered execution in presence of malicious
underlying software or co-processes. The byzantine nodes can take arbitrary
software actions as long as it does not violate SGX guarantees.
Scope. Our focus is showing how to leverage SGX features to improve the
efficient of synchronous P2P protocols. Our model does not consider an adver-
sary that can perform hardware attacks and break SGX security guarantees. We
do not aim to prevent any information leakage through side-channels such as
pagefaults, memory accesses or timing attacks to which SGX-enabled CPUs are
known to be susceptible [165,177,227]. Indeed these problems are under inves-
tigation and recent research shows that defending against them is feasible. Ex-
isting solutions against these problems can directly apply to our work [190,211].
5.2.3 Strawman Solution & Attacks
Consider a strawman protocol for distributed random number generation using
reliable broadcast, where the initiator broadcasts a random number m using an
initialization message INIT to all the peers in a synchronous network (shown in
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Algorithm 6). If m is generated randomly and unbiasedly as well as reaches ev-
ery honest node without being tampered, then all honest nodes will agree on the
common unbiased random number m and the goal of the protocol is achieved.
In Algorithm 6, upon receiving the INIT message, each peer further multicasts
an ECHO message to all other peers. After receiving the ECHO messages from
the majority of nodes, each peer accepts m as the final message mˆ. Note that
if the initiator is honest, all honest nodes receive the message INIT during the
first round and multicast ECHO messages at the beginning of the second round.
In the second round, every honest node receives at least N − t ECHO mes-
sages from N − t honest nodes and maybe some byzantine nodes. Thus, after
two rounds, every honest node will output the same value m from the initiator,
which satisfies all the conditions of reliable broadcast in Definition 5.2.1. How-
ever, we show how a byzantine initiator and other byzantine peers can attack
this protocol to violate Definitions 5.2.1 and 5.2.3.
Attacks by Byzantine Adversary. Byzantine initiator and peers can tamper
with the execution of protocol in Algorithm 6 and forge the values of INIT and
ECHO messages to perpetrate the following attacks.
A1 (Execution Deviation): For this attack, an adversary deviates from the con-
trol flow of the running program for the given protocol. The adversary can
disregard essential conditions to jump to the desired instructions and execute
them directly. For example, the adversary can skip all the conditions like Line
7 & 13 to directly multicast its ECHO value to parts of honest nodes but not
all of them, to introduce equivocation to their final decisions. Moreover, the
adversary can also repeat particular instructions to obtain an output she wants.
For instance, if m is generated from a random source without being tampered
during the execution of the protocol, an unbiased common random number can
be agreed among all the peers in the network. A byzantine peer, however, can
repeat the step that generates m (Line 3) from the random source until it returns
a favorable random number. Hence, the output is biased as per Definition 5.2.3.
117
Algorithm 6: Strawman distributed random number generation protocol using reliable
broadcast.
Input: A P2P network P composed of N nodes, an initiator node idinit
Output: A message mˆ
1 Initialization: mˆ←⊥; SSm ← ∅; rnd← 1
2 upon self id is initiator:
3 get(m) // m is a random number
4 mˆ← m
5 add self id to SSm
6 multicast INIT(m) to other peers
7 for rnd ≤ t+ 1 do
8 upon receiving INIT(m):
9 mˆ← m
10 add self id and sender id to SSm
11 multicast ECHO(m) to other peers in round rnd + 1
12 upon receiving ECHO(m):
13 if mˆ =⊥ then
14 mˆ← m
15 add self id to SSm
16 multicast ECHO(m) to other peers in round rnd + 1
17 end
18 if m = mˆ and sender id /∈ SSm then
19 add sender id to SSm




24 rnd← rnd + 1
25 end
26 if rnd > t+ 1 then
27 accept ⊥
28 end
A2 (Message Forgery): Suppose that the adversary does not deviate from the
execution of the given protocol, she can still alter the data flow (including input /
output and intermediate states) of the program to forge messages. As per Defini-
tion 5.2.1, a reliable broadcast protocol requires that if one honest node accepts
message m then all honest nodes accept m. The adversary can tamper with the
INIT and ECHO messages to violate this agreement property of the protocol. A
byzantine initiator colluding with other byzantine peers in the network can tam-
per with Line 6, 11 and 16 in the algorithm such that some honest nodes receive
most ECHO messages with m′ while others with m. This results in a fraction of
honest nodes assigning mˆ with m′ and accepting m′, while other honest nodes
accept m as the final output of the protocol, thereby causing inconsistency in
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the network.
A3 (Selective Omission): Assume that the adversary does not deviate from the
control flow (i.e., the execution) of the given protocol or tamper with the data
flow to forge messages, she can still omit, delay and replay messages in this
restricted model. For an omission attack, it has two types: one is based on the
content of the transmitted message and the other is dependent on the identity of
the sender / receiver. For the first type, the adversary can observe its generated
or received random number m and selectively decide to drop or forward it to
other nodes based on its value, which introduces a bias in the final output for the
honest nodes. For example, if the adversarial peers receive or initiate a message
m, which is not the favorable one, they can omit to relay the message to the other
nodes, thus all honest nodes may finally agree on ⊥ instead of m. Further, to
violate the agreement condition in Definition 5.2.1 and 5.2.3, the adversary can
selectively decide to omit the message m depending on whether the destination
peer is honest or malicious. It can broadcast m correctly to a few honest nodes
and not send the message to the others for the last round. The honest nodes
receiving m can multicast m to the others, but the others will not accept it as the
execution ends. Thus, the honest nodes that do not receive a message will agree
on ⊥ while others will agree on m.
A4 (Message Delay): Alternatively, to generate an unbiased common random
number, every peer can broadcast its random number to all other peers using
Algorithm 6. All peers can then XOR the random numbers in the final set to
generate the output. To bias this final output, a byzantine peer can intentionally
hold its random number until it receives inputs from all other honest peers [67].
In this way, the adversary can “look ahead” in the protocol, calculate the fi-
nal output and then decide whether to participate in the protocol by sending its
random number. If the final random number already favors the adversary then
it does not participate in the protocol, otherwise it sends its message to all the
peers. Note that, for t < N
2
, all the byzantine adversaries can collude to intro-
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duce an exponential bias in the final value.
A5 (Message Replay): In the restricted model, the adversarial node can use a
message mprev from an instance of the protocol running in parallel, or which
was run in the past to one (or more) honest node(s) and forward the correct
message m to other honest nodes [168]. This results in an inconsistency where
few honest nodes agree on mprev and others agree on m, thereby violating the
agreement condition of the protocol.
5.3 Solution Overview
In this work, our ultimate goals, with the help of SGX features, are twofold:
1) reducing the byzantine model to the general-omission model; 2) achieving
improvement for the efficiency of synchronous P2P protocols (e.g., lower com-
munication / round complexity). In this section, we put forward ideas using
SGX features to enforce six security properties to restrict the capabilities (A1 -
A5) of a byzantine adversary, as shown in Section 5.2.
5.3.1 SGX Features and Security Properties
We first start by recalling Intel SGX features which can also be provided by
other trusted hardware.
F1: Enclaved Execution - SGX supports hardware-isolated memory region called
enclaves such that a compromised underlying OS cannot tamper the execution
of the code running inside this enclave.
F2: Unbiased Randomness - SGX provides a function sgx read rand that
executes the RDRAND instruction to generate hardware-assisted unbiased ran-
dom numbers.
F3: Remote Attestation - SGX allows a remote party to verify that an applica-
tion is running in an enclave on an SGX-enabled CPU.
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Figure 5.1: Each peer consists of two entities: an Enclave and an OS. The
OS models the operating system and memory. The Enclave models the isolated
memory and the secure execution of a program. The sender Enclaves can send a
message via a secure channel to the receiver Enclaver. The grey areas are secure
against malicious OSes of byzantine nodes.
that returns a trusted elapsed time in seconds relative to a reference point.
Abstractly, a peer can be considered as the composition of two entities: an
OS and an Enclave as shown in Figure 5.1. The OS models the untrusted en-
tity including the operating system and memory. It has access to all the sys-
tem resources such as file system and network. The OS can arbitrarily invoke
an enclave program and start its execution. The Enclave models the isolated
memory space that loads the program and executes it securely. Thus, Enclave
corresponds to the trusted entity of a peer. We illustrate how to enforce P1 - P6
properties using SGX features to thwart A1 - A5 attacks.
P1 (Execution Integrity): With remote attestation (F3), an enclave in one
peer can verify the correctness of the running program for the given protocol
on the other nodes and whether it is executing on a valid SGX-enabled CPU or
not. Moreover, F1 ensures that the execution in an enclave cannot be tampered
with by the OS. F1 and F3 together enforce the execution integrity against
A1. Hence, an adversary cannot deviate from the execution of the protocol in
an enclave arbitrarily by skipping / repeating instructions to violate the control
flow of the running program.
P2 (Message Integrity & Authenticity): In designing our protocols, we first
perform a setup phase where each peer connects to every other in the network
and then performs a series of steps. Analogous to P1, every enclave first uses
F3 to verify the correctness of the protocol executing on other peers. Next,
they generate public / private key pairs inside the enclaves and exchange the
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public keys with each other. Then all the messages transmitted between any
two enclaves can be signed to ensure the integrity and authenticity against A2.
Moreover, the internal states of the program are also protected using F1. There-
fore, the integrity of all messages including input / output / intermediate states is
guaranteed. In this case, it is clear that an adversary cannot forge valid messages
to bias the honest nodes to make inconsistent decisions.
P3 (Blind-box Computation): F1 ensures that all intermediate states of the
protocol’s computation are hidden from the OS. Leveraging F2, the provided
randomness is also hidden from the OS. This guarantees that the input state is
hidden along with the intermediate states of the protocol’s execution We say in
this case that the computation is a blind-box computation. As the adversarial
node does not know the random number and given that the output of the compu-
tation is encrypted between the Enclave and the OS, she cannot selectively omit
or drop messages based on their contents. Note that an important part of instan-
tiating such a blind-box computation is the ability to instantiate a secure channel
between two or more enclaves. In fact, enclaves can agree on a shared key to
establish a secure channel using Diffie-Hellman key exchange. Nodes can then
encrypt all the messages (including program’s intermediate input / output) trans-
mitted between each other to provide confidentiality against malicious OSes.
Note that, establishing such a shared key in the enclaved setting is slightly
weaker than the standard byzantine model, as the malicious operating system
cannot access the shared secret keys and decrypt the exchanged messages due
to F1. With P1 - P3, we can reduce the byzantine model to a restricted model,
where an adversarial node can only replay, omit and delay messages.
P4 (Halt-on-Divergence): To mitigate selective omission based on nodes’
identities (A3), we enforce a security mechanism called halt-on-divergence 7.
This property halts any malicious node deviating from the protocol under some
given condition. As an instance, if an adversarial node sends a message, but
7 Halt-on-divergence captures a general mechanism called early stopping that is often used
in securing against general-omission model [193, 198].
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does not receive adequate responses, it will be forced to leave the current proto-
col execution. Halt-on-divergence mechanism should be incorporated through
a specific acknowledgment protocol instantiation in such a way that every ma-
licious node will be forced to leave if the acknowledgment is not verified. In
particular, we introduce an acknowledgment scheme where every receiver ac-
knowledges the sender on receiving every valid message. A message sent over a
secure channel is considered valid only if it contains the expected sequence and
round number. Naturally, an acknowledgment is not sent for a replayed, omitted
or delayed message. Since all honest receivers will reply with acknowledgment
(ACK) messages on receiving valid messages, an honest sender should at least
receive t+ 1 ACK messages. Any node receiving less than t+ 1 ACK messages
will halt its execution and leave the network.
The key idea here is to penalize any deviating adversary by churning the
node out of the network. This effectively “sanitizes” the network. Thus, to
remain a part of the network, every peer should send valid messages to the
majority of the network. This property also aids honest nodes in the protocol to
decide the final output early and finish the execution immediately.
P5 (Lockstep Execution): F4 allows us to realize a synchronized network
across all rounds of a protocol. Each peer uses F4 to decide the correct value of
the ongoing round and inserts this round number in all the sent messages. To
detect delay attacks (A4), a peer simply matches the round number present in an
incoming message with the current round number. This defense is hard in the
byzantine model with public-key infrastructure even if it supports F1, since the
OS can tamper with the relative time to either increase or decrease the rounds of
a node. Therefore, having access to a trusted elapsed time functionality allows
to perform lockstep execution and detect delay attacks in the restricted model.
P6 (Message Freshness): Similar to [168], we use sequence numbers to en-
sure message freshness and therefore defend against replay attacks (A5). The
main challenge lies in ensuring secure exchange of the initial sequence numbers
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for each peer and ensuring that the sequence number remains untampered with
during the entire intermediate states of the protocol execution. Using the secure
channel, the peers securely exchange a nonce or a sequence number, which is in-
cremented sequentially by the peer. The nonce is generated using F2 supported
by SGX. This prevents the malicious adversary from tampering the initial nonce
value to its own advantage. Note that the keys and initial sequence numbers
exchange occur only once during the setup phase. If an adversarial node restarts
or relaunches its enclave, all the data in the enclave will be removed. Since the
enclave does not have the valid sequence number and round number, it cannot
re-join the same or any on-going execution, which is equivalent to be considered
as a new node for the protocol.
5.3.2 Overview of Our Results
In this work, we achieve the results below.
R1: By enforcing (P1 - P6), we reduce the byzantine model to the general-
omission model, where the byzantine adversary does not have any additional
advantage than omitting messages.
By enforcing P1 - P3, we first reduce byzantine model to a restricted model,
in which byzantine nodes can only delay / omit / replay messages. Due to space
constraints, we defer the formalization and proof to Section 5.7. We believe that
the formalization, while based on traditional cryptographic primitives, provides
a new conceptual framing of SGX-enabled CPUs security features, and may be
of independent interest.
By applying P5 and P6, we further confine the adversarial nodes into the general-
omission model in the synchronous setting. Previously, numerous protocols
such as reliable broadcast and byzantine agreement were proposed for general-
omission model from a theoretical standpoint, yet considered unrealistic at that
time [99,145,193,198]. By enforcing our properties, we want to emphasize that
this entire class of protocol is realizable in the current SGX-enabled machines.
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R2: We propose an efficient reliable broadcast protocol (ERB) with early stop-
ping, which improves communication complexity from O(N3) to O(N2) (refer
to Section 5.4).
For this result, we leverage four properties. First, P1 - P3 ensure that the
adversarial nodes cannot forge messages and deviate from the execution of the
protocol. Second, we leverage P4 to show that ERB can broadcast a message
to the entire network in min{f + 2, t + 2} rounds with better performance as
shown in Table 5.1. We further illustrate that our properties are generic and
can improve the efficiency of traditional protocols of reliable broadcast. Due to
space limitations, we detail our findings in Section 5.8.
R3: We propose a new unbiased random number generation protocol (ERNG)
with communication complexity O(N3) for the basic version, or O(N logN)
for the optimized one (refer to Section 5.5).
P3 ensures that the byzantine nodes do not know the random number and
cannot selectively drop the unfavorable one. P5 disallows the adversary to look
ahead and compute the final result before the last round. With P3 and P5, our
unoptimized ERNG solution directly runs our ERB protocol as a sub-routine on
the entire network to agree on a random number generated using F2. It has round
and communication complexity of O(N) and O(N3), respectively. We present





, and forming a cluster of peers within the network. Leveraging the trusted
randomness F2 and P3, we can sample a small set of nodes forming a represen-
tative cluster. The ERB protocol is executed within this small cluster to generate
the final unbiased random number. The round and communication complexity
of this optimized ERNG is further reduced to O(logN) and O(N logN). Note
that the optimized version of ERNG only applies when the size of the network
is large enough.
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5.4 Enclaved Reliable Broadcast Protocol
We propose an enclaved reliable broadcast (ERB) in the synchronous model
using SGX features.
5.4.1 Preliminaries
The transmitted message, val, between any two peers has the following format:
val := 〈type, id, seq,m, rnd〉,
where type ∈ {INIT,ECHO,ACK} and rnd represents the current round of the
ERB protocol. If type = INIT, then the initiator peer idinit is initiating the
broadcast by sending the message m with sequence number seqinit at round rnd.
If type = ECHO, it means that its sender knows that idinit has sent m, as it has
already received either a value with INIT or ECHO for the first time. Finally, if
type = ACK, it means that the peer acknowledges that it has already received
either INIT or ECHO values from the sender.
We introduce three functions Halt, Multicast and Wait defined as follows:
• Halt(st): is a function that sets the state st to ⊥.8
• Multicast(idi, val): is a functionality that multicasts the value val from the
sender pi to the receiver pj , for all j ∈ [N ] \ {i}.
• Wait(τ): is a function that has as an input the current elapsed time τ in the
ongoing round, and suspends the protocol for (2∆− τ) seconds.
Note that Halt function enforces the halt-on-divergence property (P4) that
we have introduced in Section 5.3. For the sake of exposition, we write Wait(rnd)
in the code description, we say in this case that the protocol waits until the end
of the round rnd.
8Note that when the state of the node is set to ⊥ the node halts on-divergence and is ejected
from the P2P network P .
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5.4.2 ERB details
Prior to running the very first instance of the ERB protocol, there is a setup
phase. The setup is performed whenever the program (ERB) needs to be up-
dated or changed. We detail the setup phase followed by the explanation of our
algorithm.
Setup Phase: Every pair of sender and receiver peer use remote attestation (F3)
along with enclaved execution (F1) to verify the correctness of the execution,
and therefore enforcing P1 - P3. Then they establish a secure channel using
Diffie-Hellman key exchange. This setup enforces P1 - P3, which restricts the
byzantine nodes to only omit, replay and delay messages. Next, each peer picks
at random a sequence number such that seqs, seqr
$← {0, 1}k and send it to each
other. That is, every node has to store the sequence numbers of all other nodes
in P . Finally, every node sets the variable rnd to the value 1. The overhead of
the setup is in O(N2) while the storage overhead per node is in O(N).
Initialization Phase: An initiator node first multicasts the value val = 〈INIT, idinit,
seqinit,m, rnd)〉, where seqinit is the sequence number of the initiator node, and
rnd is the round number. The round rnd is first initialized to 1, the enclave
will now increment the rnd after every 2∆ seconds—we take advantage of the
elapsed time feature of SGX to tie a round to an interval of 2∆ seconds.
Echo Phase: Until round t + 2, if a node receives an INIT or ECHO message
for the first time, it performs the following actions: (1) start the local clock
and initialize the round rnd to 1, the round will increment every 2∆ seconds,
(2) if both rnd and seq are consistent with the expected values, it will store the
message m, else it just ignores it and treats it as an omitted message. If there
is no delay or replay detected, then it multicasts an ECHO message to all nodes
at the end of the current round. If the node has already received a valid ECHO
message from a distinct node, it will only add the sender’s identifier into the set
SSecho. Recall that at the end of the setup phase, all honest nodes have the same
copy of the sequence number of all honest nodes. After every valid instance of
127
the protocol, nodes will increase all sequence numbers by 1.
Decision Phase: If the node has received at least t+ 1 correct ECHO messages
from distinct nodes, i.e., |SSecho| = t + 1, then the node accepts mˆ. After
t + 2 rounds, if the node has not received adequate distinct ECHO messages, it
accepts mˆ :=⊥. Every multicast requires the node to receive at least t+ 1 ACK
messages, else the node churns out itself using the Halt function.
5.4.3 Analysis
Here we give an intuition about the security guarantees of ERB and how it
prevents attacks in the restricted model (ensured by P1 - P3), where byzantine
nodes can only delay, replay and omit messages.
Byzantine nodes can arbitrarily delay a message. With the round number
in every INIT or ECHO message, the receiver can easily determine the round
in which a particular message has been sent. A node in ERB will only accept
messages that have been sent in the beginning of the same round. This way, if
a message has been purposely delayed for over than a round, the message will
not be accepted by any node. Recall that the SGX has access to a relative time
(F4) untampered by the OS, and then it can tie any round to a particular interval
for enforcing lockstep execution (P5). The ERB protocol will not send an ACK
on encountering such a delayed message. Moreover, byzantine nodes can also
replay messages from previous ERB instances in the current ERB to introduce
inconsistent views among honest nodes, as in Attack A3. However, ERB pro-
tocol enforces that every message contains a unique sequence number seq for
message freshness (P6). Whenever an enclave instantiates the ERB protocol
it increments the sequence number. For every instance, the receiver Enclaver
validates the freshness of a received message. It checks whether the sequence
number is incremented as compared to previous instance of the protocol. This
step is bound to execute due to the enclaved execution feature (F1).
Further, if a byzantine sender decides to omit a message, then according
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Algorithm 7: ERB: Enclaved reliable broadcast protocol (for a node idi with the
initiator idinit sending a message m and a sequence number seqinit).
Input: A P2P network P composed N nodes, a message m and a sequence number
seqinit for the initiator idinit
Output: A message mˆ
• initialization: mˆ←⊥;SSecho ← ∅; rnd← 1
• upon idi = idinit and sti 6= ⊥:
mˆ← m;
SSecho ← SSecho ∪ {idinit};
Multicast
(
idinit, 〈INIT, idinit, seqinit,m, rnd〉
)
;
• for rnd ≤ t+ 2 do
• upon receiving 〈INIT, idinit, seq,m, rnd′〉 from idinit:
if rnd′ = rnd and seq = seqinit then
send 〈ACK, idinit, seq, H(m), rnd〉 to idinit;
mˆ← m;











• upon receiving 〈ECHO, idinit, seq,m, rnd′〉 from peer idj :
if rnd′ = rnd and seq = seqinit then
send 〈ACK, idinit, seq, H(val), rnd〉, where val = 〈ECHO, idinit, seq,m, rnd〉
to peer idj ;
if mˆ =⊥ then
mˆ← m;











if idj /∈ SSecho then
SSecho ← SSecho ∪ {idj}





• upon Multicast(idi, val):
send val to idk, for all k ∈ [N ] \ {i};
receive Nack acknowledgements 〈ACK, idinit, seq, H(val), rnd′〉, where
rnd′ = rnd and seq = seqinit;
if Nack < t then
Halt(sti) ;
end
• rnd← rnd + 1;
end




• seqinit ← seq + 1;
to Algorithm 7, it will not receive a corresponding ACK message as the sent
messages never reach the receiver peer. The sender Enclaves detects that the un-
derlying OSs is byzantine if it does not receive at least t+ 1 ACK messages. On
failing to receive majority ACK messages, Enclaves executes the Halt function
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as per our algorithm and churns itself out of the network based on our halt-
on-divergence property (P4). We state our main theorem below and defer the
detailed proof to Section 5.9.1.
Theorem 5.4.1. If N ≥ 2t+ 1, ERB is a reliable broadcast protocol as defined
in Definition 5.2.1.
Proof Outline. We prove that ERB meets all the requirements of reliable broad-
cast, according to Lemma 5.9.2 - 5.9.7 in Section 5.9.1.
ERB Performance Analysis. Algorithm 7 has a worst-case round complexity
equal to t + 2 with message complexity in O(N2) and t < N/2 byzantine
nodes. This only occurs if the byzantine peers delay the instance for t rounds
before sending the message to at least one honest node. However, in this case,
the round complexity is equal to f + 2 rather than t + 2 as the delay is only
in function of the number of byzantine nodes f . On the other hand, byzantine
nodes can also decide to not send the message to any honest node, and then the
round complexity is t+ 2 with message complexity equal to O(t). Additionally,
we study how to use our sanitization technique to further optimize the round
complexity in Section 5.9.2.
5.5 Enclaved Random Number Generation
We present our algorithm that generates an unbiased common random number
called enclaved random number generation (ERNG).
5.5.1 Unoptimized ERNG
We detail our unoptimized ERNG in Algorithm 8. At a higher level, every
node generates a random number from the enclave, and then performs ERB
protocol to broadcast to every node. According to Theorem 5.9.1, all honest
nodes in this case will receive the random numbers from all honest nodes after
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Algorithm 8: Unoptimized-ERNG: Unoptimized enclaved unbiased random number
generation protocol executed by peer pi.
Input: A P2P network P composed of N nodes
Output: A unbiased random number r
• initialization: SSfinal ← ∅; rnd← 1
for rnd ≤ t+ 2 do
• if rnd = 1 then
initiate ERB with inputs mi
$← {0, 1}k and seqi;
end
if 2 ≤ rnd ≤ t+ 2 then
execute ERB instances and wait for the output (Mi = {mˆ1, · · · , mˆli});
end
rnd← rnd + 1;
end
• SSfinal ← Mi;




t + 2 rounds, and may eventually receive several random numbers from other
byzantine nodes. According to Lemma 5.9.2, for each ERB instance, every
honest node will accept a random number from its initiator or ⊥ so that all
honest nodes have the same final set SSfinal of random numbers. By performing
exclusive disjunction (or XOR) of all received random numbers, every honest
node obtains an unbiased common random number eventually.
Unbiasedness and Randomness Analysis. We describe the main intuition be-
hind the common unbiasedness and randomness of our ERNG’s output and
defer formal details to Section 5.9.3. To bias the random value, the adversary
may perform several attacks. It can first try to directly forge the random number,
however, this is restricted as per execution integrity (P1) and message integrity
(P2) enforced by F1 and F3. An adversary can force the program to gener-
ate a local random number of its choice. However, each enclave generates an
unbiased random number from SGX-enabled CPU instruction RDRAND using
F2. It is not possible to bias the source of randomness based on the hardware
guarantees of SGX.
Our blind-box computation (P3) together with the secure channel guarantee
that an adversary cannot selectively omit its random number based on its value
with the goal to bias the output. Therefore, the adversary cannot infer the ran-
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dom numbers submitted by other honest peers during the execution. Note that,
the defense against replay attacks is already provided by the ERB protocol.
One adversarial strategy is to learn the final output and then decide whether
to participate or not in the protocol, as in Attack A4. From Algorithm 8, all hon-
est nodes output the final value after round t+ 2. In order to bias the final value,
the adversary should perform the following steps within round number t + 2:
(1) learn the XOR of random numbers from honest nodes, (2) decide whether to
participate or not based on the final value, (3) and multicast its number to honest
nodes. In Algorithm 8, the final XOR operation executes only when rnd > t+2.
The execution integrity (P1) ensures sequential execution of our protocol. This
property restricts the adversary from directly jumping to the step that computes
the XOR operation and learn the result before other honest nodes generate the
final output. Next, the lockstep execution (P5) enforced by the elapsed time fea-
ture (F4) allows us to bound the time for each round, even on a byzantine peer.
Therefore, the adversary cannot look ahead and compute the final output before
the last round. If the adversary decides to delay its own random number based
on the computed final value, the adversarial random number will be neglected
by all honest peers as it will reach after t + 2 round. Combining P1, P5 and
P3, it is not possible for the byzantine adversary to achieve steps (1) and (3)
simultaneously.
For clarity and without any loss of generality, we model Algorithm 8 as a
multi-variate functionG : {0, 1}k×N → {0, 1}k that mapsN elements in {0, 1}k
to one element in {0, 1}k such that G(x1, · · · , xN) =
⊕N
i=1 xi.
Theorem 5.5.1. The bias of G β(G) = 1.
We defer the proof to Section 5.9.3.
5.5.2 Optimized ERNG
Next, we illustrate the main steps for ERNG with optimizations. In this section,
we consider that at most t ≤ N
3
nodes of the network can be byzantine. ERNG
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Algorithm 9: ERNG: Enclaved unbiased random number generation protocol exe-
cuted by peer pi.
Input: A P2P network P composed of N nodes
Output: A unbiased random number r
• initialization: SSM ← ∅;SSfinal ← ∅;SSchosen ← ∅; rnd← 1
for rnd ≤ γ + 4 do
if rnd = 1 then
• every peer pi compute ri $← {0, · · · , N2γ − 1};
if ri = 0 then
Multicast(idi, val), where val = 〈CHOSEN, idi, seqi,⊥, 1〉;
SSchosen ← {idi};
end
• upon receiving val = 〈CHOSEN, idj , seqj ,mj , rndj〉
if type = CHOSEN and rndj = 1 and seqj = seqi then
SSchosen ← SSchosen ∪ {idj};
end
end
• if ri = 0 and rnd = 2 then
compute r′i
$← {0, · · · , γ′ − 1};
if r′i = 0 then
initiate ERB with inputs mi
$← {0, 1}k, seqi and peers in SSchosen;
end
seq′j ← seqj , for all idj ∈ SSchosen;
end
if ri = 0 and 3 ≤ rnd ≤ γ + 2 then
execute ERB instances and wait for the output;
end





then obtain Mi = {mˆ1, · · · , mˆli};
seqj ← seq′j , for all idj ∈ SSchosen;
end
if rnd = γ + 4 then
• if ri = 0 then
SSM ← SSM ∪ {Mi};
Multicast
(




• upon receiving val = 〈FINAL,Mj , seq′j , rndj〉:
if rndj = γ + 4 and seq′j = seqj then
SSM ← SSM ∪ {Mj};








rnd← rnd + 1;
end
• seqj ← seqj + 1, for all j ∈ [N ];
terminates after γ + 4 rounds, where γ is a statistical parameter. The intuition
behind our optimization can be formulated as follows: we notice that if we
select uniformly at random nodes to constitute a representative cluster in P ,
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we note that we can still guarantee w.h.p. an honest majority within this smaller
representative cluster. By leveraging F2 to generate a random number and blind-
box computation (P3), we can sample a set of peers forming the representative
cluster. The main remaining question, therefore, is how big this cluster should
be. As a starting point, note that if the cluster size is equal to 2N
3
, the probability
of having an honest majority is equal to one. Therefore, this remark already
suggests that the cluster size can be smaller. Conceptually, the optimized ERNG
can be decomposed into three main steps:
Cluster Selection: The purpose of this step is to construct a representative clus-
ter of the entire P2P network. The cluster will consist of nodes selected uni-
formly at random from P . At round 1, every node picks uniformly at random
a number from {0, · · · , N
2γ
− 1}9 using SGX (F2). This operation is protected
leveraging property P3 in such a way that the computation is hidden from the
OS. If the random number equals 0, then the node is chosen to be part of the
cluster, and then it multicasts a CHOSEN message to all nodes in P . Upon
receiving the CHOSEN message, every chosen node adds the identifier of the
sender to its own set SSchosen. The size of the set SSchosen represents the size of
the cluster.
ERB Instances: We first detail a pseudo-solution and then detail our main con-
struction in Algorithm 9. In round 2, the nodes constituting the cluster will each
generate a random number and broadcast it only to the nodes constituting the
cluster (i.e., peers’ identifiers in SSchosen). That is, every node in the cluster will
run an independent ERB instance. The intuition behind these multiple instances
is the following: for the broadcast to be effective, at least one broadcast instance
has to succeed in that the accepted message is different from ⊥. However, the
complexity of such solution is cubic in O(|SSchosen|3) which can be a handicap
in term of efficiency. As a solution, we incorporate a two-phases clustering. The
idea behind this choice is the following: in order to generate a random number
9 N is much larger than γ, and we assume N2γ − 1 is b N2γ − 1}c.
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we only require one honest node to output a random number r (otherwise the
ERNG protocol may output ⊥). We can then proceed to select just a few num-
ber of nodes to perform the ERB protocol. As long as at least one of these nodes
is honest, the correctness of our ERNG holds. Concretely, to generate the sec-
ond representative cluster, we perform the following: from nodes in SSchosen,
we uniformly pick at random a value from {0, · · · , γ′−1}, where γ′ is a param-
eter in function of γ that verifies γ′ ≤ γ. The peers that output a random number
equal to zero will be the only peers able to initiate the ERB protocol. We will
show that this strategy will greatly decrease the communication complexity and
defer its analysis to Section 5.9.4. Note that this phase lasts for γ + 2 rounds
when all ERB instances terminate.
Selection Decision: At the end of the broadcast phase, the node of the clusters
will have each a set containing eventually several random numbers. Note that,
as ERB is a reliable broadcast primitive, we know that all honest peers in the
cluster will have the same set of random numbers. Once a node in P receives
at least γ + 1 sets of random numbers, Mκ, originating from the nodes in the
cluster, it will output the set Mκ as SSfinal. All honest nodes will output the same
set under the assumption that there is a majority of honest nodes in the cluster.
Finally, the random number equals the XOR value of all random numbers in
SSfinal.
5.5.3 Analysis
We present the proofs for the Lemma and Theorems below in Section 5.9.4.
Lemma 5.5.1. If up to t = N
3
nodes are byzantine, then with at least 1−negl(γ)
probability, the representative cluster has more than γ honest nodes, and less
than γ byzantine nodes.
Theorem 5.5.2. Agreement: All honest nodes eventually agree on the same
common set SSfinal in ERNG.
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Theorem 5.5.3. Unbiasedness: The output of the ERNG protocol is an unbi-
ased random number.
ERNG Performance Analysis. Note that in ERNG,O(γ) nodes will be chosen
to form the first representative cluster and therefore run O(γ) Multicast func-
tions. The communication complexity of this first step is O(γ2). Then, among
this first representative cluster, a second cluster will be composed such that all
nodes of this cluster will run each an ERB instance. If the size of the second rep-
resentative cluster is O(
√
γ) (as shown in Corollary 5.9.1 in Section 5.9.4), then
the communication complexity of this step is O(γ2 · √γ). Finally, the member
of the first representative cluster will multicast the output of the ERB instances
to all peers in P . The communication complexity of this final step is O(N · γ).
That is, overall, the communication complexity of ERNG equalsO(N ·γ+γ 52 ).
Based on Lemmas 5.9.1 and 5.9.2, if N is large such that it verifies γ ∈ o(N),
then we can set γ ∈ O(logN). In this case, the communication complexity and
round complexity of ERNG are equal to O(N logN) and O(logN).
5.6 Evaluation
Implementation. We have implemented a prototype of ERB, unoptimized-
ERNG and ERNG in C/C++ using Intel SGX’s Linux SDK [26]. The imple-
mentation contains 4030 lines of code (LOC) measured using CLOC tool [10].
Our prototype implementation is open source and available online [34]. We re-
use the ported OpenSSL library including cryptographic utilities (libcrypto
available with Intel SDK), to perform Diffie-Hellman key exchange and AES
encryption/decryption. We use boost [9] library to implement the communi-
cations between any two nodes and use Google protobuf libraries [39] and
rapidjson [17] to serialize transferred data.
Experimental Setup. We use the DeterLab network testbed for our experi-
ments [16]. It consists of 40 servers running Ubuntu 14.04 with dual Intel(R)
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Xeon(R) hexacore processors running at 2.2 GHZ with 24 cores and 24 GB
of RAM. All machines are connected and share the same link with the band-
width of 128MBps. Every node in our protocol takes up to 1 - 800 MB memory
which limits the maximum number of nodes to 210 in our experiments. Since
the trusted elapsed time (F4) is not supported by all platforms yet and we need
to run multiple nodes on each machine, we use SGX simulation mode10 for our
program and use a simulated Intel attestation service (IAS).
Evaluation Methodology. To evaluate the correctness of our protocols, we
measure the round complexity (time to terminate) and communication complex-
ity (network traffic) for ERB, unoptimized-ERNG and ERNG, by varying the
number of nodes from 22 to 210. We have highly optimized our system to han-
dle dynamic ports allocations to handle a larger number of nodes within one
machine (order of 25 nodes per machine). Part of our results reported in this
section are for the optimistic case where all nodes behave honestly. We evaluate
the round complexity of ERB while varying the number of byzantine nodes in
the network up to 1
4
of the entire network composed of 512 nodes. We also com-
pare our experiment results for the traffic size with theoretical ones to verify if
they match our asymptotic analysis.
5.6.1 ERB Evaluation
Honest Termination: Constant Scalability. Determining the termination of
ERB is essential to validate our reliable broadcast primitive. Fig. (5.2) shows
that the termination time, in the case of an honest initiator, is nearly equal to
twice the value of one round. This validates our theoretical results where we
show that ERB finishes in 2 rounds when the initiator is honest. The small
increase at 28 is purely due to the bandwidth bottleneck of our testbed, as the
nodes share the same link.
Traffic Size: Quadratic Scalability. Fig. (5.3) demonstrates that the commu-
































Figure 5.3: (Th) theoretical and (Ex) experimental comparisons of network
overall communication bandwidth in MB for ERB in function of the number
of nodes in P .
nication complexity quadratically increases in function of the number of peers
in P (note that the x-axis is logarithmic). The message size of INIT and ACK is
around 100 Bytes and 80 Bytes, respectively. For 1024 nodes in P , the traffic














Figure 5.4: Termination time of ERNG in function of the number of nodes in
P .
5.6.2 ERNG Evaluation
Honest Termination: Limited Scalability. We show in Fig (5.4) that ERNG
termination remains slightly constant from 22 to 27 and then increases after-
wards. Unfortunately, this does not reflect our theoretical findings and this is
mainly due to the limitation of our testbed, namely, the upper bound on the
communication link of 128MBps that all nodes have to share11. For small val-
ues of peers N , the communication complexity of the unoptimized ERNG is
cubic in N , while the optimized version is also (nearly) cubic for smaller values
of N . Given a fixed bandwidth, this explains why the termination increases for
larger values of N to reach 103 s for one instance of ERNG.
Traffic Size: Cubic Scalability. Fig. (5.5) demonstrates that the communica-
tion complexity cubically increases in function of the number of peers in P for
the unoptimized ERNG. Our theoretical results back up our experimental result.
For ERNG as the bandwidth links get overflowed much faster, we limited our
experiments to 512 nodes. In this case, the traffic size was equal to ∼ 30 GB.
For the optimized ERNG, small values of the number of peers in the network






















Figure 5.5: Communication overhead of ERNG in function of the number of
nodes in P .
did not allow us to optimally select a cluster size that can guarantee w.h.p. the
agreement. In this case, we fix the cluster to be 2
3
of the network and we show
that the traffic size decreases to be equal to 12 GB for 512 nodes, a 60% im-
provement over the unoptimized one. Note that this result can get much better
for a larger number of peers in realistic settings. Here, we draw our theoretical
curve for the ideal evaluation which can be guaranteed only for larger N .
5.6.3 Byzantine case
In Fig (5.6), we show that the termination time of ERB linearly increases with
the number of byzantine nodes behaving maliciously in the current instance. We




. As a strategy of
byzantine nodes, we have taken into consideration the worst-case where byzan-
tine nodes create a chain (a byzantine sends its message to only one byzantine
node each round and then gets eliminated) in order to delay the termination as
much as possible. In the case of 1
4
byzantine fraction, the ERB termination
takes 389 seconds while it only takes 4 seconds in the honest case. For traffic
size, if the number of byzantine nodes increases in the network, the communi-











Figure 5.6: Time termination of ERB linearly increase with the number of
byzantine nodes in P .
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Figure 5.7: Communication overhead of ERB in function of different byzantine
peers in P .
to the halt-on-divergence property that will eject the nodes whenever it behaves
maliciously. That is when an honest node multicasts a message, the eliminated
byzantine node will not acknowledge this message which greatly reduces the
communication complexity. For example, for 1
4
byzantine fraction in a 512-
node network, the traffic size equals 35 MB, while in an honest node instance,
it was equal to 69 MB, a 50% decrease.
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5.7 Primitives and Formal Definitions
In this section, we first start by formally defining the syntax of the communi-
cation protocol between two peers, that we denote by Peer channel. Using this
definition, we next define various failure modes and primitives. Using SGX, we
assume that execution integrity (P1) is enforced. We then show that the follow-
ing properties: message integrity & authenticity (P2), blind-box computation
property (P3) can be emulated based on the Blinded channel, executing on a par-
ticular program. Then we go ahead and formally define the halt-on-divergence
(P4) property for any program running between two peers. Finally, we show
how to reduce the byzantine model to a model where a peer can only replay,
omit and delay, dubbed ROD for short, given that a Blinded channel exists.
5.7.1 Peer Channel
Abstractly, a peer can be considered as the composition of two entities: an
Enclave and an OS. The OS models the untrusted entity including the oper-
ating system and memory. It has access to all the system resources such as file
system, network and others. The OS can arbitrarily invoke an enclave program
and start its execution. The Enclave models the isolated memory space that
loads the program and executes it securely. Thus, Enclave corresponds to the
trusted entity of a peer. A concurrent work provides a formal study to show that
SGX enclaves can be considered as a trusted entity [194]. The Enclave of the
two Peers can interact with each other via their OSs. We formally define a Peer
channel as a protocol, Peerch, between a sender Peers = (Enclaves,OSs) and a
receiver Peerr = (Enclaver,OSr). A Peer channel can be seen as a generaliza-
tion of the traditional secure communication channel between two parties. The
main difference is that the definition of Peerch protocol is augmented with the
program pi running within the trusted Enclave. Before defining the Peer channel,
we first provide a definition of a program pi.
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Definition 5.7.1. (Program.) A program pi is a sequence of instructions i.e.,
pi = (pi1, · · · , pin) such that the ith instruction pii takes as an input the state
sti and a message mi and outputs a message mi+1 along with an updated state
sti+1. By convention, we write for all mi ∈ {0, 1}∗, (sti+1,mi+1)← pii(sti,mi).
The initial state is st1.
Based on the above definition, for a program pi with n instructions the output
out of pi is (stout, out) ← pin(stn,mn) where stout is the final state of the pro-
gram. We denote the set of all such programs by Π. Note that, in a program pi,
an instruction with ⊥ state as input always outputs ⊥ i.e., (⊥,⊥)← pii(⊥,mi).
Hence, if ∃i such that (⊥,⊥)← pii(sti,mi), then the output of the program pi is
always ⊥.
Definition 5.7.2. (Program Transcript.) Let pi ∈ Π and messagesm1, · · · ,mn ∈
{0, 1}∗ such that m = (mi)i∈[n], for all initial states st1 ∈ {0, 1}∗ and for all
i ≥ 1 such that (sti+1,mi+1)← pii(sti,mi), a transcript of pi with inputs st1 and
m denoted by transmpi equals:
transmpi =
(
pi1(st1,m1), · · · , pii(sti,mi), · · · , pin(stn,mn)
)
.
Definition 5.7.3. (Transcript Types.) Let pi ∈ Π and transmpi its transcript for
a fixed messagem = (mi)i∈[n]. We say that the transcript is:
• valid, if ∀i ∈ [n], sti 6= ⊥,
• invalid, if ∃i ∈ [n], sti = ⊥,
where (sti,mi)← pii−1(sti−1,mi−1).
We denote by Vpi and Ipi, the set of all n-messages for which the transcript
is valid and invalid, respectively.
Definition 5.7.4. (Peer Channel.) Given pis, pir ∈ Π are programs executing
in Enclaves and Enclaver with sts and str as respective initial states. A Peer
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channel between Enclaves and Enclaver is tuple of four possibly interactive al-
gorithms Peerch = (Init,Write,Transfer,Read) such that:
• (Ks, Kr) ← Init
(
(1k, sts, pis), (1
k, str, pir)
)
: is a probabilistic interactive
algorithm between Enclaves and Enclaver. Enclaves and Enclaver take
as inputs a security parameter k, a program pis and pir and the initial






(sts, Ks,m, pis), datas
)
: is a probabilistic interac-
tive algorithm between Enclaves and OSs. Enclaves has as inputs a state
sts, a key Ks, a message m and a program pis; the OSs has as the input a
data block datas; the algorithm outputs an updated state st′s for Enclaves
and the updated data block data
′
s for OSs.






: is a probabilistic interactive al-
gorithm between OSs and OSr that takes as input the data block data
′
s




• ((st′r, r), null) ← Read((str, Kr, pir), data′r): is a probabilistic interac-
tive algorithm between Enclaver and OSr. Enclaver has as inputs a state
str, a key Kr and the program pir; the OSr has as the input a data block
data
′
r; the algorithm outputs an updated state st
′
r and a response r for
Enclaver and null for OSr.
When pis = pir = pi, we can write Peerchpi to denote that Peer
ch is parametrized
with the program pi.
5.7.2 Failure Modes
We define four progressively stronger failure modes: honest, general omission,
ROD and byzantine modes of Peerch. Here we introduce a ROD model as an
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intermediate model, wherein the adversary can only a) Replay b) Omit c) or
Delay messages during a protocol, or follow it as prescribed. We particularly
focus on the sender behavior for simplicity, but our definition extends to both
sender and receiver. Note that to capture delay, we super-script the Transfer
algorithm with ∆ such that Transfer∆, to denote that the Transfer can take time
∆ to complete. We denote by Replaypi, the set containing all values generated by
Write in polynomial number of executions of program pi running concurrently
or earlier in time [168].
Definition 5.7.5. (Failure Modes.) Given a Peer channel Peerch = (Init,Write,
Transfer,Read) between two Peers, Peerr and Peers , for all security parameters
k ∈ N and for all programs pi, pis, pir, pi′ ∈ Π such that
• (Ks, Kr)← Init
(




For all messages m ∈ {0, 1}∗, for all state sts ∈ {0, 1}∗, for all data block





(sts, Ks,m, pis), datas
)
;







• ((st′r, r),⊥)← Read((str, Kr, pir), data′r).
We say that






– pis = pi,
– ∆ is bounded.




 ⊥ or,data′r ;
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– pis = pi,
– ∆ is bounded.










– pis = pi,
– ∆ <∞.












 pi or,pi′ where pi′ 6= pi;
– ∆ <∞
5.7.3 Core Primitives
We define two primitives: a) Blinded channels and b) halt-on-divergence. The-
orem 5.7.2, below, uses the Blinded channel primitive to demonstrate that byzan-
tine mode reduces to the ROD mode. As shown in Section 5.4, we can further
leverage additional SGX features, namely properties (P5) and (P6), to reduce
the ROD model to the general-omission model. Informally, a Blinded chan-
nel guarantees confidentiality and integrity of a message over a Peer channel
Peerch = (Init,Write,Transfer,Read).
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Definition 5.7.6. (Blinded Channels.) We say that Peerch is Blinded if for all
p.p.t adversaries A we have:




















The entire interaction between both of the parties is saved in a transcript
T ;
• compute b $← {0, 1}, if b = 0, then output K = (Ks, Kr) $← {0, 1}k,





• Given K and T , A outputs b′ and wins if b′ = b.
ExpPrivA,Peerch(λ):





• A has access to Øwrite(Ks,.)(.) and Øread(Kr,.)(.);
• A chooses two equal-length messages m0 and m1;
• compute Write((sts, Ks,mb, pi), datas) where b $← {0, 1}, and output
data;
• A has again access to Øwrite(Ks,.)(.) and Øread(Kr,.)(.);
• A outputs b′, if b′ = b, the experiment outputs 1, and 0 otherwise.
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ExpAuthA,Peerch(λ):





• A has access to Øwrite(Ks, .). A queries a polynomial number of messages
m and eventually outputs ct, we denote by Q the set of all queries that A
sent to the oracle;
• Given ct, Øwrite(Ks, .) outputs r. If m /∈ Q and r 6= ⊥. A outputs 1.
Attaching a program pi while defining a Peerch enables us to introduce the
halt-on-divergence primitive as follows.
Definition 5.7.7. (Halt-on-divergence.) Let pi ∈ Π be a program and transmpi
its transcript for a fixed n-messagesm, we say that Peerchpi halts on-divergence
if transmpi is invalid, i.e.,m ∈ Ipi
5.7.4 Implementing Blinded Channel using SGX
We show how we build a Peerch channel using SGX where Enclaves and Enclaver
are trusted entities. Theorem 5.7.1 shows that such a PeerChsgx channel is a Blinded
channel, and therefore enforces both (P2) and (P3) propertie. In particular, we
consider that there is a KeyExpi protocol between Enclaves and Enclaver that
is used to generate a session key for a program pi. Whenever there is a new
program the key has to be re-generated. The key exchange protocol can be in-
stantiated using Diffie-Hellman key exchange, referring to [158] Chapter 9. We
use SGX remote attestation to verify that both parties run their code inside an
Enclave. While this step is neither required nor captured in the Peerch definition,
it is mandatory to guarantee our execution integrity (P1). We detail our instan-
tiation in Figure 5.8, in our case, we consider that pir = pis = pi. We denote
by parse and compute the actions of decoding a string and running a particular
algorithm, respectively.
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Let SKE = (Gen,Enc,Dec) be a private encryption scheme, MAC = (Gen,Auth,Vrfy)
be a message authentication code, KeyEx a key exchange algorithm, and H be a hash
function. We define PeerChsgx = (Init,Write,Transfer,Read) as follows:
• Init((1k, sts, pi), (1k, str, pi)):
1. Enclaves and Enclaver fetch the hardware-embedded private keys sks, skr
from sts, str, respectively;













• Write((sts,Ks,m, pi), datas):





2. set (st′s, val)← pi(sts,m)






4. set datas = (ct1, ct2)




1. OSr sets datar = data
′
s;
2. OSs outputs ⊥ and OSr outputs data
′
r = datar.
• Read((str,Kr, pi), data′r):











:= ct2 and str 6= ⊥, Enclaver computes
– 〈r1, r2〉 = SKE.Dec(key1, ct1);





) 6= ct2 or str = ⊥, Enclaver outputs r = ⊥ and
st′r = str
Figure 5.8: PeerChsgx: SGX-based Peer channel.
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Theorem 5.7.1. If KeyEx is a secure key exchange protocol, SKE is CPA secure
encryption schemes, MAC a secure message authentication code, then PeerChsgx is
a Blinded Peer channel.
Proof Sketch. First, we want to show that the Init algorithm is a secure key
exchange. Note that both parties run two instances of a KeyEx protocol to
generate two session keys. That is, if KeyEx is a secure key exchange then
Pr[ExpEXA,Peerch(k) = 1] ≤ 12 + negl(k).
Second, we need to show that PeerChsgx is a secure communication channel.
Note that, we use the variant encrypt-then-mac which is shown in [158] Chapter
9 to provide a secure communication channel if SKE is CPA secure and MAC a
secure message authentication. This ends our proof sketch.
Theorem 5.7.2. Assuming that PeerChsgx is a Blinded channel, then Peerch in
byzantine is equivalent to Peerch in ROD mode.
Proof Sketch. For clarity, we assume that the sender is byzantine while the re-
ceiver is not. We can apply an analogous proof for the remaining combinations
as well. To prove the theorem, we need to show that the view of the honest node
in the ROD and byzantine modes are the same w.h.p. under the assumption that
PeerChsgx is a Blinded Peer channel. For this, it is sufficient to show the following
two steps: first, that any forged message for any φ ∈ {{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗} \ {C}
will not change the state of the receiver str, i.e., that the forged message is equiv-
alent to receiving nothing, ⊥, where C is the set composed of all functions that
maps data
′
r to one of the messages in Replaypi
⋃{data′r}. Second, we need to
show that, for any valid data data
′
s output by Write, the receiver state will not
change if pis 6= pir (recall that we are assuming the receiver honest and in this
case means that pir = pi). We detail below the two steps of the reduction:




r) where φ ∈ {{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗} \ {C} such
that 〈ct1, ct2〉 = data′s. Then, we have that Pr[MAC.Vrfy(key2, ct1) 6= ct2] ≥
1−negl(k) under the assumption that PeerChsgx is a Blinded channel. Based on the
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PeerChsgx in Figure 5.8, if MAC.Vrfy(key2, ct1) 6= ct2, then st′r = str w.h.p. Note













(sts, Ks,m, pis), datas
)




s = 〈ct1, ct2〉. How-
ever, based on collision-resistance assumption of the hash function H , the mali-
cious node cannot find any program pis such that H(pis) = H(pi).12 In this case,
if H(pis) 6= H(pi), then based on the PeerChsgx protocol, st′r = str, i.e., the state of
the receiver does not change, which is therefore equivalent to receiving nothing,





r for pis = pi
data← Replaypis for pis = pi
⊥
Finally, we emphasize that the delay constraint (∆ < ∞) remains valid for
both byzantine and ROD modes. Note that this final view is exactly the same
of the ROD model. Note that the same holds when we consider the receiver
byzantine, or both sender and receiver byzantine. This concludes our proof.
5.8 Rethinking Reliable Broadcast Protocols
In this section, we explain the shortcomings of classic protocols for reliable
broadcast. Reliable broadcast or byzantine generals problem is formally defined
in Definition 5.2.1. The crux of such protocol is that all honest nodes eventually
agree on the same value, which is the one proposed by the sender (or initiator)
if the initiator is honest. Reliable broadcast was first proposed by Lamport et al.
12This can also be done by signing the program for every message output by the SGX-enabled
program.
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in 1982, which hasO(N t) message complexity and t+1 round complexity. The
proposed protocol was also resilient upto N
3
byzantine nodes [162]. Since 1980s,
reliable broadcast has been extensively studied and various protocols have been
developed, which are well summarized in several excellent survey papers [160,
220]. As byzantine nodes can behave arbitrarily, these protocols have to use
different techniques to prevent the impact of the proposed biased values by the
byzantine nodes, which generally leads to high (like exponential or polynomial)
message complexity. Moreover, it has been shown that the optimal resilience
cannot exceed third the size of the network [195]. To reduce communication
complexity and increase resilience, several ways have been proposed, and using
digital signatures is the primary one.
5.8.1 Digital Signature Schemes
Using digital signatures denotes that a node appends its signature (signed with
its private key) to every message it sends. This guarantees the integrity and au-
thenticity of the message, which can be easily verified by the other nodes using
the sender’s public key. It is well known that no nodes can forge the signature of
another node w.h.p. This results in restricting the behavior of byzantine nodes,
which can in this case only omit to relay messages, or construct different values
as an initiator. We present a reliable broadcast protocol using digital signatures
in Algorithm 10 adapted from Lamport et al.’s work [162].
In RBsig, each node signs every message it multicasts. In the first round, the
initiator sends a signed message to the other nodes. Then for any round rnd, a
node that receives a valid message will sign and forward it in the next round. A
message received by a node idi in round rnd is valid if it contains signatures from
rnd different nodes except idi. In Algorithm 10, we use [m : id1 : id2 : ... : idj] to
denote a message, in whichm is the value signed by the initiator id1 and [m : id1]
is signed by id2, and so on. This means that id1 sent the signed message [m : id1]
to a node id2 in the first round, and id2 sent [m : id1 : id2] in the second round,
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Algorithm 10: RBsig: Reliable broadcast protocol using digital signatures (for a node
idi with the initiator idinit sending a message m).
Input: A P2P network P composed N nodes, a message m for the initiator idinit
Output: A message mˆ
• initialization: mˆ←⊥;SSm ← ∅; rnd← 1
• for rnd ≤ t+ 1 do
if rnd = 1 and idi = idinit then
mˆ← m
Multicast [m : idinit] to all the other nodes
end
• upon receiving [m′ : idinit] from idinit:
SSm ← {m′}
Multicast [m′ : idinit : idi] to all nodes except idinit, idi in round rnd + 1
• upon receiving [m′ : idinit : id1 : ... : idj ] from peer idj :
if m′ /∈ SSm then
SSm ← SSm ∪ {m′}
if j < t+ 1 then
Multicast [m′ : idinit : id1 : ... : idj : idi] to all nodes except idinit, ..., idi
in round rnd + 1
end
end
• rnd← rnd + 1;
end
if rnd > t+ 1 then
if |SSm| = 1 then




until idj sent the signed message [m : id1 : id2 : ...idj] in the rndth round.
In RBsig, the initiator idinit signs and sends its value to every node in the
first round. If any node receives the message, it stores the value in SSm, signs
and sends it to the other nodes for the second round. For round rnd < t + 1,
every node receives a valid message from other node. In the case where the
received value does not belong to SSm, then the node adds the value to SSm
and multicasts the signed message to the other nodes. After t+ 1 rounds, every
node verifies whether SSm consists of a unique value mˆ, if that holds then the
node outputs mˆ, otherwise he output is the default value ⊥.
Based on digital signatures property, the byzantine nodes cannot forge a
honest-like message. Therefore, every honest node only requires one valid mes-
sage sent from either one byzantine or one honest node to determine the value
from the initiator. If the initiator is honest, every honest node will receive the
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correct value from the initiator during the first round, and will discard invalid
messages forged by byzantine nodes for the remaining rounds. If the initiator is
byzantine, it can send different values to different honest nodes to bias the result.
To ensure the validity of the message, after t + 1 rounds, at least one signature
in the message is from an honest node, and the honest node will broadcast the
signed message to the other honest nodes, thus all honest nodes will receive the
same message. Eventually, all honest nodes received the same set of values.
If multiple values are received, all honest nodes will agree on a default value,
otherwise they agree on the only received value.
Using digital signatures improves network’s resilience from N
3
to N − 1,
but communication complexity remains the same O(N t). Later, an optimized
algorithm using digital signatures was proposed to reduce communication com-
plexity to O(N3) [125]. At a higher level, this improvement is achieved through
a new strategy that only retransmits values which have not been previously sent.
Even in this case, every node has to relay O(N) messages and a message can
contain O(N) signatures, which results in O(N3) communication complexity
for the protocol. Meanwhile, the verification of O(N2) signatures may lead
to a non-negligible performance cost for the honest nodes, especially when the
byzantine nodes construct and send enormous number of invalid messages to
the honest nodes.
Efficiency Improvement. In the following, we discuss how our properties
can lead to better asymptotics. First, by enforcing P1 - P3 and P5 - P6, we
confine the byzantine nodes into the general-omission model only allowing to
omit messages. We can further use P3, and secure channels in particular, to
guarantee the confidentiality of the transmitted messages. In this way, when
a node relays a message to the others in this model, it can append its identity
instead of signing the message with its private key, which achieves the same
effect of using signatures. Therefore, we circumvent the transmission of multi-
signature messages and the process of verifying signatures, which reduces the
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Algorithm 11: RBearly: Reliable broadcast protocol with early stopping (for a node
idi with the initiator idinit sending a message m).
Input: A P2P network P composed N nodes, a message m for the initiator idinit
Output: A message mˆ
• initialization: mˆ←?; QUIETrndi ← ∅,Mrndi (j)← ∅; rnd← 1
• upon idi = idinit:
mˆ← m;
Multicast m to all the other nodes
return mˆ
• for rnd ≤ t+ 1 do
• upon receiving 〈m′〉 from peer idj :
Mrndi (j)← Mrndi (j) ∪ {m′}
• QUIETrndi ← QUIETrnd−1i ∪ {idj |Mrndi (j) = ∅}
if mˆ =? and ∃idj where Mrndi (j) 6= ∅ then
mˆ← Mrndi (j)
if rnd < t+ 1 then
Multicast mˆ to all the other nodes in round rnd + 1
end
else if mˆ =? and 6 ∃idj where Mrndi (j) 6= ∅ then
if rnd < t+ 1 then
if rnd > |QUIETrndi | then
mˆ←⊥
end




else if mˆ 6=? then
return mˆ
• rnd← rnd + 1
end
communication complexity from O(N3) to O(N2) and avoids the significant
computation cost (as the symmetric decryption is much cheaper than signature
verification).
5.8.2 Early Stopping Schemes
Apart from reducing communication complexity, SGX can also aid to decrease
round complexity. In the general-omission model, several protocols have been
proposed to reduce the round complexity. We recall a classic example of re-
liable broadcast protocol with early stopping in min{f + 2, t + 1} rounds in
Algorithm 11 adapted from Perry et al.’s work [198]. When f < t omission
faults take place, then all honest nodes will stop by the end of round f + 2.
In Algorithm 11, Mrndi (j) represents the message received by idi from idj in
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round rnd. QUIETrndi denotes the set of nodes from which idi has not received a
message from round 1 through round rnd. In the first round, the initiator sends
a message to the other nodes and halts. For any round, if a node receives a
message from another node, it stores the value in Mrndi (j). If a node idi does not
receive any message from another node idj for round rnd, idj will be added into
QUIETrndi . When a node has not decided the value and it receives a value, it will
set the decision as the new value and broadcasts the value to all nodes in the next
round (rnd + 1 ≤ t + 1). If it does not receive any value and rnd = t + 1, the
node will decide the default value ⊥. If the round number rnd < t + 1 is larger
than the size of QUIETrndi , the node will send ⊥ to all nodes in round rnd + 1,
otherwise it will send ⊥. Finally, once the node decides its value, it halts.
The early-stopping protocol requires every node to broadcast its decision
for every round, to inform the other nodes about its liveness. In this way, honest
nodes can detect abnormal behaviors of malicious nodes for each round. Based
on the detection, all honest nodes can halt and agree on the same value by the
end of round f + 2, where f nodes behave maliciously (e.g., omit to replay
messages). The detailed proof can be found in the work [198]. Based on the
proposed broadcast detection mechanism, the protocol can early-stop. How-
ever, the communication complexity increases to be in O(N3), as every node
broadcasts its value every round.
Efficiency Improvement. By leveraging the halt-on-divergence property (P4),
we can actively stop nodes behaving maliciously, which eliminates the t-round
broadcasting and reduces the communication complexity to O(N2) as well as
sanitizes the network by removing the malicious nodes. For instance, if a ma-
licious node sends a message to other nodes but omit to receive messages from
over half of the nodes in the network, the node will be forced to leave the net-
work. Therefore, any node can actively detect its own anomalous behavior
instead of relying on other nodes to send messages every round to passively
identify the anomaly. This can lead to reduce communication complexity for
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anomaly detection from O(N2) to O(N).
5.9 Security Analysis
5.9.1 ERB Analysis
In this section, we use the same terminology used in Section 5.7, namely, we
assume that between any two nodes of the network, an PeerChsgx instantiation of
the Blinded Peer channel is enabled. In particular, it provides us with both mes-
sage Integrity & authenticity (P2) and blind-box computation (P3) properties.
Throughout this section, we implicitly consider that the program is publicly
available, and therefore its execution integrity (P1) is enforced.
Theorem 5.9.1. If N ≥ 2t + 1 where t is the upper bound on the number of
byzantine peers, and PeerChsgx is a Blinded Peer channel, then ERB is a reliable
broadcast protocol as defined in Definition 5.2.1 with worst-case round com-
plexity equal to t+ 2 and communication complexity equal to O(N2).
Proof. We are going to gradually prove the five requirements of terminating re-
liable broadcast. Note that the assumption that the peers communicates using
PeerChsgx implies that a byzantine node can only delay, omit or replay messages,
as we have shown in Theorem 5.7.2. As long as the network is synchronous
with a fixed time interval for a round to complete, delaying is then equivalent
to omitting a message, as the message will not be considered by honest nodes
past the round, enforcing therefore the lockstep execution (P5) property. Re-
playing a message is also ineffective as every peer is identified by a sequence
number as well, that is generated by the trusted enclave in the Peer channel, and
therefore enforcing the message freshness (P6) property. Under the assumption
that PeerChsgx is a Blinded channel, we can replace all occurrences of Multicast
by communication between two trusted parties. To sum up, and throughout the
proof, it is valid to consider that if there is a delay, omission or replay, this will
be equivalent to considering that the first party does not send any message.
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Lemma 5.9.2. Validity: In ERB, if the sender is honest and accepts messagem,
then all honest nodes eventually accept m, otherwise if the sender is byzantine,
after round t+ 2, all honest nodes either accept the same message m or ⊥.
Proof. In the following, we consider two different types of initiators: an honest
and a byzantine peer.
(1) Let the sender be the peer pinit with identifier idinit. If pinit is honest,
according to ERB, the sender multicasts its message m in an INIT message for
the first round. All honest nodes will receive m in the first round and multicast
ECHO to all nodes in the second round, as every node at this stage is going
to receive m for the first time. At the end of these two rounds, every honest
node will receive at least t + 1 ECHO messages for m from all honest nodes.
According to ERB, each honest node will accept m.
(2) If the initiator is byzantine, we proceed to show the validity by contradic-
tion. Suppose that the lemma does not hold in the byzantine case, which means
that at the end of round t+ 2, not all honest nodes agree on the same value, i.e.,
only a strict subset of honest nodes agree on m, but the remaining peers agree
on ⊥. According to the protocol, any node accepting m must have received at
least t+ 1 ECHO messages from different nodes. The upper bound of byzantine
nodes is t, thus at least one honest node should have multicasted an ECHO mes-
sage to nodes accepting m during t+ 2 rounds. For the proof to go through, we
introduce the following claims and then proceed with the contradiction case.
Claim 5.9.1. There is at least one honest node that does not receive any ECHO
message after t+ 1 rounds.
Proof. We prove this claim by contradiction. Suppose that all honest nodes
receive an ECHO message during t+ 1 rounds, then they multicast ECHO after
receiving it. Therefore, all honest nodes will receive t + 1 ECHO before the
end of round t + 2, which means that all of them accept m. This contradicts
our assumption that only a strict subset of honest nodes agree on the same value
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m.
Claim 5.9.2. No honest nodes receives ECHO messages after round t.
Proof. This claim can be also shown by contradiction. Suppose one honest
node receives an ECHO message before round t, it must multicast ECHO to all
nodes, and all honest nodes receive it before the end of round t. However, this
contradicts our Claim 5.9.1.
We can now proceed by induction where the two claims holds for any i ∈
[t− 1]. That is, we can show:
• There is at least one honest node that does not receive any ECHO message
after t+ 1− i rounds.
• All honest nodes do not receive ECHO messages after round t− i.
In this case, for any i ∈ [t], we can show that all honest nodes do not receive
ECHO messages after round i. That is the only way an honest node can receive a
message m is in round t+ 1 transmitted by a byzantine node. However, this is a
contradiction as this event cannot occur. A byzantine node holding a message at
round t+ 1 means that through all rounds the message was transmitted between
byzantine nodes, only. Knowing that if a node does not receive t + 1 ACK it
will halt, this means that the best strategy is to transfer the message to only one
byzantine node at a time. This means that there is a need to t + 1 byzantine
nodes in the network which contradicts our assumption.
Lemma 5.9.3. Agreement: If an honest node accepts m, then all honest nodes
eventually accept m.
Proof. If the sender of m is honest, then all honest nodes accept m according
to Lemma 5.9.2. If the sender is byzantine, then all honest nodes either accept
m or ⊥ according to Lemma 5.9.2. Therefore, if an honest node accepts m, all
honest nodes accept m, no matter the sender is honest or byzantine.
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Lemma 5.9.4. Integrity: For any message m, every honest node accepts m at
most once, if m was broadcast by the sender.
Proof. According to Algorithm 7, every honest node only acceptsm once, while
receiving t + 1 ECHO messages. If m 6=⊥, all honest nodes accept the mes-
sage broadcasted by the sender, no matter if the sender is honest or byzantine,
Lemma 5.9.2.
Lemma 5.9.5. Early Stopping: Every honest node will terminate at round
min{f + 2, t+ 2}.
Proof. According to Algorithm 7, if the initiator is honest, then all honest nodes
accept m from idsint after two rounds. If it is a byzantine intiatior and f nodes
violate the protocol (e.g., receiving less than t+ 1 acknowledgement responses
after sending a message), any of these f nodes can exist in the network for at
most f rounds. After f rounds, if the messagem is sent from any of the f nodes
to the other nodes, then the other nodes will follow the protocol and multicastm
to all honest nodes. After two rounds, all honest nodes will agree on the same
value m. Otherwise, all honest nodes will wait until the end of round t + 2 and
accept the default value ⊥. Therefore, all honest nodes will terminate at round
min f + 2, t + 2. Lemma 5.9.2, 5.9.3 and 5.9.4 also hold in the early-stopping
case.
Lemma 5.9.6. Termination: Every honest node eventually accepts m or ⊥.
Proof. According to Algorithm 7, if an honest node receives t + 1 ECHO or
INIT messages during min{f + 2, t + 2} rounds, it will accept m immediately;
otherwise, it will accept ⊥ at the end of round t+ 2.
Lemma 5.9.7. Efficiency: For any sender, the communication complexity is
O(N2) for one instance of ERB.
Proof. For ERB, every node only broadcasts to all nodes once when receiving
INIT or ECHO for the first time, thus every node sends N messages. To reply
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requests from other nodes with ACK messages, every node sends at most an-
other N messages. There are N nodes in the network, so the communication
complexity for one run of ERB is at most 2N2 or O(N2) in total.
This concludes our proof.
5.9.2 P2P Sanitization & Analysis
In ERB, we introduce the concept of network sanitization or faulty node elimi-
nation captured by the halt-on divergence (P4) property, or the Halt function for
short. This process has an important impact on the P2P topology as whenever a
byzantine node misbehaves, the enclave of the node will deterministically stop
the node. Thus, the byzantine node gets ejected from the network. This byzan-
tine node cannot generate any new message as its enclave halts. We say that this
sanitizes the P2P topology.
A byzantine OS gets churned out if it deviates from the sequential execution
of ERB. Since it cannot infer the content of each message due to our blinded
channel, one of the possible strategy is to behave maliciously uniformly at ran-
dom. We present in the following our analysis that details the sanitization impact
on ERB in this particular scenario, and shows that after a polynomial number
of instances, the expected round complexity of the protocol becomes constant13.
First, we give a characterization of the pace of sanitization considering that for
every instance, a byzantine node can behave malicious with a probability that
can be independently tuned. We also consider the effect of a new node joining
the network before the start of every instance of the protocol to replace eventu-
ally an eliminated node.
Theorem 5.9.8. Let Fr denotes the random variable counting the number of
byzantine nodes after r instances of Algorithm 7, then
Pr[Fr ≥ 1] ≤ e−λ,
13We believe that the network sanitization asymptotic improvement can apply independently
of the malicious nodes’ strategy
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where λ = rp
2
− ln(t), t the upper bound of byzantine nodes in the P2P network
and p the fraction of activated byzantine nodes at any instance.
Proof. It is easy to see that the number of byzantine nodes in the P2P net-
work at the (i + 1)th instance of Algorithm 7 equals: Fi+1 = Fi − Ri + Ai,
where Ri represents the number of byzantine nodes that have arbitrarily mis-
behaved and therefore are eliminated from the network, and Ai represents the









j , where X
(1)
j ∼ Bp and X(2)j ∼ Bp1
2
is
a conditional Bernoulli random variables such that , X(2)j = 1 if X
(1)




j is a Bernoulli random variable with parameter p that captures the fact
that a node can misbehave in a particular instance of Algorithm 7 with proba-
bility p, while the second random variable X(2)j captures the fact that whenever
a node is eliminated from the network, it can be replaced with either a honest
or malicious node. This is in phase with our assumption that we can handle a
honest majority at the beginning.
Note that bothRi andAi are both a random sum of random variables. As the
number of failures at some iteration can be considered independent of the sum
of failures occurred throughout all iterations of Algorithm 7, we can consider
that both X(1)j and X
(2)
j are independent of Fi.
Based on Wald’s equation, we have E[Fi+1] = (1− p2) ·E[Fi]. By induction
we can show that E[Fi+1] = (1 − p2)i+1 · E[F0], where E[F0] = E[t] = t, the
initial number of byzantine nodes in the network.
Based on Markov inequality, we show that
Pr[Fr ≥ 1] ≤ t(1− p
2
)r ≤ e− rp2 +ln(t).
Setting rp
2
− ln(t) = λ concludes the proof.
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For example, for λ = 30 and t = N
2
−1 for N = 210 p = 2−5, the number of
rounds before the P2P gets sanitized with high probability equals to r ≈ 2500.
We are now interested in computing the expected number of rounds in av-
erage of Algorithm 7 while taking into consideration our sanitization protocol.
Theorem 5.9.8 shows that the P2P can get sanitized w.h.p. after a particular
number of rounds, however, throughout the different instances, the number of
byzantine nodes decreases as well, which suggests that the round complexity
can get better. We will show in the following theorem that Algorithm 7 has a
constant round complexity in average after a polynomial number of instances.
Theorem 5.9.9. Algorithm 7 has a constant round complexity in average for a
number of instances r = poly(N) w.h.p.
In this theorem, we consider the same setting of Theorem 5.9.8 where the











j ∼ Bp and X(2)j ∼ Bp1
2
is
a conditional Bernoulli random variables such that , X(2)j = 1 if X
(1)
j = 1 for
j ∈ [Fi].
We have shown that in this case the expected value of E[Fi] = (1− p2)i · t.
To compute the expected number of rounds per instance, we need to count
first the total number of possible byzantine nodes to ever occur after r instances,








i ), Moreover, we also define
the average number of rounds per instance as a random variable , R, equal to
R = 2 · (r−Tr)
r
+ t · Tr
r
, where during r − Tr rounds the protocol is optimal and
equals 2, and in Tr rounds the protocol has a worst-case round complexity and
equals to f .
We then have that, leveraging Wald’s equation, E[Tr] = 3t2 ·(1−(1− p2)r+1).
Then, E[R]− 2 ∼ 3t2
2r






That is, if r = poly(N) and p = O(1
t




5.9.3 Unoptimized ERNG Analysis
In this section, similar to Section 5.7, we denote by the ROD mode, a mode
where peers in a network P can only replay, omit and delay messages.
Theorem 5.9.10. If P operates in the ROD mode, then the bias of G β(G) = 1.
Proof. Note that while G can be modeled as a multi-variate function, it does
not capture the sequencing of inputs. For our proof to go through, we need
to first show that the sequencing of ERNG is guaranteed and a node can only
participate with its input if it starts synchronously with all nodes. For this, we
have the following two cases:
• early start: if a byzantine node transmits its INIT at rnd = 1, then based
on Lemma 5.9.2, the node outputs (either m or ⊥) will be considered as
an input for G,
• late start: if a byzantine holds the INIT message until seeing the output,
then its input will not be added to SSfinal as the message will be considered
delayed. The output of G in this case equals ⊥
Note that for both cases, the nodes have to start the protocol at rnd = 1 if
they want to participate with their inputs in the final output. Moreover, based
on the Blinded channel, we know that nodes can only obtain the final output
of G while not viewing any internal state of G, which enforce the blind-box
computation (P3) property. That is, it is valid to consider G as a multi-variate
function that is fed all inputs at once. Let us denote by X the random variable
that captures the output ofG such thatX = X1⊕· · ·XN , whereXi’s are random
variables that capture the input provided by every node in P , for all i ∈ [N ]. As
P operates in the ROD mode, Lemma 5.9.2 demonstrates that all honest nodes
receive the same set SSfinal at the end of the protocol. We then can rewrite X




i=κ+1 Xi, where κ = |SSfinal|. In the following,
we need to show that EG[S] = E[S] =
|S|
2k
, for all S ⊆ {0, 1}k. Note that
EG[S] = Pr[X ∈ S], and therefore it is sufficient to compute Pr[X ∈ S].
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The second equality follows from the fact that all events are disjoint. Now for
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|{x2, · · · , xκ ∈ {0, 1}k}| = 1
2s
Thus, Pr[X ∈ S] = |S|
2s
. This concludes our proof.
5.9.4 Optimized ERNG
Lemma 5.9.1. If up to t = N
3
nodes are byzantine, then with at least 1−negl(γ)
probability, the representative cluster has more than γ honest nodes, and less
than γ byzantine nodes.
Proof. In ERNG at round 1, every node picks uniformly at random a value
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from {0, · · · , N
2γ
− 1}. That is, every node has a probability equal to q = 2γ
N
to be chosen as a representative. Let Hi and Bi be two random variable that
equal 1 if the ith honest and byzantine node is chosen respectively, otherwise
they equal zero. Let us denote by H =
∑2t
i=1Hi and B =
∑t
i=1Bi the number
of selected honest and byzantine nodes in the cluster. Then both H and B are
distributed following a binomial distribution with a number of trials equal to 2t
and t, respectively. We have E[H] =
∑2t
i=1E[Hi] = 2t · 2γN = 4t·γN . Similarly,
E[Y ] = 2t·γ
N




Pr[H > (1− δ1)4γ
3




similarly, Pr[B < (1 + δ2)2γ3 ] ≥ 1 − e−
2δ22 ·γ




and δ2 = 13 , we obtain,
Pr[H > γ] ≥ 1− e− γ24 ,
and,
Pr[B < γ] ≥ 1− e− γ41 .
Lemma 5.9.2. If γ′ = √γ, then the probability that Ω(√γ) honest nodes are
selected to be in the second representative cluster is at least 1− negl(γ).
Proof. Based on Algorithm 9, every node in the cluster has a probability of 1
γ′
to be chosen. Let us denote by Xi the random variable equal to one if the node
is selected. We then denote by, H′ =
∑H
i=1Xi, the random variable that counts
the number of honest node in the second cluster. Based on Wald’s equation,
we obtain E[H′] = E[H]
γ′ =
4γ
3γ′ . Then, based on Chernoff bound, we obtain for
δ < 1,
Pr[H′ > (1− δ) · 4γ
3γ′














] ≥ 1− e−√γ.
This ends out proof.
Note that we can obtain better bounds if we consider computing the pmf of
H′ as it follows a binomial distribution with a binomial number of trials
Corollary 5.9.1. If γ′ = √γ, then the size of the first and second representative
clusters is in O(γ) and O(
√
γ) w.h.p
The proof of the corollary directly follows from Lemma 5.9.2.
Theorem 5.9.11. Agreement: All honest nodes eventually agree on the same
common set SSfinal in ERNG.
Proof. In round 1, |SSchosen| nodes are uniformly at random selected to be part
of the representative cluster. Based on Lemma 5.9.1, we have shown that the
cluster contains strictly more than γ honest nodes, and strictly less than γ byzan-
tine nodes w.h.p. when t < N
3
That is, we have created a new smaller P2P
network SSchosen in which the honest nodes represent the majority. In the clus-
ter, all honest nodes know each other, but byzantine nodes may deliberately not
contact honest nodes on purpose. In this case, the cluster will be more robust
with less byzantine nodes. Thus, all the results introduced for ERB will hold
for this cluster of nodes.
From round 2 to round γ + 3, the second cluster has more than
√
γ honest
nodes w.h.p. according to Lemma 5.9.2. For each instance of ERB— whether
initiated by an honest or byzantine node, the honest representative nodes will
agree on a same message according to Lemma 5.9.3. Since there is at least
one honest sender, all honest nodes will accept the honest sender’s message for
its run of ERB based on Lemma 5.9.2. After around O(
√
γ) runs, all honest
nodes will agree on the same set of random numbers. Since the number of
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honest representative nodes is larger than γ and all of them will multicast FINAL
messages for the same set of messages in round γ+4, then all honest nodes will
receive adequate FINAL messages to accept the common set SSfinal.
In ERNG, since the message mi is a random number generated by the SGX
and proposed by the peer pi, then eventually every honest node accepts the same
set SSfinal of random numbers according to Theorem 5.9.11. By performing ex-
clusive disjunction (or XOR) of all the random numbers in SSfinal, every honest
node can obtain a common random number r. We demonstrate next that the
random number r is unbiased against byzantine nodes.
Theorem 5.9.12. Unbiasedness: The output of the ERNG protocol is an unbi-
ased random number.
sketch. Given Theorem 5.9.11, we know that all honest nodes agree on the same
set SSM. On the other hand, leveraging PeerChsgx Peer channel, we know that all
random numbers in the ERNG protocol are generated within the SGX enclave
and never tempered with as the network is in the ROD model, based on Corol-
lary 5.7.2. Finally, it is sufficient to show that if all random numbers gener-
ated in SGX are truly random then the output of ERNG is an unbiased random
number, which holds given SGX primitive generates unbiased random number
against the operating system according to Theorem 5.9.10.
5.10 Discussions
5.10.1 Are Assumptions Reasonable?
S1: Network Size. We start with a fixed size network P with N peers. We
assume that there exists information that publicly identifies every node in P ,
this can be for example a node IP address. This assumption is reasonable under
some common conditions. For example, for banking systems, all involved ma-
chines should be registered and publicly available. Fortunately, we can weaken
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such as assumption and we can extend our setting to work within a variable
size network based on the following technique: whenever a node wants to join
P , the joining node contacts another neighbor node and communicates both its
sequence number and identifier. The contacted node will use ERB to reliably
broadcast the pair to all peers in P and then send the joining peer a message
containing all existing identifiers of P . We can leverage the same technique in
a recursive way to even start with a one node network P . Note that in this case
the identifier need not to be publicly known.
S2: Synchronous Start. Before initiating the ERB primitive, we assume that
any honest node inP can be triggered at the same reference time. This reference
time can be provided in different ways such as periodic execution from a fixed
reference date, or simply by starting at a time posted in public servers. Once
synchronized, every node uses the trusted elapsed time from SGX to maintain
a relative time from the reference time. This therefore will maintain an internal
clock within every node’s enclave. As the enclaves in all honest nodes will have
the (nearly) same internal clock, all nodes will start the next instance of the pro-
tocol at the same time. If any byzantine node deviates by omitting or delaying
the oracle message, its elapsed time will be different from the one honest nodes
have. Consequently, all the byzantine node messages will be delayed as they are
going to have a different round number.
S3: Round time 2∆ seconds. The round time (2∆ seconds) is adequately
determined to allow any honest round trip message to complete within 2∆ sec-
onds. The round increments are managed using the trusted elapsed time, which
implies that even if the OS is byzantine, the round number will be always incre-
mented inside the enclave every 2∆ seconds. We also emphasize that the time
interval between any two internal clocks for honest nodes is negligible compared
to 2∆ seconds. As ERB does not use any underlying heavy cryptographic prim-
itive, we assert that any sent message will be received in the same round. The
2∆ seconds is mostly dedicated for network latency reasons.
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S4: Number of byzantine nodes less than N
2
. To join a network P , an ad-
versary is required to control machines with SGX-enabled CPUs, in which the
number of possible launched enclaves is bounded [110]. To control N
2
, the ad-
versary needs to control a number of SGX machines. Meanwhile, we can also
employ existing sybil defenses in our network to control the number of byzan-
tine nodes, e.g., defenses using computation puzzles or proof of work [83,167].
The details of deploying these sybil defenses are beyond the scope of this chap-
ter.
S5: Connected Peers. For simplicity of design and to follow the standard model
used in previous works, we assume that all the peers in the network are con-
nected to each other. However this assumption can be relaxed such that the
network is a sparse but expander or random graph. This will guarantee that
there is a path in between any two honest nodes. Thus, the direct point-to-point
broadcast in our protocol can be replaced with a flooding algorithm to broadcast
messages.
5.10.2 Applications
Both ERB and ERNG primitives can be used as building blocks to solve a wide
range of problems in distributed systems. In the following, we review some of
the most prominent applications.
Random Beacons. A random beacon protocol [202] offers a way to generate
uniformly random strings that are unknown to the nodes before their generation.
Random beacons have been extensively studied as they have numerous applica-
tions in cryptography and information security, such as secure contract signing
protocols [131,202], voting schemes [184], zero-knowledge protocols [68,143],
and cryptocurrency protocols [172]. Building random beacons is a difficult task.
Practical solutions usually leverage a trusted third party [31, 54], or utilize pub-
lic data available on the Internet such as financial data [106]. However, the data
from these services has to be trusted and certified, which unfortunately repre-
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sents a strong assumption in practice. Recently, researchers have also proposed
several protocols to generate random beacons by using Bitcoin as a source of
publicly-verifiable randomness [75, 82]. However, the adversary can bias the
beacon by introducing a new monetary cost. With ERNG, the underlying sys-
tem can easily generate a common unbiased random number in the network.
Random Walks. In order to build a more robust P2P topology, random walk is
an essential primitive to distribute nodes uniformly in the network to maintain
an expander topology. Guerraoui et al. [144] build a virtual overlay on top
of the physical nodes, in order to maintain a robust P2P topology. Each virtual
node represents a cluster that consists of a set of physical nodes such that at least
2
3
of the nodes are honest. This guarantees that decisions or agreements of the
cluster hold on the behalf of the entire physical nodes of the network. Ensuring
that the virtual nodes are honest will guarantee the correctness of the random
walks against byzantine nodes. However, this is not sufficient and in order to
determine the next hop in the random walk, an unbiased random number is
required. With ERNG, we present an efficient solution for this issue in such a
way that physical nodes in the cluster can generate a common unbiased random
number to designate the next hop, and therefore maintain a robust topology.
Shared Key Generation. By performing ERNG, every honest node will share
a common unbiased random number that can be used as a key, salt or initializa-
tion vector for symmetric cryptography. ERNG can also be used as a building
block for distributed key generation (DKG) where the peers want to compute
a shared public and private key. DKG has several applications and in particu-
lar in threshold cryptography, we refer the reader to the works by Gennaro et
al. [140, 141].
Random Load Balancing. Random load balancing is generally performed by
a centralized server to distribute tasks to slave servers [111, 203]. A centralized
server is often considered as a single point of failure, which is usually the pri-
mary target of attackers. Once the centralized server is compromised, the whole
171
load balancing system fail as well. With ERNG, we distribute the decision gen-
eration process to a cluster of nodes instead of a centralized server. When a new
request or a task comes to any node, the cluster of nodes evaluate ERNG to gen-
erate an unbiased common random number and send the decision to the target
slave server. Once the slave server receives adequate confirmations from (say)
half of the nodes, it can take upon the task and evaluate it. This way, even if
half of the nodes are either compromised/failed, the load balancing system can
still work correctly. Note that the nodes can a-priori pre-process many random
numbers to speed-up the process. The random numbers can be generated and
stored in the hard drive using sealing technique enabled by the SGX.
5.11 Related Work
Reliable broadcast has been extensively investigated in various adversarial mod-
els. In our work, we show how Intel SGX improves the efficiency of existing
protocols in these adversarial models, renewing interest in studying these proto-
cols with SGX-based implementations.
Reliable Broadcast: Reliable broadcast has been extensively studied since the
1980s, and is closely related to the problem of byzantine agreement (BA). Sev-
eral excellent surveys on the problem are available [160,220]. Byzantine agree-
ment can also achieve reliable broadcast [88,92,94,155,176,185,201,220]. We
have discussed the related approaches in Chapter 2.
Researchers have proposed byzantine fault-tolerant algorithms using trusted
services, such as by using trusted computing primitives, primarily focusing on
making PBFT more efficient [73, 98, 105, 107, 108, 166, 170, 221]. These works
have observed similar relation to crash-fault-tolerant protocols, as we have. For
example, Chun et al. introduce an attested append-only memory (A2M) to re-
move the ability of adversarial replicas to equivocate without detection, which




[105]. Liu et al. further pro-
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pose FastBFT using message aggregation to reduce message complexity from
O(N2) to O(N) [170]. However, these works have concentrated on handling
asynchronous protocols with weak time assumptions like PBFT. In this paper,
in contrast to previous approaches, we work on the round-based synchronous
model. Our work extends these ideas to detecting and remediating failures of
synchronous network assumptions (e.g. our lockstep execution and halt-on-
divergence). Additionally, we investigate the use of our blind-box execution
primitive in our new distributed RNG protocol which is bias-resistant, and more
efficient using secure sampling for cluster creation. We leave the extension
of applying our properties and primitives to asynchronous protocols for future
work.
As it is difficult to tolerateN/2 byzantine nodes withO(N2) communication
complexity, researchers studied a weaker model, dubbed omission model. We
study one of these models called general-omission. Perry et al. and Parvedy
et al. propose protocols that can achieve O(N3) communication complexity,
tolerate N
2
faulty nodes, and terminate in min{f + 2, t + 1} rounds [193, 198].
Chandra et al. present a protocol achieving O(N2) communication complexity,
but terminating with 2t+ 1 rounds if optimizations apply [99]. In this work, we
use SGX features to reduce the byzantine model to the general omission model,
and further propose ERB to achieve min{f + 2, t + 2} round complexity and
O(N2) communication complexity.
Distributed RNG: Generating common coins in a distributed manner for ran-
domized BA in asynchronous networks can also be used for generating unbiased
random numbers [77,93,201]. However, these protocols either require a trusted
dealer to set up the initial states of different nodes or pre-distribute data to the
nodes in the network. Other works employing asynchronous verifiable secret
sharing (AVSS) protocols do not have the trusted dealer, but can probabilisti-
cally execute with errors [74, 88, 96, 217]. Most of these works employ some
cryptographic primitives that, in most case, can be considered heavy-weight and
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performance unfriendly. Awerbuch et al. propose a solution that tolerates up
to N
6
byzantine nodes, with O(N) round complexity and O(N3) communica-
tion complexity [67] to generate a random number with a constant bias. Other
works, such as Andrychowicz et al.’s one, generate a common random num-
ber based on proof of work [65] with O(N4) communication complexity, but
the output can eventually be biased. Moreover, the large communication cost
for most of these approaches prevents scalability to a large number of nodes.
We present more efficient (with O(N logN) communication complexity) and
unbiased RNG generation for the synchronous network case.
5.12 Summary
The recent availability of Intel SGX in commodity laptops and servers provides
a promising research direction for advancing the area of P2P systems. Our main
observation is that leveraging SGX features can restrict a byzantine model to a
general-omission model in synchronous systems. We highlight that using SGX
we can improve the efficiency of P2P protocols such as reliable broadcast and




While peer-to-peer techniques are introduced to the web infrastructure, the pri-
vacy issues in P2P systems are also brought to this new P2P web. In this the-
sis, we first investigate the inference attacks in peer-assisted CDNs on top of
web overlays, which can infer users’ online activities such as browsing history.
Moreover, we propose an anonymous peer-assisted CDN (APAC), which em-
ploys onion-routing techniques enabling users to be unidentifiable within a large
set of other users. We also design a region-based circuit selection algorithm
for APAC to reduce performance overhead and provide options for developers
to balance the tradeoff between privacy and performance. Second, to thwart
attacks via long-term global traffic analysis, we propose an oblivious peer-to-
peer content sharing system (OBLIVP2P) using distributed oblivious RAM and
other cryptographic primitives to hide users’ online activities (or access pat-
terns). Lastly, the core utilities and security / privacy guarantees of P2P pro-
tocols are based on the robustness of these protocols. With the new hardware
primitive called Intel SGX, we ensure the robustness of fundamental P2P pro-
tocols in the malicious (or byzantine) setting, which is not considered in APAC
and OBLIVP2P. By using SGX features, we further improve the efficiency of
P2P protocols, which can be widely used for other P2P operations such as ran-
dom walks, shared key generation and load balancer algorithms. We release
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the source code of our implementations for the three works, which are available
online [4, 32, 34].
Future Work. OBLIVP2P is the first attempt to adapt ORAM technique to
P2P systems to conceal data access patterns. However, OBLIVP2P has several
shortcomings, e.g., having a centralized trusted tracker and low throughput as
well as only working in the honest-but-curious setting. We have demonstrated
that SGX can be employed to propose robust P2P primitives. For future work,
we are planning to leverage SGX features to re-design OBLIVP2P to achieve
decentralization of the trusted tracker and better throughput with low latency
against byzantine adversaries. In the meantime, the majority of current privacy-
preserving P2P systems do not have proper incentive mechanisms to engage
users to join these system. To address this challenge, we can use secure execu-
tion and remote attestation provided by SGX-enabled CPUs to fairly quantify
the transferred data to reward the nodes involved in the fetch / eviction pro-
cesses of OBLIVP2P. Furthermore, we can integrate our SGX-based solutions
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